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Accidents · NTSB CEN24LA020 · Final report

Piper PA 46-350P accident near Pierre, South Dakota, October 23, 2023

On October 23, 2023 at about 9:11 pm local time, a 1997 Piper PA 46-350P, registered N92884, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Pierre, South Dakota. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation as a result of the pilot’s improper configuration of the automatic fuel transfer system. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to adequately monitor the header tank’s fuel quantity.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 23, 2023 · about 9:11 pm local time
Place
Pierre, South Dakota · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA 46-350P, built 1997 · all PA 46-350Ps on the register
Registration
N92884 · registry record · serial 4636107
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that before takeoff on the cross-country flight, the airplane contained 100 gallons of fuel, with 11 gallons in the header fuel tank, and the airplane’s automatic fuel transfer system was configured as per the checklist. No anomalies were noted during the engine start, takeoff, and initial climb. About 7 minutes into the flight and climbing through 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the engine sustained an abrupt loss of power that was confirmed by the loss of torque and engine compressor turbine rpm (Ng) speed. The pilot noted no cockpit warning or abnormal indications before the loss of engine power. The pilot declared an emergency and then executed a 180° turn back to the departure airport. The pilot attempted two engine restarts, and both were unsuccessful. Unable to make it back to the airport, the pilot executed an off airport forced landing. During the forced landing, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. A postaccident examination of the airframe, fuel system components, and functional engine test revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The fuel transfer pump switch was found in the manual position. The engine’s fuel was provided by the airframe header tank. Avionics data indicated that during the short flight, the header fuel tank quantity consistently decreased, and the airplane’s automatic fuel system did not continually resupply fuel to the header tank. Based on the available data, a functional engine test, and functional testing of the airplane’s fuel system, it is likely the pilot improperly configured the airplane’s fuel transfer system, which prevented the header fuel tank from automatically refilling during the flight and resulted in fuel starvation and total loss of engine power. Although the pilot reported that he had configured the airplane’s automatic fuel transfer system per the checklist, it is likely that the fuel transfer switch was in the manual or OFF position during the flight. In addition, the pilot did not properly monitor the header tank’s fuel quantity.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during emergency descent
  2. Fuel starvation during initial climb defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Fuel planning › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel transfer valve › Incorrect use/operation
  • Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring equip/instruments › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,810 hours in all; 680 in this make and model; 10 in the last 90 days; 10 in the last 30 days; 2,630 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: September 21, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,653 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, August 1, 2023
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,317 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Pratt And Whitney Canada PT6A-35 (turboprop); 3,653 hours total

The flight

  • Destination: SBS Steamboat Springs CO
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 010° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
  • Observation at 4:11 pm

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1
Passengers1

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN24LA020.