Embraer S A ERJ 170-200 LR and Airbus A320 incident near San Francisco, California, February 16, 2017
On February 16, 2017 at about 4:00 am local time, 2 aircraft, Embraer S A ERJ 170-200 LR (N214NN) and Airbus A320 (N627VA), were involved in the same incident near San Francisco, California (San Francisco Intl airport). The NTSB record does not give the injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The local controller's issuance of a landing clearance for runway 28L to the ERJ170, and the subsequent issuance of line up and wait instructions to the A320 for runway 28L, resulting in a runway incursion.
The local controller's issuance of a landing clearance for runway 28L to the ERJ170, and the subsequent issuance of line up and wait instructions to the A320 for runway 28L, resulting in a runway incursion.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 16, 2017 · about 4:00 am local time
- Place
- San Francisco, California · San Francisco Intl · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- The NTSB record does not give the injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Embraer S A ERJ 170-200 LR 200LR, built 2015 · all ERJ 170-200 LRs on the register
- Registration
- N214NN · registry record · serial 17000508
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Public-use flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
- Aircraft 2
- Airbus A320 214, built 2006 · all A320s on the register
- Registration
- N627VA · registry record · serial 2851
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative for the Embraer S A ERJ 170-200 LR final · quoted from the NTSB record
The Boulder sector approach controller was the first controller the pilot of CPZ6081 contacted when entering NCT airspace. The controller informed the pilot that the ATIS was "tango" and to expect a visual approach to runway 28L. Aircraft arriving from the south of SFO were routinely assigned runway 28L on initial contact; however, when noise abatement procedures were in effect, runway 28R was the preferential runway. When the Boulder controller realized that CPZ6081 would arrive at SFO during noise abatement hours, he informed the Woodside controller that he would change CPZ6081 to runway 28R. The Boulder controller subsequently changed CPZ6081's data tag on the radar display from runway 28L to runway 28R and electronically handed the airplane off to the Woodside controller. The Boulder controller did not inform the pilot of CPZ6081 about the runway change to 28R and did not inform the Woodside controller that he had not passed that runway change information to the pilot. CPZ6081's data tag indicated runway 28R when the Woodside controller accepted the airplane. When the Woodside controller cleared CPZ6081 for the visual approach to runway 28R, that was the first mention of runway 28R to the pilot. The pilot read back "runway 28R," however, continued to prepare for the runway 28L approach. The flight crew had briefed for a visual approach to runway 28L with a backup ILS to runway 28L and thought they had been cleared for the runway 28L approach. The Woodside controller electronically handed off CPZ6081 to SFO ATCT, and the SFO local controller accepted the handoff; the data tag on the tower radar display indicated runway 28R. The pilot of CPZ6081 contacted SFO tower and reported they were on a visual approach to runway 28L. The local controller issued the wind and cleared CPZ6081 to land "runway 28L," which the pilot read back correctly. When the local controller instructed VRD920 to LUAW on runway 28L, she visually scanned the approach corridor and saw CPZ6081 on final approach, and then scanned the tower radar display and saw that CPZ6081's data tag indicated runway 28R. She stated that although it was difficult to visually discern which runway (28L/28R) an aircraft was lined up for, especially at night, she expected CPZ6081to land on runway 28R, and thought she had cleared the flight to land on runway 28R. The local control audio revealed that the local controller had been consistent in providing traffic information to a pilot when she put an airplane into LUAW when another airplane was on the approach for that runway; however, in this case she had not provided traffic information to VRD920 or CPZ6081. The airport surface surveillance capability (ASSC) system functioned as designed and produced the appropriate alert when CPZ6081 was approximately .85 nautical mile final runway 28L. The local controller took timely and appropriate action when the ASSC alerted and issued go-around instruction to CPZ6081; the pilot adhered to the go-around instruction.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus A320 final · quoted from the NTSB record
The Boulder sector approach controller was the first controller the pilot of CPZ6081 contacted when entering NCT airspace. The controller informed the pilot that the ATIS was "tango" and to expect a visual approach to runway 28L. Aircraft arriving from the south of SFO were routinely assigned runway 28L on initial contact; however, when noise abatement procedures were in effect, runway 28R was the preferential runway. When the Boulder controller realized that CPZ6081 would arrive at SFO during noise abatement hours, he informed the Woodside controller that he would change CPZ6081 to runway 28R. The Boulder controller subsequently changed CPZ6081's data tag on the radar display from runway 28L to runway 28R and electronically handed the airplane off to the Woodside controller. The Boulder controller did not inform the pilot of CPZ6081 about the runway change to 28R and did not inform the Woodside controller that he had not passed that runway change information to the pilot. CPZ6081's data tag indicated runway 28R when the Woodside controller accepted the airplane. When the Woodside controller cleared CPZ6081 for the visual approach to runway 28R, that was the first mention of runway 28R to the pilot. The pilot read back "runway 28R," however, continued to prepare for the runway 28L approach. The flight crew had briefed for a visual approach to runway 28L with a backup ILS to runway 28L and thought they had been cleared for the runway 28L approach. The Woodside controller electronically handed off CPZ6081 to SFO ATCT, and the SFO local controller accepted the handoff; the data tag on the tower radar display indicated runway 28R. The pilot of CPZ6081 contacted SFO tower and reported they were on a visual approach to runway 28L. The local controller issued the wind and cleared CPZ6081 to land "runway 28L," which the pilot read back correctly. When the local controller instructed VRD920 to LUAW on runway 28L, she visually scanned the approach corridor and saw CPZ6081 on final approach, and then scanned the tower radar display and saw that CPZ6081's data tag indicated runway 28R. She stated that although it was difficult to visually discern which runway (28L/28R) an aircraft was lined up for, especially at night, she expected CPZ6081to land on runway 28R, and thought she had cleared the flight to land on runway 28R. The local control audio revealed that the local controller had been consistent in providing traffic information to a pilot when she put an airplane into LUAW when another airplane was on the approach for that runway; however, in this case she had not provided traffic information to VRD920 or CPZ6081. The airport surface surveillance capability (ASSC) system functioned as designed and produced the appropriate alert when CPZ6081 was approximately .85 nautical mile final runway 28L. The local controller took timely and appropriate action when the ASSC alerted and issued go-around instruction to CPZ6081; the pilot adhered to the go-around instruction.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Embraer S A ERJ 170-200 LR from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Air traffic event during landing defining event
- Wrong surface or wrong airport during approach (IFR final approach)
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Accuracy of communication › ATC personnel
- factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Expectation/assumption › ATC personnel
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Following instructions › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of automation › ATC personnel
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › (general) › (general) › Contributed to outcome
The aircraft
- Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
- Maximum gross weight: 20,000 lb
- Seats: 88
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Ge CF34-8E5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Ge CF34-8E5 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Compass Airlines
The flight
- Departed from: LAX Los Angeles CA
- Destination: SFO San Francisco CA
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 28L, 11,381 ft by 200 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 200° at 19 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 12,000 ft; a few clouds at 10,000 ft
- Temperature: 61°F (16°C), dew point 39°F (4°C)
- Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
- Observation at 7:56 pm from KSFO, 1 miles away
The factual record for the Airbus A320 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Air traffic event during taxi (into takeoff position) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Understanding/comprehension › ATC personnel
The aircraft
- Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
- Maximum gross weight: 169,756 lb
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Cfm Intl CFM56-5B4/P (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Cfm Intl CFM56-5B4/P (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Alaska Airlines
The flight
- Departed from: SFO San Francisco CA
- Destination: LAS Las Vegas NV
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 28L, 11,381 ft by 200 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.