British Aircraft Corp. (Bac) 167 StrikemasterMK83 accident near Boca Raton, Florida, May 15, 2005

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot initially stated that he performed a preflight inspection of the aircraft which included a flight control continuity check. He had the passenger disable the gust lock for the flight controls. He performed a flight control continuity check before taxiing onto the runway for takeoff; no discrepancies were reported. The takeoff roll commenced and at the calculated rotation speed (70 knots), he applied back pressure to the stick but noticed an unusual amount of load on the controls. The takeoff roll continued and he performed trim adjustments. He then aborted the takeoff by retarding the throttle, extending the speed brakes, and applying the wheel brakes. He retracted the flaps, briefed the passenger and tower of the situation, and, after realizing that he was unable to stop the airplane on the runway, he opened the canopy. The airplane rolled through a fence then came to rest upright. The pilot also stated that the airplane is kept outside on the ramp at the Boca Raton Airport. Examination of the airplane by an FAA operation's inspector before recovery revealed the control column would only move aft between 1/4 and 1/2 inch. No determination was made as to the position of the control lock in the cockpit. Examination of the airplane following recovery by an FAA airworthiness inspector revealed that the elevator was free to travel through the full range but was noted to be "...very stiff." Additionally, the rudder was "...extremely hard to move in either direction." During movement of the elevator flight control surface, the rudder flight control surface was noted to move, and with movement of the rudder flight control surface, the elevator flight control surface was noted to move. A review of a United Kingdom (U.K.) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Mandatory Permit Directive (MPD) No. 2002-001 R1, issued on January 16, 2003, indicates "...partial binding or complete seizure of the elevator/rudder concentric torque tube bearings causing an interconnect between elevator and rudder control systems. This interconnection has resulted in uncommanded rudder movement with the application of elevator control inputs and vice versa. Investigation has determined that bearing seizure was due to inadequate lubrication and water ingress in the elevator torque tube bearings. Aeroplanes subject to external storage are particularly prone to this occurrence." There was no record that U.K. CAA MPD No. 2002-001 R1 had been complied with.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.