Cessna 150 accident near Riverside, California, February 4, 2021

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Toward the end of a banner-tow operation, the pilot made an approach to the runway and released the banner over the runway to prepare for landing. After releasing the banner, the pilot climbed the airplane to the traffic pattern altitude. While on final approach, she performed a go-around due to “extreme wind shear.” During climbout, the pilot made a left turn to the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern, and the engine lost partial power. She continued the left turn and turned back to the runway, intending to complete a forced landing. However, the pilot reported that a “strong and gusty” tailwind existed, and that the airplane’s speed was too fast to safely land, so she aborted the landing. During the climb with partial engine power, the pilot made a 180° turn to the right with the intention of landing on the runway, but the engine lost total power halfway through the right turn. The airplane’s altitude during the right turn was insufficient for the pilot to reach the runway, so she made a forced landing onto a road located about 800 ft southeast of the runway threshold. During the descent, the elevator collided with trees, and the airplane landed upright on the asphalt surface. Subsequently, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the right wing collided with two cars that were parked on the right side of the road. A postaccident examination of the airplane found the fuel selector in the OFF position. Examination of the fuel system revealed that the left and right wing fuel tanks and the auxiliary fuel tank were intact and not breached. The left wing fuel tank was empty, and the right wing fuel tank contained less than 1 gallon of fuel. The auxiliary fuel tank contained about 4 gallons of fuel, but the pilot did not use fuel from the auxiliary tank because she thought that the wing tanks contained about 10 to 12 gallons of fuel. Examination of the engine revealed no preimpact anomalies or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation, and the engine operated through various speeds during an engine test run. The accident pilot did not request nor received weather information from Leidos Flight Service, or the commercial vendor foreflight. There was no record of the accident pilot receiving or retrieving any other weather information before or during the accident flight. A weather study revealed that at about the time of the accident winds in the vicinity of the accident were gusting to 21 knots at the accident time. The wind flow down the terrain helped to induce areas of low-level wind shear (LLWS) along with up and downdrafts. During a postaccident interview, the owner of the airplane reported that, given his experience flying the accident airplane, the fuel consumption rate during banner-tow operations was about 13 gallons per hour with high-wind conditions, such as those that occurred during the accident flight, because of the higher engine rpm during cruise flight. However, the pilot assumed a fuel consumption rate of 10 gallons per hour, which was below the fuel consumption rate that the owner experienced during banner-tow operations in cruise flight with calm wind (11 gallons per hour). The weather study for this accident revealed that, about the time of the accident, the wind near the accident site was gusting to 21 knots. The wind flow down the terrain would have helped to induce areas of low-level windshear along with up- and downdrafts. One pilot report indicated that severe turbulence was occurring at 4,000 ft near the accident site at the accident time. The weather conditions that occurred during the accident flight were addressed by the National Weather Service forecast conditions. However, the accident pilot did not request or receive weather information from Leidos Flight Service or Foreflight. Also, no evidence indicated that the accident pilot retrieved any other weather information before or during the accident flight. Thus, the pilot likely did not plan for windshear and turbulence during the flight, which likely created a higher pilot workload, increased fuel consumption during the flight, and resulted in fuel starvation and the total loss of engine power.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.