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Accidents · NTSB ERA26LA181 · Final report

Aeroprakt Mfg Sp Z O O A32 accident near Lexington, Kentucky, April 16, 2026

On April 16, 2026 at about 6:15 pm local time, a 2025 Aeroprakt Mfg Sp Z O O A32, registered N993CW, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Lexington, Kentucky (Blue Grass Airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The flight instructor’s improper in-flight fuel management, which resulted in fuel starvation, a total loss of engine power, and a forced landing to rough terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 16, 2026 · about 6:15 pm local time
Place
Lexington, Kentucky · Blue Grass Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Aeroprakt Mfg Sp Z O O A32, built 2025 · all A32s on the register
Registration
N993CW · registry record · serial 372
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The flight instructor had planned an instructional flight that included practice takeoffs and landings at a nearby airport followed by practice flight maneuvers. Prior to departing, the flight instructor determined that the airplane’s fuel tanks were about 1/2 full, based on the fuel gauges in the cockpit. About 10 minutes into the flight the flight instructor noticed a fuel imbalance, with the left tank reading below 1/2 tank and the right reading above 1/2 tank, so he turned off the left fuel valve leaving the engine to run on the right tank to re-balance the fuel load. After performing two touch-and-go landings and some practice maneuvers, the flight instructor noted that the right tank had dropped to below 1/4 tank, while the left showed between 1/4 and 1/2 tank. The flight instructor then turned on the left fuel valve and turned off the right fuel valve, again, to re-balance the fuel load. Shortly afterward, the flight instructor noticed that the left fuel gauge read empty and the fuel pressure was 0 just as the engine lost all power. He then turned on both fuel valves and both fuel pumps but was unable to restart the engine over the next 20 to 30 seconds before performing a forced landing in a rough field. The airplane’s left wing was substantially damaged during the forced landing. After the accident, the flight instructor stated that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. He further described that he should not have attempted to operate the fuel tanks independently, but rather selected them both on, consistent with the guidance contained in the airplane’s Pilot Operating Handbook (POH). According to the POH, when the fuel level in one of the fuel tanks was below 1/4, both fuel valves must be placed in the on position. Based on this information, it is likely that the airplane’s engine was starved of fuel when the left fuel tank’s fuel supply had been exhausted, after which the flight instructor was unable to restart the airplane’s engine with the limited time remaining.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel starvation during maneuvering defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action selection › Instructor/check pilot
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Incorrect use/operation
  • Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management

Flight instructor

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot, private
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 293.9 hours in all; 7.2 in this make and model; 34.8 in the last 90 days; 26.3 in the last 30 days; 212.5 as pilot in command; 23.3 on instruments
  • Last flight review: July 15, 2025
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 39.5 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, December 5, 2025
  • Maximum gross weight: 1,320 lb
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Brp - Rotax Gmbh & Cokg Rotax - 912iS (piston); 40 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: 27K Georgetown KY at 5:00 pm
  • Destination: LEX Lexington KY
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 22, 7,004 ft by 150 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 250° at 16 knots, gusting 24
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 6,500 ft; a few clouds at 5,000 ft
  • Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 55°F (13°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.96 inHg
  • Observation at 2:00 pm from KLEX, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KLEX 161754Z 25016G24KT 10SM FEW050 OVC065 23/13 A2996

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1
Passengers1

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA26LA181.