Piper PA 30 accident near Dublin, Georgia, January 18, 2016

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was receiving multiengine flight instruction from a flight instructor. The wind was about 20° off the runway heading at 8 knots, gusting to 16 knots. The pilot indicated that, after flying for about 50 minutes then landing, they reviewed procedures for a short-field obstacle takeoff and a short-field obstacle landing. The short-field takeoff was normal, and they joined the traffic pattern for landing. When the airplane was abeam the numbers for the landing runway, they completed the prelanding checklist, which included ensuring the landing gear were extended to the down-and-locked position. The pilot verbally called out the "GUMP" check with acknowledgment from his flight instructor and then turned onto final approach at higher than normal airspeed to compensate for the wind gusts. When the airplane crossed the runway threshold, the pilot further reduced power and closed the throttles. He then descended the airplane toward the runway and started his flare as the airspeed decreased. The pilot reported that all indications of touchdown were normal with weight on wheels for about 50 yards or so when it felt as if the airplane was "shimmying," followed shortly thereafter by a "sandpaper sound" of the propellers striking the runway. According to the flight instructor, during rollout, the pilot reached to select the wing flaps up, simulating a short-field landing, and the brakes were applied. The airplane then settled completely on its belly and slid to the right of centerline where it came to a stop. The instructor noticed that the flaps were partially retracted when the airplane came to rest. Scrape marks and propeller strike marks were found on the runway surface, and the airplane had sustained substantial damage to the belly of the fuselage. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of preaccident malfunctions or failures of any of the components that made up the landing gear retraction system that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident operational checks of the landing gear system, during which the landing gear were extended and retracted several times, also did not reveal any anomalies. The owner’s handbook for the accident airplane make/model included a caution indicating that it was “possible for a pilot to inadvertently reach for the landing gear selector switch instead of the wing flap switch while there is still enough lift on the wings to keep full weight of the airplane off the wheels and thus prevent the actuation of the landing gear safety mechanism, causing retraction during the landing roll.” Thus, it was likely that the pilot inadvertently operated the landing gear selector instead of the flaps, during the practice short-field landing, which resulted in the landing gear retraction. Because the airplane was operating at a higher-than-normal speed due to the gusting wind conditions, enough aerodynamic lift was being produced by wings to keep the full weight of the airplane off of the wheels, which prevented actuation of the landing gear safety mechanism.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.