Beech 58 accident near Gulfport, Mississippi, October 17, 2001
On October 17, 2001 at about 10:20 am local time, a Beech 58, registered N943V, was substantially damaged in an accident near Gulfport, Mississippi (Gulfport-Biloxi International airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of the pilot to use the checklist resulting in a gear-up landing. Contributing factors in the accident were: 1) The inoperative landing gear warning system, 2) Inadequate preflight of the airplane by the pilot for his failure to assure that the cabin door was closed and latched before takeoff, and, 3) Distraction of the pilot due to the open door. Findings in the investigation were several discrepancies related to the cabin door.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 17, 2001 · about 10:20 am local time
- Place
- Gulfport, Mississippi · Gulfport-Biloxi International · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech 58 · all 58s on the register
- Registration
- N943V · no longer on the register · serial TH-659
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot stated that after the initial takeoff, the cabin door "came ajar." The flight returned and landed uneventfully where he closed the cabin door. The flight again departed and the cabin door "came ajar again." The flight returned and the airplane was landed, "...with the landing gear up." Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed the landing gear warning system was inoperative. The microswitch for the left throttle/gear warning system was shorted internally and the roller arm was bent backwards. The microswitch for the right throttle/gear warning system was not making contact with the throttle cam; buckling of the throttle attachment plate was noted. Manual operation of the microswitch of the right throttle/gear warning system would trip the circuit breaker. The left microswitch was removed from the circuit and manual activation of the microswitch of the right throttle/gear warning system activated the gear warning system. Examination of the cabin door revealed that when the cabin door was closed and latched, the outside door handle was extended away from the door approximately 1.5 inches; a rusted and broken spring was noted. Operational check of the door latch mechanism was accomplished revealing no binding noted; the door locked. The upper latch was found to go over center with the door latched and the aft latch bolt "...locked properly." The two rivets that secure the pin guide assembly to the door were found broken. There were no written discrepancies pertaining to the cabin door between May 25, 2000, and September 7, 2001. During that same time frame, one discrepancy related to the gear warning system was noted. The entry indicates that the throttle warning horn circuit breaker popped during descent to land prior to having the landing gear extended. Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-14-15, effective date of September 2, 1997, applicable to the accident airplane, to prevent unintentional opening of the cabin side door and the utility door from the interior of the airplane, was complied with on October 4, 1997. The airplane had accumulated approximately 1,281 hours at the time of the accident since compliance. Further review of the maintenance records revealed that the airplane was inspected last in accordance with a 100-hour inspection that was signed off on September 17, 2001; the airplane had accumulated 38 hours since the inspection at the time of the accident. Review of the inspection guide for the airplane indicates that the cabin door is inspected for security of attachment and the latching mechanism is checked for proper engagement and ease of operation.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,550 hours in all; 2,771 in this make and model; 120 in the last 90 days; 47 in the last 30 days; 5,015 as pilot in command; 794 on instruments
- Last flight review: July 9, 2001
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 7,099 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 17, 2001; 38 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 5,400 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Continental IO-520C (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: KGPT Gulfport MS at 10:10 am
- Destination: MEM Memphis TN
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 32, 9,002 ft by 150 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: dawn
- Wind: from 350° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 43°F (6°C), dew point 39°F (4°C)
- Altimeter: 30.31 inHg
- Observation at 9:53 am from KGPT
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.