The U.S. aircraft register, updated daily
Accidents · NTSB ERA15LA006 · Final report

Socata TBM 700 accident near Fayetteville, Georgia, October 5, 2014

On October 5, 2014 at about 4:55 pm local time, a 2010 Socata TBM 700, registered N536EM, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Fayetteville, Georgia (Falcon Field). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s inadvertent deactivation of the yaw damper in flight, which resulted in a prolonged side-slip condition that led to fuel starvation and the eventual total loss of engine power. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to attempt to restart the engine.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
October 5, 2014 · about 4:55 pm local time
Place
Fayetteville, Georgia · Falcon Field · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Socata TBM 700 850, built 2010 · all TBM 700s on the register
Registration
N536EM · no longer on the register · serial 536
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. The pilot reported that, during cruise flight at 6,000 ft mean sea level, he observed a crew alerting system oil pressure message, followed by a total loss of engine power. An air traffic controller provided vectors to a local airport; however, the pilot reported that the airplane would not reach the runway. He did not attempt to restart the engine. He feathered the propeller and placed the power lever to "idle" and the condition lever to "cut off." The pilot subsequently attempted a forced landing to a sports field with the gear and flaps retracted. The airplane collided with trees and the ground and then came to rest upright. Examination of the engine revealed that it displayed contact signatures to its internal components and evidence of ingested unburned organic debris, consistent with the engine likely being unpowered and the engine gas generator and power sections wind-milling at the time of impact. No evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies or malfunctions to any of the engine components was found that would have precluded normal operation. Recorded GPS flight track and systems data showed that the loss of engine power was preceded by about 5 minutes of flight on a constant heading and altitude with an excessive lateral g force of about 0.17 g and a bank angle between about 8 and 10 degrees, consistent with a side-slip flight condition. The airplane then entered a right turn with the autopilot engaged, and it lost power at the end of the turn. The data indicated that, even though the autopilot was engaged, the lateral g forces increased as the airplane leveled off and accelerated, indicating that the automatic rudder trim feature of the yaw damper system was not engaged. Given that the yaw damper system operated normally after the flight, it is likely that the pilot inadvertently and unknowingly disengaged the yaw damper during flight with the autopilot engaged. During a postaccident interview, the pilot stated that he was not aware of a side-slip condition before the loss of engine power. Although the fuel tank system was designed to prevent unporting of the fuel lines during momentary periods of uncoordinated flight, it was not intended to do so for extended periods of uncoordinated flight. Therefore, the fuel tank feed line likely unported during the prolonged uncoordinated flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of engine power. If the pilot had recognized the side-slip condition, he could have returned to coordinated flight and prevented the engine power loss. Also, once the airplane returned to coordinated flight, an engine restart would have been possible.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel starvation during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise)
  3. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing (flare/touchdown)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Yaw control › Incorrect use/operation
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 4,244 hours in all; 411 in this make and model; 9 in the last 90 days; 3 in the last 30 days; 4,111 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: January 24, 2014
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: minor injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 719 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, January 8, 2014; 135 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 6,579 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: P&W PT6A66D (turboprop); 719 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: PDK Atlanta GA at 4:40 pm
  • Destination: PIM Pine Mountain GA
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 64°F (18°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.05 inHg
  • Observation at 4:53 pm from FFC, 3 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

12 documents, released by the NTSB on May 12, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.