Piper PA32 accident near Apopka, Florida, May 8, 2024
On May 8, 2024 at about 3:30 pm local time, a 1973 Piper PA32, registered N908DK, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Apopka, Florida. It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A partial loss of engine power due to sticking exhaust valves. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel’s failure to use available engine data while troubleshooting a known engine issue and maintenance personnel’s failure to comply with inspections called out in a relevant service bulletin.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 8, 2024 · about 3:30 pm local time
- Place
- Apopka, Florida · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Piper PA32 300, built 1973 · all PA32s on the register
- Registration
- N908DK · registry record · serial 32-7440070
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
After departing, the pilots initiated a climb to 2,500 ft mean sea level (msl), during which the engine began to run “rough.” One of the pilots noticed that two cylinders had stopped producing power and he asked the pilot/owner to look up the common traffic advisory frequency for the closest airport. An emergency radio transmission was made and the pilot/owner noticed that two more cylinders had stopped producing power and the airplane was unable to maintain altitude. The other pilot identified an area and performed a forced landing, during which the left wing struck a tree and sustained substantial damage. Postaccident review of engine data for the flight showed that the exhaust gas temperatures (EGT) of the Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 6 cylinders dropped excessively. These drops in EGT and subsequent loss of cylinder head temperatures (CHT) were consistent with the cylinders failing to produce power. Additionally, the data showed that the oil temperature reached a maximum of 231° F (the engine manufacturer’s maximum permitted oil temperature was 245° F). Postaccident examination of the airplane found the thermostatic oil cooler bypass valve in the oil filter adapter was not seating properly and was allowing hot oil to partially bypass the oil cooler, increasing the temperature of the engine. When the oil filter adapter was replaced, the engine was successfully test run according to manufacturer’s standard power and leak engine run test. The test also revealed that the engine airflow limit was below the designated range, which would result in the engine having slightly less power and a richer fuel/air mixture. The spark plugs were dark in color, which was also consistent with excessively rich fuel air/mixture engine operation. The airplane was also based and operated in an area that typically experienced high ambient temperatures and was operated using leaded fuel; two factors that could contribute to an increased rate of oil contaminant accumulation. An examination of the engine exhaust valve stems found buildup of carbon on the combustion side of the exhaust guides in five cylinders. Given this information, the rich mixture and elevated oil temperature likely led to the buildup of carbon and coked oil that resulted in the sticking of multiple exhaust valves during the accident flight. The pilot/owner reported that there had been three previous events during which the engine lost power in the cylinders; each time the engine was returned to service by the maintenance provider. Historical data from the engine monitoring device showed cylinder behavior consistent with the accident flight. Specifically, during those flights, the oil temperatures were near or in excess of the engine manufacturer’s limit. Maintenance personnel reported they had not reviewed at the historical engine data during troubleshooting or before returning the airplane to service. It is possible that if maintenance personnel reviewed the engine data they could have identified the high oil temperature trend and correlated it to the multiple losses of power in individual cylinders. Additionally, a review of the airplane’s maintenance logbooks revealed that the engine was 15 years past the manufacturer’s recommended time between overhaul. There was no evidence that an engine manufacturer service bulletin related to determining exhaust valve and guide condition was complied with, nor, based on the logbooks and date of overhaul, is it likely that improved design exhaust valve guides were installed on the engine. Had the valve guide inspections called for in the service bulletin been complied with, it is likely that the oil coking and carbon buildup, that were the likely result of the rich engine operation and high oil temperature, would have been detected and addressed before resulting in the losses of power that were observed on the accident and previous flights.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Emergency descent initiated during enroute
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during enroute
- Loss of engine power (partial) during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
- Aircraft maintenance event during prior to flight
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › (general) › Malfunction
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › (general) › Inadequate inspection
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › (general) › Maintenance personnel
Flight instructor
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,260 hours in all; 200 in this make and model; 60 in the last 90 days; 28 in the last 30 days; 5,170 as pilot in command; 3,070 on instruments
- Last flight review: June 24, 2022
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 1,550 hours in all
- Medical certificate: Unknown
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,606 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, February 13, 2024
- Maximum gross weight: 3,400 lb
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming IO-540-K1A5 (piston); 4,606 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: ORL Orlando FL at 3:00 pm
- Destination: BOW Bartow FL
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 3,400 ft
- Temperature: 88°F (31°C), dew point 72°F (22°C)
- Altimeter: 29.95 inHg
- Observation at 11:53 am from ORL, 15 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KORL 081553Z 10SM SCT034 SCT042 31/22 A2995 RMK AO2 SLP143 T03060217
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
30 documents, released by the NTSB on January 14, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ERA24LA211.
