Cirrus Design CORP SR20 accident near Green Cove Springs, Florida, November 19, 2008
On November 19, 2008 at about 12:40 pm local time, a Cirrus Design CORP SR20, registered N389CP, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Green Cove Springs, Florida (Reynolds Airpark airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The fusing of an electrical cable from the No. 2 (standby) alternator with the throttle cable resulting in the flight crew’s inability to move the throttle control. Contributing to the accident was the failure of maintenance personnel to detect inadequate clearance and chafing of the Alternator No. 2 output cable against the throttle cable housing during the 100-Hour inspections.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 19, 2008 · about 12:40 pm local time
- Place
- Green Cove Springs, Florida · Reynolds Airpark · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cirrus Design CORP SR20
- Registration
- N389CP · registry record · serial 1881
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During an instructional flight while in contact with a Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control facility, the student pilot reduced the throttle to descend with no response. The CFI took the controls and attempted several times to move the throttle control but was unable. The certified flight instructor (CFI) maneuvered the airplane toward a nearby airport, but was unable to maintain altitude due to the decreased engine rpm. During controlled flight while descending, the airplane impacted the tops of trees then impacted the ground. The CFI, whose hand was on the airframe parachute system handle at the point of tree contact, unintentionally fired the parachute at the moment of ground contact. The airplane then nosed over and the rear seat occupant broke the rear window using the emergency egress hammer. All 3 occupants exited the airplane. Further inspection of the engine compartment revealed the No. 2 alternator output cable was routed under the throttle cable, which is contrary to the routing when the airplane was manufactured. The throttle cable housing chafed thru the insulation of the Alternator No. 2 output cable causing arching and fusing both together, preventing movement of the throttle control. Review of the maintenance records revealed six discrepancies related to the No. 2 alternator and two discrepancies related to the throttle control in over a six month period. Two of the corrective action entries for the alternator issued involve removal and replacement of the data acquisition unit (DAU) and master control unit (MCU), while the corrective action for the throttle control was that it was lubricated. Between the date of the six discrepancies related to the No. 2 alternator and the two entries related to the throttle, the airplane was inspected a total of four times either in accordance with a 100-Hour or annual inspection. Inspection of the wiring of the alternator for condition and security is contained in the airplane's maintenance manual.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine controls › Power lever › Inoperative
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Maintenance personnel
Flight instructor
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 4,160 hours in all; 500 in this make and model; 162 in the last 90 days; 59 in the last 30 days; 3,050 on instruments
- Last flight review: April 30, 2008
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
Dual student
- Certificate: student
- Flight time: 42 hours in all; 42 in this make and model; 25 in the last 90 days; 12 in the last 30 days
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 531 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, November 14, 2008; 35 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 3,000 lb
- Seats: 3
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Cont Motor IO-360-ES (piston); 0 hours total
- Operator: Capt, LLC
The flight
- Departed from: XFL Palm Coast FL at 12:11 pm
- Destination: XFL Palm Coast FL
- Flight plan: none
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 330° at 8 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 39°F (4°C), dew point 28°F (-2°C)
- Altimeter: 30.34 inHg
- Observation at 12:50 pm from SGJ
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.