Robinson Helicopter R44 accident near Charlotte, North Carolina, November 22, 2022
On November 22, 2022 at about 4:57 pm local time, a 1999 Robinson Helicopter R44, registered N7094J, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Charlotte, North Carolina. It was an aerial observation flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The inadequate inspections of the forward left control rod end attachment hardware to the stationary swashplate by the pilot and by maintenance personnel, resulting in an eventual loosening and backing out of the hardware and subsequent loss of helicopter control.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 22, 2022 · about 4:57 pm local time
- Place
- Charlotte, North Carolina · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Robinson Helicopter R44, built 1999 · all R44s on the register
- Registration
- N7094J · registry record · serial 0600
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Aerial observation flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The purpose of the flight was to provide video training for a local staff meteorologist over a simulated news scene. About 5 minutes into the flight, the pilot began a series of left, 360° orbits over an interstate highway. During the third orbit, helicopter control was lost and the helicopter entered a steep descent until it impacted a grassy area adjacent to the highway. The pilot made a radio call before impact stating that they were “going down.” The helicopter impacted a grassy area adjacent to an interstate highway. There was no postaccident fire. An examination of the helicopter’s flight controls after the accident revealed the forward left control rod end that should have been connected to the stationary swashplate on the main rotor was disconnected and the connecting hardware was missing. A metallurgical examination of the remaining components suggested that the connecting hardware, including a threaded bolt, nut, palnut, two washers, and two hat-shaped spacers were loose and backed out during the flight. It is unlikely that the hardware was secure before the flight and may have been loose for multiple flights before the accident. Additional examination of the remaining hardware revealed that one of the two spacers was installed backwards, most likely during the field overhaul of the helicopter about three years before the accident. The subject hardware was required to be inspected for security by the pilot during each preflight inspection and by maintenance personnel at each 100-hour/annual inspection. The pilot tested positive for quinine and the pain reliever tramadol and was under a physician’s care for arthritis and polyarthralgia that was unreported to the Federal Aviation Administration. However, based on the mechanical issues and the actions of the pilot immediately before the accident, performance impairments were not an issue. Thus, it is unlikely that the effects from the pilot’s use of quinine and tramadol were factors in this accident.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during maneuvering defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Rotorcraft flight control › Main rotor control › Inadequate inspection
- Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor › Rotorcraft flight control › Main rotor control › Incorrect service/maintenance
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Scheduled/routine inspection › Maintenance personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 3,759 hours in all; 3,159 in this make and model; 69 in the last 90 days; 19 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: May 24, 2021
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 13,560 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, October 16, 2022; 23 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,400 lb
- Seats: 3
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming O-540-F2B5 (piston); 841 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: NC90 Charlotte NC at 11:50 am
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 340° at 3 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 13,000 ft
- Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 25°F (-4°C)
- Altimeter: 30.38 inHg
- Observation at 4:52 pm from KCLT, 5 miles away
Weather report (METAR): METAR KCLT 221652Z 34003KT 10SM BKN130 BKN250 14/M04 A3038 RMK SLP286 VIRGA S-SW T01391044
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
30 documents, released by the NTSB on May 2, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
Other NTSB records under N7094J the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
