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Accidents · NTSB DCA15CA129 · Final report

Mcdonnell Douglas DC 9 83(MD-83) accident near St Petersburg, Florida, June 8, 2015

On June 8, 2015 at about 9:00 pm local time, a Mcdonnell Douglas DC 9 83(MD-83), registered N869GA, was involved in an accident during taxi (from runway) near St Petersburg, Florida (St Pete-Clearwater airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 1 person was seriously injured and 7 people had minor injuries; 137 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

evacuation of the aircraft due to reported, but unverified, aircraft condition and poor communication between Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting personnel and the flight crew.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 8, 2015 · about 9:00 pm local time
Place
St Petersburg, Florida · St Pete-Clearwater · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured and 7 people had minor injuries; 137 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Mcdonnell Douglas DC 9 83(MD-83) 83 · all DC 9 83(MD-83)s on the register
Registration
N869GA · registry record · serial 53294
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

During initial climb after departure from St Pete-Clearwater International Airport (PIE), St. Petersburg, Florida, the flight attendants (FA) notified the flight crew of an odor they described as that of "burning rubber". The flight returned to PIE where two Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) vehicles responded and met the airplane as it stopped on the taxiway after landing. The captain communicated with ARFF personnel over Air Traffic Control (ATC) ground control frequency. According to statements, the ARFF Lieutenant advised that there was smoke coming from the #1 engine and requested that the crew shut down the engine so they could examine the airplane. The firefighter in ARFF vehicle 3 stated that while the Lieutenant was outside the vehicle examining the airplane, the flight crew reported their intent to evacuate the airplane and the firefighter advised the crew to hold off on the evacuation while he contacted the Lieutenant. According to flight crew statements, the crew asked for verification of this request three times without hearing a response. Flight crew statements indicated the flight deck crew did not communicate with the cabin crew during this time to assess the conditions in the cabin. The crew stated that they believed the delay in receiving response to their radio calls indicated ARFF personnel were busy addressing a safety concern and after hearing no further transmissions, the crew completed the evacuation checklist and advised passengers and cabin crew to proceed with evacuation. During the evacuation, one passenger sustained a serious injury (fractured wrist) and six passengers and one cabin crew member received minor injuries. Although ARFF and the flight deck crew established a direct line of communication, they lacked prompt, clear, and concise communication. Following this event, Allegiant Air implemented a Captain Leadership training program and established joint flight deck and cabin crew resource management training.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fire/smoke (non-impact) during initial climb
  2. Evacuation during taxi (from runway) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Flight crew
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Emergency services personnel
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Interpretation/understanding › Flight crew
  • factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Flight crew

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 7,162 hours in all; 1,199 in this make and model; 463 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: May 17, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 7,283 hours in all; 492 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: November 12, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 48,214 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, May 5, 2015
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney JT8D-219 (turbofan); 48,242 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney JT8D-219 (turbofan); 49,201 hours total
  • Operator: Allegiant Air LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: PIE St Petersburg FL
  • Destination: HGR Hagerstown MD
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 36R, 9,730 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 010° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 91°F (33°C), dew point 66°F (19°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.98 inHg

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi13
Flight crew2
Passengers16132

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

3 documents, released by the NTSB on April 8, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.