Boeing 737-8 incident near Kenner, Louisiana, December 20, 2023
On December 20, 2023 at about 8:14 pm local time, a 2022 Boeing 737-8, registered N8830Q, suffered minor damage in an incident during takeoff near Kenner, Louisiana (Louis Armstrong New Orleans In airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). The NTSB record does not give the injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A partial loss of engine power due to bird ingestion in the No. 1 (left) engine, which resulted in the activation of the load reduction device to prevent vibration. The load reduction device activation resulted in smoke and fumes entering the cockpit.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 20, 2023 · about 8:14 pm local time
- Place
- Kenner, Louisiana · Louis Armstrong New Orleans In · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- The NTSB record does not give the injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 737-8, built 2022 · all 737-8s on the register
- Registration
- N8830Q · registry record · serial 67750
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
During initial climbout shortly after takeoff, Southwest Airlines flight 554 struck and ingested a bird into its No. 1 (left) engine, resulting in damage to the left engine fan blades and a partial loss of engine power. The airplane began to “shake violently with a distinct loss of thrust” in the left engine. The engine master caution activated, and the captain reported that he heard the fire bell sound. The captain called for the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist on the Quick Reference Card (QRC). According to the captain, after the first officer (FO) started the checklist, the cockpit began to fill with “acrid white smoke.” The FO called out “masks,” the pilots donned their masks, and they resumed performance of the checklist. The flight crew declared an emergency to air traffic control and requested airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) in preparation for the flight’s return to the departure airport. The flight crew notified the cabin crew and passengers about the emergency. The captain later reported that, due to the smoke, his instrument panel was difficult to see and that he thought he might need to fly the airplane by solely using the heads-up guidance system. However, the captain stated that the smoke began to rapidly dissipate after the FO pulled the engine fire switch. After flight 554 landed and came to a full stop, ARFF personnel inspected the airplane before the flight crew taxied to the assigned gate. The passengers deplaned normally, and no injuries were reported. Postaccident examination found that the smoke in the cockpit was a result of the activation of the No. 1 engine’s load reduction device (LRD) after the bird ingestion. LRD activation is designed to reduce the severity of the vibration transmitted into the airframe by disconnecting the left engine’s fan blades from the turbomachinery. When the LRD activated, tubes supplying oil to the engine sump became dislodged and the flange from the sump area opened, allowing engine oil to enter the core compressor upstream of the pneumatic bleed ports that supply bleed air to the cabin and cockpit. The oil was exposed to high temperatures and resulted in smoke and fumes that were then fed into the cockpit. About 15 seconds after the bird ingestion, the left engine’s core speed (N2) was below 62% rpm, which would have de-energized the engine’s running relay and subsequently closed the pressure regulating shutoff valve (PRSOV). Following the closure of the PRSOV, which was the point of access into the cockpit, the smoke and fumes would have quickly dissipated. Considering that both crewmembers described the airplane as shaking following the bird ingestion, the captain’s decision to begin the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist was appropriate (one of the conditions for using the checklist was airframe vibrations). Although the crew did not report performing the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist, the first officer stating “masks” accomplished two of the three memory items by donning their one-piece oxygen masks. Postincident review of this checklist found that it instructed pilots to turn off various switches, including the RECIRC FAN switches at step 9. It is not until step 11 that the checklist instructs that if the smoke or fumes become the greatest threat, pilots should reference another checklist. It is likely that the incident flight crew would have performed the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist first if they had not experienced severe airframe vibration following the bird ingestion. Boeing released a flight crew operations manual (FCOM) bulletin on February 9, 2024, that described the results of the bird ingestion in this incident and the actions a flight crew should take if they experience a similar incident. Boeing also updated the system description in the Boeing 737-8 FCOM on November 15, 2024, and the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) on November 30, 2024, to include engine failure with smoke or fumes in the flight deck or cabin as a condition to trigger reference to the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation QRC. Although the NTSB found no clear evidence of significant toxic or irritant exposure to the flight crew resulting from the LRD activation on the incident flight, such an event may pose a toxicological risk. There are insufficient data to reliably determine the nature and magnitude of such risk, especially at what is expected to be limited exposure duration. It is reasonable to consider the potential for irritant effects on the pilots among the threats to the immediate safety of the flight in an LRD-related smoke event.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Birdstrike during takeoff defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Power plant › (general) › Damaged/degraded
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Animal(s)/bird(s) › Effect on equipment
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Air conditioning system › (general) › Design
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Eng oil sys (airframe furnish) › (general) › Design
- Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › (general) › Manufacturer
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine bleed air system › (general) › Design
- Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › Manufacturer
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: balloon
- Flight time: 25,000 hours in all; 20,000 in this make and model; 115 in the last 90 days; 44 in the last 30 days; 22,000 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: October 27, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (waiver time limited special)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 20,800 hours in all; 7,000 in this make and model; 207 in the last 90 days; 76 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: March 1, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,141.2 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, December 16, 2023
- Seats: 175
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Cfm Intl LEAP-1B28 SER (turbofan); 31,835 hours total
- Engine 2: Cfm Intl LEAP-1B28 SER (turbofan); 31,835 hours total
- Operator: Southwest Airlines CO
The flight
- Destination: KTPA Tampa FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 11/2, 10,104 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 050° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: a few clouds at 3,000 ft
- Temperature: 61°F (16°C), dew point 48°F (9°C)
- Altimeter: 30.32 inHg
- Observation at 2:31 pm from KMSY, 1 miles away
Weather report (METAR): SPECI KMSY 202031Z 05010KT 10SM FEW030 FEW150 SCT250 16/09 A3032 RMK AO2 T01560094
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
34 documents, released by the NTSB on February 25, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
