Fairchild KR-31 and Waco QCF mid-air collision near Bartlesville, Oklahoma, June 1, 1996
On June 1, 1996 at about 7:12 pm local time, 2 aircraft, Fairchild KR-31 (N7780) and Waco QCF (N12428), were involved in a mid-air collision near Bartlesville, Oklahoma (Bartlesville Municipal airport). 4 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure of each pilot-in-command to maintain visual lookout. Factors were: the lack of each pilot-in-command obtaining/maintaining communication with the control tower, and inadequate lookout by each pilot-rated passenger, the inadequate procedures/directives by the biplane association management and the airport management, and inadequate supervision by the Federal Aviation Administration.
The failure of each pilot-in-command to maintain visual lookout. Factors were: the lack of each pilot-in-command obtaining/maintaining communication with the control tower, and inadequate lookout by each pilot-rated passenger, the inadequate procedures/directives by the biplane association management and the airport management, and inadequate supervision by the Federal Aviation Administration.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 1, 1996 · about 7:12 pm local time
- Place
- Bartlesville, Oklahoma · Bartlesville Municipal · map
- Type
- Accident · mid-air collision
- Injuries
- 4 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft 1
- Fairchild KR-31 · all KR-31s on the register
- Registration
- N7780 · no longer on the register · serial 223
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
- Aircraft 2
- Waco QCF · all QCFs on the register
- Registration
- N12428 · registry record · serial 3569
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative for the Fairchild KR-31 final · quoted from the NTSB record
Both the Fairchild KR-31, N7780, and the Waco QCF, N12428, were occupied by a PIC and a pilot-rated passenger. Witnesses observed both biplanes collide at the downwind/base position and descend uncontrolled to the ground. Left wing portions from each biplane were found at the initial impact site. The lower left wing outboard section of the Waco was found between the left wings of the Fairchild. The Fairchild did not have an electrical system. The Waco was equipped with navigation lights and an electrical system; however, the type and status of avionics equipment could not be determined due to the postimpact fire damage. A light gun was available in the temporary control tower; however, it was not being used at the time of the collision, and neither biplane was in communication with the tower in Class D airspace. An ATC letter to the airport indicated that ATC would separate arriving and departing traffic, with ground movement by airport management, operators and pilots, with safety items/factors brought to the attention of ATC prior to the operation of the tower. The biplane association and the airport representatives stated that the tower was a 'control tower' and applicable control airspace procedures were expected by ATC and the pilots. Neither the NBA nor the airport had established rigid communication, routing and altitude procedures for the fly-by period, and pilot briefings were not conducted. In tension with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the Federal Aviation Administration did not offer and/or provide the NBA and airport authorities with clearly delineated insight and guidance that fostered the safest use of the airspace during the fly-in.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The NTSB's narrative for the Waco QCF final · quoted from the NTSB record
Both the Fairchild KR-31, N7780, and the Waco QCF, N12428, were occupied by a PIC and a pilot-rated passenger. Witnesses observed both biplanes collide at the downwind/base position and descend uncontrolled to the ground. Left wing portions from each biplane were found at the initial impact site. The lower left wing outboard section of the Waco was found between the left wings of the Fairchild. The Fairchild did not have an electrical system. The Waco was equipped with navigation lights and an electrical system; however, the type and status of avionics equipment could not be determined due to the postimpact fire damage. A light gun was available in the temporary control tower; however, it was not being used at the time of the collision, and neither biplane was in communication with the tower in Class D airspace. An ATC letter to the airport indicated that ATC would separate arriving and departing traffic, with ground movement by airport management, operators and pilots, with safety items/factors brought to the attention of ATC prior to the operation of the tower. The biplane association and the airport representatives stated that the tower was a 'control tower' and applicable control airspace procedures were expected by ATC and the pilots. Neither the NBA nor the airport had established rigid communication, routing and altitude procedures for the fly-by period, and pilot briefings were not conducted. In tension with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the Federal Aviation Administration did not offer and/or provide the NBA and airport authorities with clearly delineated insight and guidance that fostered the safest use of the airspace during the fly-in.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record for the Fairchild KR-31 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: glider; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane; rotorcraft: glider; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 19,660 hours in all; 283 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rear
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 1,678 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, April 26, 1996; 2 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,078 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Curtis Wright OX-5 (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: BVO at 7:45 pm
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 35, 6,200 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 340° at 7 knots
- Visibility: 15 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 25,000 ft; scat at 2,000 ft
- Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
- Observation at 7:46 pm from BVO
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
The factual record for the Waco QCF from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,000 hours in all; 100 in this make and model
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rear
The aircraft
- Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Continental W670 (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: BVO at 7:00 pm
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 35, 6,200 ft by 100 ft
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number FTW96FA234.