Raytheon Aircraft Company G36 accident near Hawthorne, California, July 15, 2009
On July 15, 2009 at about 11:20 pm local time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company G36, registered N618MW, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR go-around) near Hawthorne, California (Hawthorne Municipal Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 3 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s failure to maintain an adequate airspeed during a go-around, which resulted in a loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident was the inadvertent activation of the fuel boost pump during the attempted go-around.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 15, 2009 · about 11:20 pm local time
- Place
- Hawthorne, California · Hawthorne Municipal Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 3 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Raytheon Aircraft Company G36
- Registration
- N618MW · no longer on the register · serial E-3643
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
While on final approach during the accident landing, the pilot informed air traffic control tower personnel that he was going to perform a go-around but gave no explanation for the maneuver. Witnesses observed the airplane climbing westbound ”belching” black smoke, then the engine stopped. When the airplane was about midfield, they saw it turn left and then back to the right and descend out of sight. The airplane impacted the roof and a vertical wall of a five-story building before coming to rest in an adjacent parking lot. Postaccident examination of the engine’s spark plugs and cylinders indicated that the engine was running with an overly rich fuel/air mixture, which was also evident from the witness statements of the black exhaust emanating from the airplane. The electric fuel boost pump switch is located next to the landing gear selection handle. According to the G36 Pilot Operating Handbook, the engine’s electric boost pump provides pressure for starting and emergency operation only. The handbook cautions that use of the electric boost pump during normal operations can result in an overly rich fuel/air mixture, possibly flooding the engine. If either pilot inadvertently activated the fuel boost pump while attempting to retract the landing gear during the go-around, it could have resulted in a temporarily rich fuel/air mixture, reducing the available engine power and possibly distracting the pilots during the go-around. Although, the examination revealed that the electric fuel boost pump system switch was in the “OFF” position and that the pump was not operating at the time of impact, it is possible that the pilots recognized that the electric fuel boost pump system was on during the go-around and switched it off before the crash. The position of the switch and the reduced engine power likely distracted the pilot, who did not maintain adequate airspeed during the go-around, which resulted in a loss of control.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR go-around) defining event
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Airspeed › Not attained/maintained
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
Flight instructor
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,500 hours in all
- Last flight review: May 26, 2009
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
Crew member
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rear
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 470 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, February 11, 2009; 82 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,650 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Cont Motor IO-550 B (piston); 0 hours total
- Operator: Carpet Pros, INC.
The flight
- Departed from: HHR Hawthorne CA
- Destination: HHR Hawthorne CA
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 25, 4,956 ft by 100 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 240° at 12 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 29.97 inHg
- Observation at 11:53 pm from HHR
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.