Bombardier CL600 2C10 incident near Atlanta, Georgia, October 23, 2011
On October 23, 2011 at about 7:15 pm local time, a Bombardier CL600 2C10, registered N751EV, was involved in an incident during landing (landing roll) near Atlanta, Georgia (Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Int). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt.
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The Start Operability Bleed Valve (OBV) fuel return adapter-fitting fractured and separated in cyclic fatigue, which allowed fuel to spill onto a hot engine case that ignited the undercowl fire. The OBV fuel adapter-fitting was dropped and the damage reduced its load carrying and fatigue capability, eventually leading to its failure.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 23, 2011 · about 7:15 pm local time
- Place
- Atlanta, Georgia · Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Int · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt.
- Weather
- not recorded
- Aircraft
- Bombardier CL600 2C10 701 · all CL600 2C10s on the register
- Registration
- N751EV · registry record · serial 10163
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
An Atlantic Southeast Airways (ASA) Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet (CRJ)-700 experienced an undercowl engine fire after landing at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Atlanta, Georgia. The pilot shut down the affected engine and the fire warning quickly ceased. No fire bottles were discharged. The airplane taxied to the gate and the passengers deplaned normally. The airplane was undamaged and no injuries were reported. The incident flight was a 14 CFR Part 121 regularly scheduled passenger flight from a Des Moines Airport, Iowa, to ATL. Examination of the engine revealed that the Start Operability Bleed Valve (OBV) fuel return adapter-fitting had fractured and the electrical harness in the vicinity of the OBV was sooted and thermally damaged. No cowling damage was noted. Metallurgical examination of the fractured fuel return adapter-fitting revealed that it had failed in fatigue due to cyclic loading. The return adapter-fitting tube end ball-nose area had a dent. Material deposits were found outboard of the sealing area and axial scrape marks were found beneath and adjacent to the deposited material. The valve flow body flange of the OBV also exhibited a dent and material deposit. An analysis of the deposited material revealed elemental peaks of silicon and oxygen, elements present in sand and not in the return adapter-fitting alloy composition. The presence of silicone and the dent is consistent with the OBV most likely having been dropped and impacted a hard surface that damaged the fuel return adapter-fitting before it was reinstalled on the engine. The impact damage to the return adapter-fitting reduced its loading-carrying and fatigue capability. The OBV fuel return adapter-fitting eventually fractured and separated, which allowed fuel to spill onto a hot engine case that ignited the undercowl fire. Although not related to the incident, testing and analytical modeling of the OBV adapter-fitting joint revealed that, as designed, the joint is directly affected by variations in the applied preload caused by differences in installation torque, coefficient of friction, application of a primer on the serrations, and use of the combination installation tool and that static applied loads were sufficient to create loose contact between the adapter-fitting and the OBV piston housing threads. Vibratory loads during normal engine operation can create relative motion between the adapter-fitting and the piston housing threads generating a wear mechanism that can eventually lead to a fatigue separation of the piston housing threads and the pull-out of the adapter-fitting and subsequent fuel leaks that could lead to a fire. To address this design deficiency, service bulletins were issued to replace the affected OBV with an OBV from alternate manufacturer, and the removal schedule was based on the amount of flight time each OBV had accumulated. The FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive mandating the service bulletins.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during landing (landing roll) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine bleed air system › Compressor bleed control › Capability exceeded
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine bleed air system › Compressor bleed control › Damaged/degraded
- Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › Equipment manufacture › Manufacturer
- Organizational issues › Development › Design › Design of document/info › Manufacturer
- Organizational issues › Development › Design › Equipment design › Manufacturer
The aircraft
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: General Electric CF34-8C5B1 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Atlantic Southeast Airlines INC
The flight
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
