Cessna 208 accident near Wailea, Hawaii, October 22, 2013
On October 22, 2013 at about 4:45 am local time, a 2000 Cessna 208, registered N861MA, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Wailea, Hawaii (Kahului airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 10 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
Improper maintenance that resulted in contamination of the engine's compressor turbine disc and blade assembly by glass bead remnants, which resulted in a blade failure.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 22, 2013 · about 4:45 am local time
- Place
- Wailea, Hawaii · Kahului · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 10 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 208 B, built 2000 · all 208s on the register
- Registration
- N861MA · registry record · serial 208B0825
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
According to the flight crew, as the airplane passed through about 8,000 ft mean sea level during climb over open ocean water, they heard a loud bang and a grinding sound, which was followed by a loss of engine power. Sparks were observed coming out of the engine's right exhaust. The flight crew initiated a turn back towards the departure airport, which was about 13 miles north of their position. The crew accomplished the emergency checklists and elected to perform an emergency landing on a highway. During the landing roll, the airplane struck two highway traffic signs, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. A postaccident examination of the airplane's engine revealed that all of the compressor turbine (CT) blades had separated near the blade platforms, and the remaining stubs were gouged and battered. The fracture surface of one of the blades displayed smooth features characteristic of fatigue fracture; all other blade fracture surfaces displayed course features characteristic of overload fracture. The fatigue-fractured blade's microstructure in the fracture area was normal, and the blade material and hardness met engineering drawing requirements. The CT hub displayed a frosted appearance over the entire front and aft surfaces, and glass beads and bead fragments were observed between the fir-tree joints of the blade platforms and the CT disc, consistent with the disc assembly having been cleaned by aggressive glass media blasting in the assembled condition. The engine manufacturer specifies that all media blast cleaning be performed with the CT disc and blades disassembled. The glass bead contamination of the fir-tree joints caused the CT blades to be unevenly restrained, and it altered the blades' designed vibration frequency, making them susceptible to the aerodynamic vibrations from the combustor gas flow. Therefore, the fatigue fracture of the blade was most likely due to the glass bead contamination. The CT disc assembly had been removed from the engine for repair about two months before the accident, and this was likely when the glass bead media cleaning occurred and the beads became embedded in the exposed fir tree joints. When the CT disc assembly is installed in the engine, the fir tree joints are protected from exposure; therefore, the glass bead contamination could not have occurred when the engine was installed on the airplane.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Aircraft servicing event during prior to flight
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
- Off-field or emergency landing during landing
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Turbine section › Damaged/degraded
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Repair › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,062 hours in all; 411 in this make and model; 281 in the last 90 days; 81 in the last 30 days; 1,950 as pilot in command; 720 on instruments
- Last flight review: May 7, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,040 hours in all; 690 in this make and model; 115 in the last 90 days; 70 in the last 30 days; 470 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: August 12, 2013
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 11,828 hours
- Last inspection: approved inspection programme, October 20, 2013
- Maximum gross weight: 7,449 lb
- Seats: 11
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: P&W PT6A SER (turboprop); 9,339 hours total
- Operator: Mokulele Flight Service INC
The flight
- Departed from: OGG Kahului HI at 4:30 am
- Destination: MUE Waimea-Kohala HI
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: dusk
- Wind: from 020° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat
- Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 64°F (18°C)
- Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
- Observation at 4:54 am from OGG, 13 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 8 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Other NTSB records under N861MA the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.