The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB MIA08FA114 · Final report

Beech BE-58 accident near Jackson, Mississippi, June 5, 2008

On June 5, 2008 at about 12:07 pm local time, a Beech BE-58, registered N3106W, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff (rejected takeoff) near Jackson, Mississippi (Hawkins Field). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

An outboard left wing explosion during takeoff due to the improper fuel cell installation and inadequate subsequent inspections by maintenance personnel.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 5, 2008 · about 12:07 pm local time
Place
Jackson, Mississippi · Hawkins Field · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Beech BE-58
Registration
N3106W · no longer on the register · serial TH-408
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

According to the pilot, during the takeoff roll and while traveling at about 50 knots, he heard an "explosion" and could feel a thud in the rudder pedals. He immediately looked up and saw damage on the left wing with black smoke coming out of a hole in the wing. The pilot stopped the airplane, exited and put out the fire with an onboard fire extinguisher. Examination of the airplane found a thermally damaged hose (vent line), which contained a tight hose clamp and crimped end within the clamp. The separated hose was found lying below the siphon break-bent line interconnect. The position of the clamped and crimped end was consistent with the hose being clamped prior to the break-bent line, which would have allowed the partially connected hose to separate from the break-bent line. The separation of the hose from the break-bent line interconnect would have allowed fuel vapor to accumulate within the wing's open cavities. Additionally, the landing light power wire was separated and the exposed end of the wire exhibited melting, and there was evidence of arcing that existed along the base of the structure (lighting hole) and adjacent interior upper wing skin. This arcing was likely the ignition source for the trapped fuel vapor. The outboard leading edge fuel cell was removed during the investigation and checked for leaks. The fuel cell was pressurized and an air leak was found on the aft side of the fuel cap assembly, at the interior fuel placard mounting rivets. The fuel full placard and rivets were found to be loose when moved by hand. The loose mounting rivets would have also been a source of fuel vapor, which would have contributed to the fuel vapors trapped in the wing. The left wing fuel cells were replaced about 13 months prior to the accident and the airplane's most recent 100-hour inspection was performed about 3 months prior to the accident. For 100-hour inspections, the airplane's maintenance manual contained instructions to examine fuel cells, vent lines, and electrical wiring.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Explosion (non-impact) during takeoff (rejected takeoff) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections › Scheduled maint checks › Inadequate inspection
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel storage › Incorrect service/maintenance

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 2,525 hours in all; 900 in this make and model; 65 in the last 90 days; 32 in the last 30 days; 2,387 as pilot in command; 1,083 on instruments
  • Last flight review: February 28, 2008
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 10,013.3 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, February 25, 2008; 64.2 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 5,400 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Continental IO-520-C (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Continental IO520-C (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground
  • Operator: Jim Hankins Air Service, Inc.

The flight

  • Departed from: HKS Jackson MS at 12:07 pm
  • Destination: PNS Pennsicola FL
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 16, 5,387 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: dawn
  • Wind: from 170° at 10 knots
  • Visibility: 6 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 1,300 ft; clear
  • Temperature: 79°F (26°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
  • Observation at 12:35 pm from HKS

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.