Vans Aircraft INC RV-12 accident near Fishers, Indiana, August 31, 2017
On August 31, 2017 at about 3:25 pm local time, a 2011 Vans Aircraft INC RV-12, registered N212ZF, was destroyed in an accident during initial climb near Fishers, Indiana (Indianapolis Metropolitan airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's failure to latch the canopy before takeoff, and his failure to maintain pitch control following the in-flight opening of the canopy during the initial climb resulting in a subsequent impact with terrain and ground fire.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 31, 2017 · about 3:25 pm local time · cases in 2017
- Place
- Fishers, Indiana · Indianapolis Metropolitan · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Vans Aircraft INC RV-12 NO SERIES, built 2011
- Registration
- N212ZF · no longer on the register · serial 120136
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
A private pilot departed on a local flight in his experimental, amateur-built airplane equipped with a tip-up (forward-opening) canopy. A witness saw the airplane during its initial climb after takeoff and stated that it descended "straight down and burst into a ball of flames" upon impact. Examination of the accident site revealed that items from the cabin were found on the ground near the runway threshold and before the impact site. There were no preimpact anomalies of the airframe or engine and kit manufacturer fuel tank Service Bulletins were compiled with. The airplane's before takeoff checklist stated, "Canopy – CHECK Latched." However, the metal canopy latching mechanisms on the roll bar frame exhibited soot-colored discoloration and its polyethylene latch block was not present, and the latch handle on the canopy was intact, not deformed, and not discolored, consistent with the latch being unsecured at the time of impact. Additionally, the presence of items from the cockpit before the impact site is consistent with the canopy opening in flight. About 9 months before the accident, the kit manufacturer published a service letter regarding the in-flight opening of tip-up canopies. The letter stated that, based on previous events, the aircraft will most likely pitch nose down abruptly if the canopy opens in flight. The severity of the pitching moment can depend on speed, attitude, and weight and balance. The letter further stated that most instances of in-flight canopy openings were the result of the pilot forgetting to latch the canopy properly before takeoff, and cautioned pilots to ensure that the latching mechanism fully engaged as designed. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the accident pilot failed to properly latch the canopy before takeoff, did not maintain airplane control following the canopy opening, and the airplane subsequently impacted terrain to the extent that the incorporated service bulletins remedies did not keep the fuel tank from breaching, causing the ground fire.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during initial climb defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
- Fire/smoke (post-impact) during post (impact)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Doors › Passenger/crew doors › Incorrect use/operation other cases naming the airframe structure
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Pitch control › Not attained/maintained
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incomplete action › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 1,200 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 153.4 hours
- Last inspection: condition inspection, November 20, 2016
- Maximum gross weight: 1,320 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Rotax 912ULS (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: UMP Indianapolis IN at 3:30 pm
- Destination: UMP Indianapolis IN
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 070° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 63°F (17°C)
- Altimeter: 30.11 inHg
- Observation at 3:29 pm from KMQJ, 9 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Photographs from the investigation 20 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them
Photo 1 – View of a debris path looking towards the main wreckage.
Photo 2 – Close-up view of the separated nose landing gear and wheel in the debris path.
Photo 3 - Close-up view of a ground scar in the debris path looking towards the main wreckage.
Photo 4 - Quartering view of the left, rear side of the main wreckage.
Photo 5 - Quartering view of the right, rear side of the main wreckage.
Photo 6 - View of the right wing.
Photo 7 - View of the engine.
Photo 8 - Close-up quartering view of the left, rear side of the main wreckage
Photo 9 - Close-up view of the inboard section of the right wing.
Photo 10 - View of the left wing.
Photo 11 - View of the roll bar frame between the wings.
Photo 12 - View of the control cables within the empennage.
Photo 13 - View of the canopy latch handle mechanism.
Photo 14 - View of the elevator trim servo and linkage.
Photo 15 - View of glasses resting in the grass in the foreground and the main wreckage in the background.
Photo 16 - View of a checklist from the airplane resting in the grass in the foreground and the main wreckage in the background.
Photo 17 - View of rolled foam resting in the grass in the foreground and the main wreckage in the background.
Photo 18 - View of removed sparkplugs.
Photo 19 - View of removed sparkplugs.
Photo 20 - View of recovered fluid from an airplane carburetor and a water testing paste indication of no water present.The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
19 documents, released by the NTSB on July 31, 2019. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N212ZF: not on the register today · the record of its deregistration
- Engine: Rotax 912ULS 63 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Indianapolis Metro Airport · nearest airport
- Accidents and incidents in Indiana 1,367 since 1982 · 179 in the last ten years
- Indiana 5,705 aircraft registered
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/CEN17FA334.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
