Cessna 208B accident near Dallas, Texas, March 14, 2025

The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record

On March 14, 2025, about 0738 central daylight time, a Cessna 208B airplane, N9471B, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident at the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), Dallas, Texas. The pilot was not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 positioning flight. The pilot reported that while holding short of runway 17R a departing Spirit Airlines Airbus A321 airplane was cleared for takeoff on runway 17R. The pilot estimated that the departing Airbus A321 was 1,500 to 2,000 ft down the runway when the air traffic controller cleared her to line up and wait on runway 17R. She completed the pretakeoff checklist tasks before taxiing onto runway 17R. The pilot reported that the airplane’s wing flaps were at 10° due to the gusty wind condition and that she held the airplane’s control yoke to the right (left aileron down and right aileron up) to manage the right quartering headwind as the airplane taxied toward the runway 17R centerline on a 45° intercept. The pilot reported that as the airplane approached the runway 17R centerline it encountered an “unexpected wind shear and wake turbulence” that caused the airplane to “skid to the left”. She was unable to regain directional control by reducing engine power and applying rudder and right aileron. The strong wind lifted the airplane’s right wing enough to allow the left wingtip to strike the ground, which resulted in an uncontrolled left swerve and a propeller strike. The pilot reported that the airplane pivoted 360° on the left wingtip before it came to rest upright on the airplane’s landing gear and aligned with the runway 17R centerline. The airplane operator reported that the airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing during the accident. A postaccident review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control tower communications and ADS-B data was conducted to establish the sequence-of-events that led to the accident, as depicted in figure 1. At 0737:08, the DFW tower controller cleared Spirit Airlines flight 196, an Airbus A321, to line up and wait on runway 17R. At 1237:41, the tower controller transmitted the current surface wind was 170° at 18 knots, gusting to 27 knots. At 0737:49, the tower controller cleared the Airbus A321 for takeoff on runway 17R. At 0737:55, the tower controller issued a caution for wake turbulence and cleared the Cessna 208B to line up and wait on runway 17R. Based on reported ground speed and the airplane ground track, at 0738:16, about 740 ft past runway 17R threshold, the Airbus A321 began a takeoff roll. About 0738:30, the Cessna 208B lost directional control as it approached runway 17R centerline about 85 ft past the runway threshold. Figure 1. Plot of ADS-B data depicting airplane position on ground, selected air traffic control clearances, and reported surface wind direction and speed. According to the FAA Aircraft Registry, the Airbus A321-231 was equipped with two International Aero Engines (IAW) V2533-A5 engines. According to Airbus technical document A321 Aircraft Characteristics - Airport and Maintenance Planning, an Airbus A321 equipped with IAE V2500 series engines set at maximum takeoff power has an exhaust danger area that extends 1,150 ft aft of each engine with no surface wind, as depicted in figure 2. Additionally, an engine exhaust velocity of 30 knots would extend to 575 ft aft of the engine exhaust nozzle with no surface wind. Similarly, without a surface wind, an engine exhaust velocity of 17 knots would extend to 990 ft aft the engine exhaust nozzle. A surface wind would affect the extent of the engine exhaust danger area and velocity profiles. Figure 2. Plot of the engine exhaust danger area and exhaust velocity profiles for an Airbus A321 airplane equipped with IAE V2500 series engines (Source: Airbus A321 Aircraft Characteristics - Airport and Maintenance Planning)

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.