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Accidents · NTSB WPR22LA271 · Final report

Piper PA-32-301 accident near San Jose, California, July 23, 2022

On July 23, 2022 at about 2:11 am local time, a 1980 Piper PA-32-301, registered N300BH, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (climb to cruise) near San Jose, California (Reid-Hillview of Santa Clara C airport). It was a business flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection and fuel management, which resulted in fuel starvation, a total loss of engine power, and an impact with terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 12, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 23, 2022 · about 2:11 am local time · cases in 2022
Place
San Jose, California · Reid-Hillview of Santa Clara C · cases near this airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-32-301, built 1980 · all PA-32-301s on the register
Registration
N300BH · registry record · serial 32-8006011
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Business flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot had planned to fly the airplane on a short flight back to the owner’s hangar following an annual inspection. According to the pilot, the engine lost all power during climbout from the departure airport. The airplane impacted the ground, struck a fence and came to rest upright. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane contained 15 gallons of fuel in each wing fuel tank before the annual inspection began. The maintenance facility ran the engine at maximum power with the fuel selector positioned on the left fuel tank for at least 45 minutes during the annual inspection. Fuel consumption calculations indicate this would have nearly depleted the left fuel tank of fuel. No additional fuel was added by the mechanics or the pilot before the accident flight nor was there any discussion between the pilot and mechanic regarding the amount of fuel remaining in the airplane. It is likely that the pilot departed without a thorough preflight inspection or he would have observed the low fuel quantity and switched to the right fuel tank before departure. The pilot stated that he switched tanks once during the accident flight after the power loss. As the fuel selector was found in the right tank position at the accident site, it is likely that he departed on the left fuel tank. This evidence suggests that the pilot’s improper fuel management resulted in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power. Further, the departure airport did not sell the type of fuel required to power the accident airplane. However, it is unlikely that this would have influenced the pilot’s decision as he believed he had sufficient fuel to complete the flight.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel starvation during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management other cases naming the fuel system
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Inadequate inspection other cases naming the fuel system
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Fuel planning › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Lack of communication › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,039 hours in all
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,430.9 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, July 19, 2022; 1 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming IO-540-K165 (piston); 5,431 hours total
  • Operator: Green Valley Corporation I

The flight

  • Destination: SJC San Jose CA

Weather at the time

  • Light: dusk
  • Wind: from 300° at 9 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 50°F (10°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.90 inHg
  • Observation at 6:47 pm from KRHV

Weather report (METAR): KRHV 230147Z 30009KT 10SM SKC 26/10 A2990

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Photographs from the investigation 4 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

13 documents, released by the NTSB on December 14, 2023. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/WPR22LA271.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.