

Safety Event Report - Summary

Number		Status	New	Event Date	6/8/2015 4:50:00 PM
Type	Safety Event Report - Flight Operations			Reported By	Kinzer, Jason
Resp. Dept			Flight Ops		
Subject	Airborne Smoke Event and Emergency Evacuation				

Employee Number		Reporter Email	
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Flight Number	864	Tail Number	869GA	Aircraft Type	
Departure Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport				
Scheduled Arrival Airport	HGR - Hagerstown Reg				
Landing Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport				

Seat assignment during flight	CA	Primary flight duties during time of event			Pilot Flying
What is your familiarity with the other pilot?	More than one day	Name of ATC Facility	KPIE Tower and Ground Control	Type of ATC Facility	Tower
ATC Control at Beginning of Event		On SID/STAR/RNAV			

Approximate Location of Event	5 miles North of the KPIE airport at 2,500 feet.	Phase of Flight at Start of Event	05. Take off		
Nearest NAVAID	PIE	Altitude (ft)	2500	MSL or AGL?	MSL

Meteorological Conditions	VMC	Lighting Condition at Time of Event	Daylight
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Aircraft Damage or Encounter (EV25)	Other Aircraft Damage or Encounter
Aircraft Malfunction Event (EV26)	
Aircraft Malfunction Other (EV32)	
Aircraft Mechanical Issues (EV27)	
Airspace Deviation (EV19)	
Airworthiness/Documentation Event (EV03)	
Altitude Deviation (EV12)	
Approach/Arrival Problems (EV21)	
Charts (EV31)	
Complications with Airport Facilities (EV24)	
Coordination/Communication Issue (EV01)	Other Coordination/Communication Issue
Course Deviation (EV13)	
Datalink Coordination/Communication Event (EV02)	
Departure Problems (EV11)	
Evacuation Event (EV36)	
Excursion (EV09)	
Fire, Smoke or Fumes (EV33)	Cabin
Flight Diversion/Air-Ground Return (EV20)	Return to field/Air return
Fuel Event (EV07)	
Go Around (EV22)	
Illness or Injury Event (EV34)	Illness/Injury Passenger
Incursion (EV10)	
Landing Event (EV23)	
Operation in Non-compliance - FARs, Policy/Procedures (EV04)	

Power plant/Engine (EV30)	
Propeller/Rotor (EV29)	
Rejected Takeoff (EV05)	
Safety Event / Concern (EV37)	
Security Concern (EV35)	
Speed Deviation (EV14)	
Structures (EV28)	
Takeoff Deviations (EV08)	
Terrain Proximity Event (EV16)	
Traffic Proximity Event (EV17)	
Uncommanded/Unintended State or Loss of Control (EV15)	
Weather Issue/Weather Proximity Event (EV18)	
Weight and Balance (EV06)	
Other Type of Event (EV38)	

Aircraft Handling / Configuration/Performance Control (IN06)	
Automation Management / Configuration (IN09)	
Communication - Pilot-to-ATC (IN02)	
Communication - Pilot-to-Operations (IN03)	Flight crew communication with ground crew
Communication - Pilot-to-Pilot (IN01)	
Cross Verification or Monitoring (IN10)	
Documentation Error / Issue (IN04)	
Flight Crew Coordination (IN11)	
Navigation / Position Control (IN07)	
Personal Flight Crew Issues (IN12)	
Procedural Issue / Error (IN05)	
Security Procedures / Errors (IN13)	
System, Instrument or Radio Settings or Interpretation (IN08)	
Other Internal Issues or Crew Errors (IN14)	

Adverse weather Conditions/Environmental Issue (EX10)	
Aircraft Systems Malfunction / Complication (EX11)	
Airport Conditions (EX08)	Other airport conditions
ATC Complications/Errors (EX01)	Other ATC complications
Cabin Crew / Passenger Issue (EX07)	
Complications Due to Airline Operations (EX06)	
Dispatch Complications / Errors (EX02)	
Ground Operations Complications / Errors (EX03)	
Load Planning Complications / Errors (EX04)	
Maintenance Complications / Errors (EX05)	
Security Issue or Concern (EX12)	
Traffic Congestion or Conditions (EX09)	
Other External / Contributing Factors (EX13)	Other external/contributing factors

Narrative about the Event
On Monday, 08 June, 2015, Allegiant flight 864 experienced smoke/fumes in the cabin immediately after takeoff and executed an emergency return and evacuation upon landing. Operating from KPGE to KHGR after an hour long delay due to an ATC groundstop, First Officer Neil Godbole and I received a call from the cabin immediately after takeoff at approximately 2,500msl. FO Godbole was the PM for this leg and was advised by Flight Attendant Ryan Hershman that all of the cabin crew were smelling the odor of smoke and fumes described as "burning rubber". FO Godbole asked Hershman to "standby" and conveyed the same detail to me as the PF. I immediately advised FO Godbole that "I have the flight controls still (I was hand flying) and now the

radios, QRH for smoke/fumes of an unknown origin, please..." FO Godbole advised Hershman that he would call him back and initiated the QRH procedure as I advised Tampa Departure that "Allegiant 864 needed to level off at five or six thousand to run a procedure." Tampa Departure obliged and we leveled at five thousand, engaging the autopilot to further effect the QRH as a crew. After performing the initial QRH items pertaining to "cabin" (not cockpit), FO Godbole queried Hershman further and was advised that "the smoke/fumes were not clearing..." With this information, I advised Tampa Departure that "Allegiant 864 was declaring an emergency- flight attendants were reporting smoke in the cabin" and that we "needed to return to St. Petersburg..." Tampa Departure controllers then cleared us to KPIE "via direct" and were immediately accommodating. With FO Godbole coordinating communications from cockpit to cabin, I initiated left traffic for the immediate return to KPIE. With QRH procedures complete, I asked FO Godbole to advise the cabin crew that I did not expect to have passengers brace. FO Godbole also advised passengers via the PA that "we were returning to St. Petersburg, as the cabin crew had alerted us to the odor of smoke/fumes in the cabin..." Further, FO Godbole advised the passengers to "be prepared to follow the instructions of the cabin crew", and that "while all was seemingly normal with the aircraft, they would see Airport Rescue Fire Fighting personnel and equipment come alongside the aircraft after landing..." FO Godbole and I then discussed the imminent overweight landing and the fact that the smoke/fumes did not seem to be clearing, which necessitated the overweight landing. The aircraft was then landed on rwy 36R at approximately 141,500 pounds with a vertical descent rate no greater than -600fpm and "medium auto-brakes" selected. The landing was soft and unremarkable. We cleared runway 36R, exiting left at the end onto taxiway "A" and set the parking brake. I then made a PA to the passengers stating, "Ladies and gentlemen, this is Captain Jason, remain seated and please follow the instructions of your cabin crew..." Neither FO Godbole or myself anticipated that an evacuation was imminent and we both expected to taxi back to the terminal after ARFF personnel completed their duties. As ARFF emergency vehicles approached the aircraft, communication was established on the KPIE ground control frequency with the permission of the KPIE ATC specialist, and ARFF personnel asked us, "what would you like us to do?" FO Godbole and I were both puzzled by this seemingly unfamiliar firefighter's question, and I responded by asking them to "please tell us what you see- do you see smoke, fire or any type of scorching on the aircraft?" There was a pause, followed by a response from ARFF Personnel that they were "using FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared) to examine the aircraft" I asked the ARFF personnel if they "preferred the aircraft cleaned up with flaps and slats retracted for this procedure?", however, this transmission was met with "Allegiant, you have smoke coming from your left engine..." I asked ARFF personnel, "verify that we have smoke coming from the left engine?" To my best recall, this transmission went unresponded to, and I asked FO Godbole to advise ARFF personnel and KPIE ATC specialists that we'll be evacuating on taxiway alpha as I advised the cabin crew to "standby, standby, standby!" I then asked FO Godbole for the "evacuation checklist". During execution of the evacuation checklist, an unfamiliar voice came over the frequency declaring, "hold off on the evacuation..." To say that FO Godbole and I were perplexed by this obscure order would be an understatement, and FO Godbole immediately replied, "who is asking us to hold off on the evacuation?" This went ignored. I then asked again, "who is asking Allegiant to hold off on the evacuation, please?" This second query also went ignored. I then asked a third time, "Who is asking Allegiant not to evacuate and why?" Yet again, this transmission went ignored. I then directed FO Godbole to continue with the evacuation checklist, as the last transmission we received from ARFF personnel was that there was smoke coming from the number one engine. KPIE ATC specialists then attempted an intervention, declaring that "Okay, everybody, please identify yourselves in your transmissions so that Allegiant can understand what is going on out there" followed by, "ARFF two, Allegiant is trying to call you..." This transmission went ignored. KPIE ATC specialists then asked, "any emergency vehicle, any emergency vehicle on frequency, please respond to Allegiant, they're preparing to evacuate!" This transmission went ignored, at which point I picked up the PA and ordered the cabin crew to "evacuate, evacuate, evacuate!" We never received any further transmissions from ARFF personnel and FO Godbole and I believed that this could be because they were fighting a fire. Further, we never learned who ordered the "hold off on evacuating" transmission. The evacuation went very efficiently, and cabin crew performance was nothing short of impressive. FO Godbole evacuated and offered assistance to evacuating passengers superbly. At the end of the evacuation, only one passenger, Flight Attendant Natalee Negron and myself remained. This passenger seemed quite scared, asking Negron and myself not to leave him behind. We assured him that we were not leaving him, however it was at this point that Negron informed me that he was paralyzed from the waist down. I said to the passenger, "I'm going to bear hug you, I want you to throw your arms around me and I'll carry you..." Terrified, the passenger informed me that he "was osteoporotic in his legs" and that "moving abruptly could easily break my legs, please don't break my legs!" I then embraced the passenger from behind, lifted him from his seat and Negron carefully embraced his legs. Together, we carried the passenger down the aisle to the L1 door and gently lowered him to the cabin floor at the slide. The passenger then stated that he "could take it from here", and with ARFF personnel waiting at the bottom of the slide, he evacuated, followed by Negron. I then turned and walked from the L1 door aftward through the cabin calling out to "anybody that could hear my voice" (cabin visibility was impaired in no way). Upon reaching the aft cabin door and after ensuring that nobody remained aboard, I evacuated via the tail slide. Passengers congregated approximately 100 yards northeast of the aircraft at the direction of ARFF and I advised LAS dispatch and PIE Operations that we had evacuated and were awaiting a company response at the end of runway 36R. While a multitude of ARFF and medical personnel tended to passengers, PIE Allegiant Operations personnel seemed overwhelmed, and the response was very slow. By approximately one hour after evacuating ARFF personnel advised me that if I "didn't do more to get these people out of the sun and to shelter, we were going to have an entirely different set of medical emergencies..." I advised PIE Operations of this accordingly. After all passengers were transported back to the terminal building, my crew and I were transported back to PIE Operations and company debriefings began. All of us were later sent for DOT drug and alcohol testing per SOP.

Narrative about Possible Preventative Measures

This was a very dynamic situation with a multitude of minor failures at hand; after our evacuation event, I learned that the cabin crew had complained of a similar burning odor on the previous leg, and had advised that aircrew accordingly. I do not have any insight as to how this was received by that aircrew. However, there was no entry to this effect in the aircraft logbook upon FO Godbole and I taking command of ship N869GA at the beginning of our shift. KPIE ARFF seemed disorganized, and unprepared for our emergency return. Exacerbating and predating our evacuation was the fact that ARFF personnel became unreachable via radio, even as the KPIE ATC specialists also pleaded for them to answer the radio calls from Allegiant emergency aircraft. Finally, a more affirmative response from PIE Operations personnel for, and pertaining to, our traumatized passengers would have eased considerable angst, post evacuation. As passengers sat for upwards of an hour in the sun beside their stricken aircraft, many pleaded with ARFF and Allegiant aircrew to retrieve their personal effects as media helicopters circled overhead. I feel that this left the already traumatized passenger disgruntled and contributed to negative publicity. Passengers were later shuttled, fifteen at a time, back to the terminal building via two buses. This process prolonged passenger discomfort and seemed inadequate for my cabin crew that spent the entire time engaging passengers and attempting to ensure their comfort after their experience.

Safety Event Report - Summary

Number		Status	New	Event Date	6/8/2015 4:50:00 PM
Type	Safety Event Report - Flight Operations			Reported By	Godbole, Neil
Resp. Dept			Flight Ops		
Subject	Smoke in cabin with subsequent passenger evacuation				

Employee Number		Reporter Email	
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Flight Number	864	Tail Number	869GA	Aircraft Type	
Departure Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport				
Scheduled Arrival Airport	HGR - Hagerstown Reg				
Landing Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport				

Seat assignment during flight	FO	Primary flight duties during time of event			Pilot Monitoring
What is your familiarity with the other pilot?	More than one day	Name of ATC Facility	KPIE Tower/Ground	Type of ATC Facility	Tower
ATC Control at Beginning of Event		Uncontrolled/other			

Approximate Location of Event	3NM North of runway 36R	Phase of Flight at Start of Event	05. Take off		
Nearest NAVAID	PIE	Altitude (ft)	2500	MSL or AGL?	AGL

Meteorological Conditions	VMC	Lighting Condition at Time of Event	Daylight
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Aircraft Damage or Encounter (EV25)	
Aircraft Malfunction Event (EV26)	
Aircraft Malfunction Other (EV32)	Aircraft Malfunction Other
Aircraft Mechanical Issues (EV27)	
Airspace Deviation (EV19)	
Airworthiness/Documentation Event (EV03)	
Altitude Deviation (EV12)	
Approach/Arrival Problems (EV21)	
Charts (EV31)	
Complications with Airport Facilities (EV24)	
Coordination/Communication Issue (EV01)	Other Coordination/Communication Issue
Course Deviation (EV13)	
Datalink Coordination/Communication Event (EV02)	
Departure Problems (EV11)	
Evacuation Event (EV36)	Evacuation Event
Excursion (EV09)	
Fire, Smoke or Fumes (EV33)	Cabin
Flight Diversion/Air-Ground Return (EV20)	
Fuel Event (EV07)	
Go Around (EV22)	
Illness or Injury Event (EV34)	
Incursion (EV10)	
Landing Event (EV23)	Other Landing Event
Operation in Non-compliance - FARs, Policy/Procedures (EV04)	

Power plant/Engine (EV30)	
Propeller/Rotor (EV29)	
Rejected Takeoff (EV05)	
Safety Event / Concern (EV37)	
Security Concern (EV35)	
Speed Deviation (EV14)	
Structures (EV28)	
Takeoff Deviations (EV08)	
Terrain Proximity Event (EV16)	
Traffic Proximity Event (EV17)	
Uncommanded/Unintended State or Loss of Control (EV15)	
Weather Issue/Weather Proximity Event (EV18)	
Weight and Balance (EV06)	
Other Type of Event (EV38)	

Aircraft Handling / Configuration/Performance Control (IN06)	
Automation Management / Configuration (IN09)	
Communication - Pilot-to-ATC (IN02)	
Communication - Pilot-to-Operations (IN03)	Flight crew communication with ground crew
Communication - Pilot-to-Pilot (IN01)	
Cross Verification or Monitoring (IN10)	
Documentation Error / Issue (IN04)	
Flight Crew Coordination (IN11)	
Navigation / Position Control (IN07)	
Personal Flight Crew Issues (IN12)	
Procedural Issue / Error (IN05)	
Security Procedures / Errors (IN13)	
System, Instrument or Radio Settings or Interpretation (IN08)	
Other Internal Issues or Crew Errors (IN14)	

Adverse weather Conditions/Environmental Issue (EX10)	
Aircraft Systems Malfunction / Complication (EX11)	
Airport Conditions (EX08)	
ATC Complications/Errors (EX01)	
Cabin Crew / Passenger Issue (EX07)	
Complications Due to Airline Operations (EX06)	
Dispatch Complications / Errors (EX02)	
Ground Operations Complications / Errors (EX03)	
Load Planning Complications / Errors (EX04)	
Maintenance Complications / Errors (EX05)	
Security Issue or Concern (EX12)	
Traffic Congestion or Conditions (EX09)	
Other External / Contributing Factors (EX13)	

Narrative about the Event
Normal takeoff of runway 36R in KPIE upon reaching 2500 ft received a chime for the FA's. I answered the call and they told me that they smelled burning rubber and that it was strong. I told them to standby as we were too low and I would call them back. Upon reaching 5000ft Captain Kinzer told me to call them back and said that he had the flight controls and radios. I called the FA's back and asked if they could still smell the burning smell. They responded with yes, I relayed this information to Captain Kinzer who determined that we needed to run a QRH for smoke/fumes of unknown origin. So I ran that particular QRH after competition of it I then again called back to the FA's and asked if they could still smell it, they responded again with yes. At that

point an emergency was declared and we promptly returned to the field. We ran a return checklist and I briefed the passengers on why we were returning to KPIE. I then once again called the FA's to inform them as to how much time remained in flight and that we were not planning on evacuating. At this point Captain Kinzer and I determined that we were going to have an overweight landing and we discussed that. The landing took place without any further event and we cleared 36R at taxiway Alpha. Upon clearing we asked Crash Fire Rescue to examine the exterior of the aircraft. They responded with, What are we looking for and Captain Kinzer gave them some examples. They then responded with you have smoke coming out of the number 1 engine. At this point we commenced the exaction procedure and I told ground that we were evacuating. Immediately after an unidentified voice came over and said DO NOT EVACUATE. We then proceeded to query, Who said that identify yourself. We received no response then ground queried with no response then I again asked who was that to no avail. Finally Captain Kinzer asked when he received no response we completed the evacuation and quickly and safely got all passengers off the aircraft. I went out L1 and assisted in making sure all passengers were going to the meeting area that the fire department had set up. I then noticed that people were on the wing in need of help, I ran to the backside of the wing and help all the passengers safely egress down and told them where to go. After all passenger where clear from my side of the aircraft I also followed to make sure no one sustained any injuries or needed help. After a passenger count was done and everyone accounted for airport ops arranged for busses to bring all the passengers to the terminal.

Narrative about Possible Preventative Measures

communication with Crash Fire Rescue was poor and unclear. Ops quickness on transportation was untimely.

Safety Event Report Summary

Number		Status	New	Event Date	6/8/2015 4:20:00 PM
Type	A. Safety Event Report - Inflight	Recorded By	Bush, Aubry		
Resp. Dept	Inflight	Subject	emergency landing/evac		
Tail Number	869GA	Flight Number	864	Location of Event	Airborne
Phase of Flight	Initial Climb	Departure Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport		
Scheduled Arrival Airport	HGR - Hagerstown Reg	Landing Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport		
LFA	Hershman, Ryan			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA2	Bush, Aubry			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA3	Negron, Natalee			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA4	Ivey, Georgia			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA5				Assisted or Involved in Event?	
FA6				Assisted or Involved in Event?	
Cabin Event		Cabin Equipment Discrepancy			
Passenger Misconduct		Prohibited Items			
Security Event		Suspicious Event / Activities			
Other (explain)	emergency landing/evac				
Passenger Event		Actions Taken			
Passenger Injury / Illness		Action Taken			
Smoking Event		Action Taken			
Emergency Equipment Used / Discrepancy					

Narrative about the Event

at aprox. 1620 flight 864 with scheduled service from PIE to HGR pushed back from the gate aprox one hour late due to ATC hold. Within the first few minutes of initial take off, both myself (Aubry Bush FA 2) and FA 4 (Georgia Ivey) smelled a faint smell of burning rubber. Immediately LFA (Ryan Hershman) called back to inquire about the smell. I advised him that we did smell it but that the smell was faint. He informed me that he was advising the flight deck. FO Neil communicated with us two more times (for a total of three conversations via inter phone). The first time gathering information from myself and Ryan. And the second time advising that we would "not evacuate but would return to clearwater and would be met by emergency personnel." He then made an announcement to the pax on the PA that we were returning to clearwater due to FA's smelling smoke. He advised pax that upon landing the vessel would be met by emergency personnel and to maintain there seats and follow FA instructions. Shortly after landing, we received command to "standby, standby, standby!" FA's began to chant commands and started standby procedures awaiting our next command. We then heard the PA command "evacuate, evacuate, evacuate!" We then began evacuation sequence the tail-cone was safe and I dropped the cone and blew the slide and began the evacuation. once the flow of pax ceased, I returned to the cabin. FA 4(Georgia) made the cabin sweep meeting FA 3 in the forward while I grabbed emergency equipment. FA 4 (Georgia) returned and advised me cabin clear. we went to our assigned doors and went down the slide. Once i got on the ground, I noticed that the pax had gathered in the grassy area just off the runway. I walked around aircraft left to see if everyone was away from the aircraft. At that point, I saw

pax helping a paralyzed pax off the L1 slide. I then proceeded over to the operations vehicle to make room for the paralyzed pax to sit. Once he was safe in the vehicle I continued on to the main gathering of pax and met up with LFA Ryan who was asking pax to move away from the runway and go further back towards the fence line. I coordinated with the emergency responders to ensure we had a designated area for the pax. I was advised the the fence line was good, and that a tent would be put up for shade. also, to try to keep pax out of the grass area since airport operations had advised that there was snakes in the grass. pax gathered in the gravel area at the fence line and we identified medical personnel and injured pax. FA 4 Georgia stayed with the nurse and tended to injured pax while myself and Ryan performed a pax count. Once we finished, I assisted with getting pax onto the shuttles and to ensure that all pax were accounted for.

Narrative about Possible Preventative Measures

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Safety Event Report Summary

Number		Status	New	Event Date	6/8/2015 5:00:00 PM
Type	A. Safety Event Report - Inflight	Recorded By	Negron, Natalee		
Resp. Dept	Inflight	Subject	Evacuation		
Tail Number	869GA	Flight Number	864	Location of Event	On Aircraft
Phase of Flight	Takeoff	Departure Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport		
Scheduled Arrival Airport	HGR - Hagerstown Reg	Landing Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport		
LFA	Hershman, Ryan			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA2	Bush, Aubry			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA3	Negron, Natalee			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA4	Ivey, Georgia			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA5				Assisted or Involved in Event?	
FA6				Assisted or Involved in Event?	
Cabin Event	Cabin Evacuation	Cabin Equipment Discrepancy			
Passenger Misconduct		Prohibited Items			
Security Event		Suspicious Event / Activities			
Other (explain)					
Passenger Event		Actions Taken			
Passenger Injury / Illness		Action Taken			
Smoking Event		Action Taken			
Emergency Equipment Used / Discrepancy	Evacuation Slide / Slide Raft, FAK, Megaphone				

Narrative about the Event

During our 2nd leg of the day, OMA-PIE, we all had smelled a strong odor of burning rubber. Being LFA this leg, I contacted the flight deck and advised them of it. They replied with there were no indications of a fire and that it was probably just the smell of the tires since we had a high AOA on take off. The smell had dissipated and we continued to PIE with no incident. After an ATC hold in PIE for flight 864-2, we were cleared for takeoff. Immediately after takeoff the same odor appeared, it seemed to be stronger in the front of the cabin this time. The LFA contacted the AFT FAs and confirmed that they were smelling it as well. He then contacted the flight deck advising them of the odor. After a short conversation, we were told we would be returning to PIE and declaring an emergency. No bracing would be necessary. We should expect emergency vehicles to inspect the aircraft upon landing. The FO made an announcement letting the passengers know that we were returning to PIE due to an odor in the cabin, expect to see emergency vehicles outside the windows. Once on the ground and off of the runway, the LFA could see the emergency vehicles around the aircraft. An announcement was made to the passengers by the flight deck to remain in their seat and follow the directions of the crew. We then heard the command "standby, standby, standby". The LFA and I got out of our jumpseat and started assessing our primary exits and shouting "remove seat belts, remain seated". Shortly after we received the "evacuate, evacuate, evacuate" command. I then opened my exit door, ensured the slide was inflated and the gust lock was engaged and began shouting my evacuation commands. Passengers followed the commands and began exiting the aircraft. There was a gap in the flow of passengers so I

looked down the aisle and saw a wheelchair passenger, carrying her suitcase, trying to make her way to the front of the aircraft. I ran to her and removed the suitcase from her hand and had her put her arm over my shoulder so I could walk her to my exit. Once the flow of passengers stopped again, I looked in the cabin and saw that only my aisle chair passenger was left. FA4 had swept the cabin up until where the passenger was sitting, she told me the rest of the cabin was clear. I then told the passenger that I would be lifting him to the exit. He was unable to move his legs completely and that he had severe osteoporosis in both legs and someone needed to carry them. I noticed the CA standing behind me and I told him to grab the passenger from behind, under his arms, and help me get him to the exit. I carried the man's legs and walked backwards toward L1 since it was a larger opening. I asked the LFA to start calling for people at the bottom of his slide to assist the man. I was able to sit the man down right in front of the slide and he pushed himself to the edge. I ensured his legs were straight out and shouted to the people at the bottom to catch him, he cannot move his legs. There were about 10 passengers at the bottom waiting to assist. I went behind the passenger and held him from under the arms and slowly guided him down the slide and let go. The passengers at the bottom caught him with no issues. After I cleared the rest of my cabin, I grabbed what emergency equipment was left, a POB & flashlight and exited the aircraft from R1. Once on the ground, everyone had already been walked away from the aircraft. The LFA and FA2 did a head count, everyone was accounted for. I walked through the crowd asking if everyone was ok and answering questions about their belongings. Everyone seemed to be in good spirits and was very thankful. Airport Operations, EMS and Fire and Rescue teams were all out helping. The airport started to shuttle the passengers back to the terminal. I spoke with the aisle chair passenger and his family quite a bit during the time on the ground. They were doing okay and I was able to have a man from the Fire and Rescue team retrieve their bag onboard that had medical equipment they needed. Once the aircraft was deemed safe to enter, all crew bags were taken off and we proceeded to the terminal.

Narrative about Possible Preventative Measures

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Safety Event Report Summary

Number		Status	New	Event Date	6/8/2015 12:00:00 AM
Type	A. Safety Event Report - Inflight	Recorded By	Hershman, Ryan		
Resp. Dept	Inflight	Subject	Flight 864 Evaluation		
Tail Number	869GA	Flight Number	864	Location of Event	On Aircraft
Phase of Flight	Takeoff	Departure Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport		
Scheduled Arrival Airport	HGR - Hagerstown Reg	Landing Airport	PIE - St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport		
LFA	Hershman, Ryan			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA2	Bush, Aubry			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA3	Negron, Natalee			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA4	Ivey, Georgia			Assisted or Involved in Event?	Yes
FA5				Assisted or Involved in Event?	
FA6				Assisted or Involved in Event?	
Cabin Event	Cabin Evacuation	Cabin Equipment Discrepancy			
Passenger Misconduct		Prohibited Items			
Security Event		Suspicious Event / Activities			
Other (explain)					
Passenger Event		Actions Taken			
Passenger Injury / Illness	Other (Add Details Below)	Action Taken			
Smoking Event		Action Taken			
Emergency Equipment Used / Discrepancy	AED, Emergency Flashlight, EMK, Evacuation Slide / Slide Raft, FAK, Megaphone, POB				

Narrative about the Event

On 06/08/2015 our crew was assigned to work an Omaha, Nebraska and Hagerstown, Maryland double beginning and ending in St. Petersburg Florida. Upon take off on our 2nd leg, I was flying position FA3 at this point in the day, the back notified the lead that they have a smell of burning rubber which at this time I began to smell the same thing and told the lead. She then notified the flight deck and we were told that no indications had been going off and that we would continue. By the time we passed through 10,000 feet I noticed that the smell had dissipated and the flight was back to normal operations. On the third leg I had switched positions with Natalee and became lead for the last two flights while she switched to be FA3. When prepare for pushback the flight deck had notified us that we had been told to hold due to a line a weather moving into Hagerstown and we should be expected to have wheels up in 1 hour. The flight deck had made an announcement and we prepared a water pour service. The passengers understood and after our weather hold we proceeded to the runway as normal. We took off which from my opinion was just a normal take off. When we began to rotate FA3 and myself noticed the smell of burning rubber that began to fill the forward cabin again, this time a lot stronger then the first time, and to me was very concerning. I had called the back of the aircraft and they told me immediately that they smelled it to. I then hung up the phone and broke sterile flight deck and notified them of the smell. Between the phones calls back and forth with the flight deck and the back of the aircraft they informed us that we would be returning to PIE, fire crash rescue will be meeting the aircraft and doing a check as a precaution, and there would be no need to brace that we should have a rather normal landing. After just

clearing the active runway, I noticed and gave update from my point of view to FA3 informing her that the Crash Fire Rescue has arrive and I can see them beginning their sweeps of the aircraft. At that time the captain came over the PA with our standby evacuation calls and we immediately being to react by assessing our doors, turning on the ELS, and shouting our commands. We then herd the evacuate command come over the PA and we blew open the doors, insured the slides have been deployed, and commanding the evacuation. When the stream of passengers stopped both FA3 and I looked back to find one of our wheel chair passengers holding the line coming down the aisle. FA3 meet her and helped her to her exit and got her out of the plane, while I was command more passengers to my exit. After the stream of passengers stopped again, we saw no one in the cabin was left except our aisle chair passenger. FA4 had come all the way up to the aisle chair passenger and ensured both FA3 and me that no passenger was left in the cabin except our aisle chair passenger that we were going to evacuate off the aircraft. The captain and FA3 lifted him out of his seat and were bring him to the door, while I was calling help to my exit to help him out of the aircraft. While FA3 and the Captain were evacuating our aisle chair passenger I began to grab as much emergency equipment as I could hold, did a quick walk of the first half of the forward cabin to double check no passenger was left behind, checked the flight deck, and proceeded out my exit. After evacuating the aircraft I meet up with the crew and began to coordinate with the ground to get the passengers away from the aircraft. We then need to get a count of all the passengers, and I told FA3 and FA4 that they should walk through and see if anyone need medical attention and do what we could do to help, ensure passengers, and answer any questions they might have, while FA2 and myself got a head count. By then the airport had began a shuttle service for the passengers to the terminal where they would have been taken care of by our ground crew. We were let back on the plane were we grabbed our bags and got a shuttle to the crew room where then we had a informal debrief with Terri Mac.

Narrative about Possible Preventative Measures

Instead of worrying about being delayed and not getting home right away, I personally feel that this could have been avoided if the captain on our first flight would have taken us seriously and returned to Omaha and had the aircraft looked at.