Grumman G-44A accident near Anchorage, Alaska, September 17, 2009
On September 17, 2009 at about 5:40 pm local time, a Grumman G-44A, registered N86627, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Anchorage, Alaska (Merrill Field). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A fatigue fracture of an unapproved hydraulic brake line fitting, which resulted in a loss of control during the landing roll. Contributing to the accident was the installation of an unapproved part by an unknown maintenance personnel.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 17, 2009 · about 5:40 pm local time
- Place
- Anchorage, Alaska · Merrill Field · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Grumman G-44A · all G-44As on the register
- Registration
- N86627 · registry record · serial 1453
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The commercial pilot reported that he was landing his tailwheel-equipped amphibious airplane on a dry, paved runway at the conclusion of a local area postmaintenance flight operated under Title 14, Part 91 after a local facility had completed repairs to the right brake assembly. After landing, the pilot applied the brakes to slow the landing roll, and while depressing both brake pedals, the right brake pedal unexpectedly "went to the floor" and the airplane swerved to the left. The airplane ground looped to the left, sustaining substantial damage to the right wing and right aileron. A postaccident investigation revealed that a hydraulic supply line fitting on the airplane's right brake assembly had broken. The maintenance technician that did the repairs on the airplane's brake reported that the hydraulic supply line fitting was not removed during his work. He also said that he strongly suspected that the broken fitting might be an unapproved or "bogus" aircraft part due to an atypical thread pattern. An NTSB metallurgical examination revealed that the fractured fitting had failed due to a fatigue fracture. A Safety Board mechanical engineer noted that the broken fitting was marked with the "AN" (Air Force-Navy standards) identification stamp, signifying that it was approved for use in aircraft. Further investigation revealed that the fractured fitting was consistent in appearance to that of a fitting manufactured to meet the standards of a Joint Industrial Council (JIC), which is not intended for use in aircraft. The Safety Board mechanical engineer also noted that the two types of fitting are nearly indistinguishable except for the "AN" identification stamp. He added that without the aid of magnification, the "JIC" fittings and the "AN" fittings look identical. The "AN" fitting is reported to have a 40 percent increase in fatigue strength over the identical "JIC" fitting. There was no logbook entry which disclosed replacement of the hydraulic fittings, and the airplane's owner said that he was unaware when the brake line fittings had been replaced, but assumed it had been done prior to him purchasing the airplane. On July 22, 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an Advisory Circular (AC) 21-29C, change 1, which provides updated information and guidance to the aviation community for detecting suspected unapproved parts and reporting them to the FAA.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during landing (landing roll) defining event
- Loss of control on ground during landing (landing roll)
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing (landing roll)
- Runway excursion during landing (landing roll)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Brake › Malfunction
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › (general) › Other/unknown
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; multi-engine sea; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,560 hours in all; 780 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 15,267 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, June 18, 2009; 22 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 5,400 lb
- Seats: 5
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Cont Motor IO-470 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Cont Motor I0-470 SERIES (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: MRI Anchorage AK at 12:15 pm
- Destination: MRI Anchorage AK
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 07, 4,000 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 7,500 ft
- Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 45°F (7°C)
- Altimeter: 29.43 inHg
- Observation at 11:53 am from MRI
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flig | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ANC09LA100.