Dehavilland DHC-3T accident near Homer, Alaska, May 30, 2014
On May 30, 2014 at about 5:30 pm local time, a 1960 Dehavilland DHC-3T, registered N3125N, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Homer, Alaska (Ted Stevens Anchorage Intl airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The flutter failure of the right elevator servo tab due to the improper fabrication of the servo tab and maintenance personnel’s subsequent failure to detect anomalies with the servo tab.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 30, 2014 · about 5:30 pm local time · cases in 2014
- Place
- Homer, Alaska · Ted Stevens Anchorage Intl · cases near this airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Dehavilland DHC-3T, built 1960 · all DHC-3Ts on the register
- Registration
- N3125N · registry record · serial 394
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The airline transport pilot was conducting an on-demand commercial taxi flight. The pilot reported that, during level cruise flight, he felt a vibration in the airplane that progressed such that the airplane exhibited a nose-down pitch. He also believed that there was a change in the elevator. The pilot reduced the airspeed and applied gradual pitch corrections to avoid excessive aerodynamic loads on the tail. Once the airplane was slowed and recovered from the pitch deviation, the vibration stopped, and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. However, after landing, the pilot and a mechanic examined the airplane and found damage to the elevator servo tab and spar structures inside the right elevator. Examination revealed that the elevator auxiliary spar and rear spar forward of the servo tab location exhibited fractures and buckling consistent with overload. The servo tab hinge was intact and attached to the elevator, and nearly all of the rivets remained installed through the tab upper skin and hinge; however, the tab lower skin was separated from the hinge along the rivet line of the C-channel such that the tab structure was splayed open. The rivet holes in the C-channel portion of the skin were intact but had some elongation and deformation consistent with the rivets pulling out. Dark staining was evident around every rivet on the upper servo tab skin. Such staining, commonly known as "smoking rivets," is typically caused by the loosening of one or more rivets, which allows relative movement between the rivet(s) and the underlying structure. However, if the joint is adequately riveted, there should be no movement between the rivet(s) and the underlying structure. About 100 flight hours before the accident, the elevator servo tab had been disassembled and its hinge replaced. The elevator servo tab uses steel blind rivets to fasten the upper skin, hinge, and upper leg of the C-channel together because there is no access to the lower side of the joint, which is needed for a typical driven rivet. Replacing the hinge required drilling out each of the rivets fastening the tab skin, C-channel, and hinge together; drilling out rivets can enlarge the holes beyond their nominal diameter. In an adequately riveted joint, the rivet expands to fill the hole and should slightly deform the hole, making each hole diameter slightly larger than the original; however, if the diameter is already larger than required, the rivet may not adequately fill the hole. Postaccident examination of the servo tab skin found that the material used to construct the tab was about 25 percent thinner than the skin material specified in the original servo tab design and that the hinge used was not in accordance with the original servo tab design. The servo tab is subject to a harsh vibratory environment due to the natural airframe vibration and the propeller wash induced on the airplane's tail. The holes in the servo tab upper skin and upper leg of the C-channel, which had been previously attached to a different hinge, were likely slightly larger than nominal when the new hinge was installed. Based on the dark staining evidence, the rivets installed on the accident servo tab likely did not adequately fill the holes in the tab structure, which allowed them to loosen over a short period of operation. The airplane was inspected less than 2 flight hours (2 days) before the accident flight as required by an airworthiness directive (AD) that specifically required checks for elevator servo tab condition, fastener security, and tab free-play. Although maintenance personnel found the tab to be compliant with the AD's maximum free-play/trailing edge deflection allowances, the dark staining should have provided maintenance personnel a visual indication that there was a problem with relative movement between the rivets and the underlying structure; however, no maintenance action was taken. The reported vibration during the accident flight and the overload damage observed on the servo tab and elevator spar structures are consistent with aerodynamic flutter of the elevator servo tab that excited to the point of imposing damaging loads on the servo tab and the elevator spar structures. Both airspeed (airflow) and inadequate structural stiffness are required for a servo tab flutter event to develop. Inadequate stiffness of the servo tab was evident by both the inadequate servo tab skin thickness and the loose rivets. Airspeed information was not obtained for the accident flight. Generally, as airspeed increases, a flutter condition is exacerbated.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
- Aircraft inspection event during prior to flight
- Flight control sys malf/fail during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Empennage structure › Tab structure (on elevator) › Failure other cases naming the airframe structure
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Fabrication › Maintenance personnel
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Empennage structure › Tab structure (on elevator) › Not serviced/maintained other cases naming the airframe structure
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 16,000 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Honeywell TPE331 (turboshaft); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: PASO Seldovia AK
- Destination: PANC Anchorage AK
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 110° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 6,000 ft; clear
- Temperature: 55°F (13°C), dew point 43°F (6°C)
- Altimeter: 29.65 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
2 documents, released by the NTSB on October 31, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Airworthiness Group Factual Report | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Airworthiness Group Factual Report - Appendix A - Figures | PDF, 8 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Other NTSB records under N3125N the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- N3125N on the register today · the tail number may have moved to another aircraft since
- Dehavilland DHC-3 67 registered today · the model family and its accident history
- Dehavilland 860 aircraft on the register
- Engine: Honeywell TPE331 27 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Ted Stevens Anchorage International · nearest airport
- Seldovia Airport · departed from
- Accidents and incidents in Alaska 5,932 since 1982 · 823 in the last ten years
- Alaska 9,144 aircraft registered
- Other NTSB records under N3125N 4 records · the number may have belonged to another aircraft at the time
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ANC14LA035.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
