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Accidents · NTSB DCA24FA164 · Final report

Airbus A330 and C Series Aircraft LTD Ptnrsp BD-500-1A10 and Boeing 767-432ER and Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de ERJ 170-200 LR and Boeing 737-8 incident near Queens, New York, April 17, 2024

On April 17, 2024 at about 8:46 pm local time, 5 aircraft, Airbus A330 (HBJHD) and C Series Aircraft LTD Ptnrsp BD-500-1A10 (N104DU) and Boeing 767-432ER (N838MH) and Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de ERJ 170-200 LR (N210JQ) and Boeing 737-8 (N342RX), were involved in the same incident near Queens, New York (John F Kennedy Intl airport). The NTSB record does not give the injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Nonstandard crossing phraseology and ineffective coordination between local controller 1 (LC1) and local controller 2 (LC2) which resulted in degraded shared situation awareness, and a runway incursion.
Nonstandard crossing phraseology and ineffective coordination between local controller 1 (LC1) and local controller 2 (LC2) which resulted in degraded shared situation awareness, and a runway incursion.
Nonstandard crossing phraseology and ineffective coordination between local controller 1 (LC1) and local controller 2 (LC2) which resulted in degraded shared situation awareness, and a runway incursion.
Nonstandard crossing phraseology and ineffective coordination between local controller 1 (LC1) and local controller 2 (LC2) which resulted in degraded shared situation awareness, and a runway incursion.
Nonstandard crossing phraseology and ineffective coordination between local controller 1 (LC1) and local controller 2 (LC2) which resulted in degraded shared situation awareness, and a runway incursion.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 17, 2024 · about 8:46 pm local time · cases in 2024
Place
Queens, New York · John F Kennedy Intl · cases near this airport · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
The NTSB record does not give the injuries.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft 1
Airbus A330 343, built 2009 · all A330s on the register
Registration
HBJHD · registered outside the United States · serial 1026
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · foreign airline rules (Part 129)
Aircraft 2
C Series Aircraft LTD Ptnrsp BD-500-1A10 · all BD-500-1A10s on the register
Registration
N104DU · registry record · serial 50023
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
Aircraft 3
Boeing 767-432ER, built 2001 · all 767-432ERs on the register
Registration
N838MH · registry record · serial 29711
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
Aircraft 4
Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de ERJ 170-200 LR, built 2008
Registration
N210JQ · registry record · serial 17000260
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
Aircraft 5
Boeing 737-8, built 2019 · all 737-8s on the register
Registration
N342RX · registry record · serial 44466
Damage
Not recorded
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative for the Airbus A330 final · quoted from the NTSB record

This incident occurred when Swiss International Air Lines flight 17K (SWR17K), an Airbus A330343, was involved in a runway incursion on runway 4L at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York, after four aircraft were cleared to cross the runway during its takeoff roll. The four crossing aircraft were Delta Air Lines flight 29 (DAL29), a Boeing 767-432ER, Delta Air Lines flight 420 (DAL420), an Airbus A220-100, Republic Airlines flight 5752 (RPA5752), an Embraer E175LR and America Airlines flight 2246 (AAL2246), a Boeing 737 MAX 8. SWR17K rejected the takeoff at about 50 knots, when three aircraft entered runway 4L and a fourth was nearing the edge of the runway; the nearest aircraft (DAL29) was traveling at 14 knots and was about 4,692 feet away from SWR17K at the time of the rejected takeoff. At the time of the runway incursion, the local controller 2 (LC2) was responsible for operations on runway 4L, and the local controller 1 (LC1) was responsible for operations on runway 4R and all the taxiways between runways 4L and 4R. LC2 cleared an airplane for takeoff and instructed SWR17K to line up and wait on runway 4L. LC2 subsequently directed LC1 to cross awaiting aircraft over runway 4L behind SWR17K at intersections Yankee Alpha (YA), Golf (G), Fox (F), Hotel (H), to which the LC1 replied roger, behind the departure, I’ll go one at each. Subsequently the LC1 began to issue sequential instructions for four aircraft (DAL29, AAL2246, RPA5752, DAL420) to cross runway 4L at these four intersections. At 1645:50, SWR17K was cleared for takeoff. SWR17K began its takeoff roll as the four aircraft were approaching the taxiway intersections with runway 4L. At 1646:15, SWR17K rejected the takeoff at approximately 50 knots, reporting traffic on the runway. At that time, DAL29, RPA5752, and AAL2246 had entered runway 4L, while DAL420 was approaching the runway edge. The standard operating procedures (SOP) at JFK allowed for simultaneous runway crossings at multiple intersections. Furthermore, the SOP required that explicit runway and intersection identification be used between controllers for these clearances and prohibited the use of generalized instructions for simultaneous runway crossings of multiple aircraft. The phraseology used by LC1 and LC2 controllers in this incident, including “behind the departure” and “one at each,” was inconsistent with this SOP. As a result, LC1’s understanding of the intended sequence differed from LC2’s intent. Specifically, LC1 interpreted the crossing clearance as applicable to the departure preceding SWR17K and initiated runway crossings after that airplane had departed, rather than delaying crossings until SWR17K had passed the applicable intersections as LC2 intended. The absence of precise standard phraseology and the failure to explicitly restate the crossing condition degraded the shared situational awareness between LC1 and LC2, likely leading LC1 to misidentify the aircraft authorized to cross behind traffic. As a result, multiple aircraft were cleared to cross and subsequently occupied runway 4L during SWR17K’s takeoff roll, resulting in a runway incursion and rejected takeoff.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the C Series Aircraft LTD Ptnrsp BD-500-1A10 final · quoted from the NTSB record

This incident occurred when Swiss International Air Lines flight 17K (SWR17K), an Airbus A330343, was involved in a runway incursion on runway 4L at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York, after four aircraft were cleared to cross the runway during its takeoff roll. The four crossing aircraft were Delta Air Lines flight 29 (DAL29), a Boeing 767-432ER, Delta Air Lines flight 420 (DAL420), an Airbus A220-100, Republic Airlines flight 5752 (RPA5752), an Embraer E175LR and America Airlines flight 2246 (AAL2246), a Boeing 737 MAX 8. SWR17K rejected the takeoff at about 50 knots, when three aircraft entered runway 4L and a fourth was nearing the edge of the runway; the nearest aircraft (DAL29) was traveling at 14 knots and was about 4,692 feet away from SWR17K at the time of the rejected takeoff. At the time of the runway incursion, the local controller 2 (LC2) was responsible for operations on runway 4L, and the local controller 1 (LC1) was responsible for operations on runway 4R and all the taxiways between runways 4L and 4R. LC2 cleared an airplane for takeoff and instructed SWR17K to line up and wait on runway 4L. LC2 subsequently directed LC1 to cross awaiting aircraft over runway 4L behind SWR17K at intersections Yankee Alpha (YA), Golf (G), Fox (F), Hotel (H), to which the LC1 replied roger, behind the departure, I’ll go one at each. Subsequently the LC1 began to issue sequential instructions for four aircraft (DAL29, AAL2246, RPA5752, DAL420) to cross runway 4L at these four intersections. At 1645:50, SWR17K was cleared for takeoff. SWR17K began its takeoff roll as the four aircraft were approaching the taxiway intersections with runway 4L. At 1646:15, SWR17K rejected the takeoff at approximately 50 knots, reporting traffic on the runway. At that time, DAL29, RPA5752, and AAL2246 had entered runway 4L, while DAL420 was approaching the runway edge. The standard operating procedures (SOP) at JFK allowed for simultaneous runway crossings at multiple intersections. Furthermore, the SOP required that explicit runway and intersection identification be used between controllers for these clearances and prohibited the use of generalized instructions for simultaneous runway crossings of multiple aircraft. The phraseology used by LC1 and LC2 controllers in this incident, including “behind the departure” and “one at each,” was inconsistent with this SOP. As a result, LC1’s understanding of the intended sequence differed from LC2’s intent. Specifically, LC1 interpreted the crossing clearance as applicable to the departure preceding SWR17K and initiated runway crossings after that airplane had departed, rather than delaying crossings until SWR17K had passed the applicable intersections as LC2 intended. The absence of precise standard phraseology and the failure to explicitly restate the crossing condition degraded the shared situational awareness between LC1 and LC2, likely leading LC1 to misidentify the aircraft authorized to cross behind traffic. As a result, multiple aircraft were cleared to cross and subsequently occupied runway 4L during SWR17K’s takeoff roll, resulting in a runway incursion and rejected takeoff.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Boeing 767-432ER final · quoted from the NTSB record

This incident occurred when Swiss International Air Lines flight 17K (SWR17K), an Airbus A330343, was involved in a runway incursion on runway 4L at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York, after four aircraft were cleared to cross the runway during its takeoff roll. The four crossing aircraft were Delta Air Lines flight 29 (DAL29), a Boeing 767-432ER, Delta Air Lines flight 420 (DAL420), an Airbus A220-100, Republic Airlines flight 5752 (RPA5752), an Embraer E175LR and America Airlines flight 2246 (AAL2246), a Boeing 737 MAX 8. SWR17K rejected the takeoff at about 50 knots, when three aircraft entered runway 4L and a fourth was nearing the edge of the runway; the nearest aircraft (DAL29) was traveling at 14 knots and was about 4,692 feet away from SWR17K at the time of the rejected takeoff. At the time of the runway incursion, the local controller 2 (LC2) was responsible for operations on runway 4L, and the local controller 1 (LC1) was responsible for operations on runway 4R and all the taxiways between runways 4L and 4R. LC2 cleared an airplane for takeoff and instructed SWR17K to line up and wait on runway 4L. LC2 subsequently directed LC1 to cross awaiting aircraft over runway 4L behind SWR17K at intersections Yankee Alpha (YA), Golf (G), Fox (F), Hotel (H), to which the LC1 replied roger, behind the departure, I’ll go one at each. Subsequently the LC1 began to issue sequential instructions for four aircraft (DAL29, AAL2246, RPA5752, DAL420) to cross runway 4L at these four intersections. At 1645:50, SWR17K was cleared for takeoff. SWR17K began its takeoff roll as the four aircraft were approaching the taxiway intersections with runway 4L. At 1646:15, SWR17K rejected the takeoff at approximately 50 knots, reporting traffic on the runway. At that time, DAL29, RPA5752, and AAL2246 had entered runway 4L, while DAL420 was approaching the runway edge. The standard operating procedures (SOP) at JFK allowed for simultaneous runway crossings at multiple intersections. Furthermore, the SOP required that explicit runway and intersection identification be used between controllers for these clearances and prohibited the use of generalized instructions for simultaneous runway crossings of multiple aircraft. The phraseology used by LC1 and LC2 controllers in this incident, including “behind the departure” and “one at each,” was inconsistent with this SOP. As a result, LC1’s understanding of the intended sequence differed from LC2’s intent. Specifically, LC1 interpreted the crossing clearance as applicable to the departure preceding SWR17K and initiated runway crossings after that airplane had departed, rather than delaying crossings until SWR17K had passed the applicable intersections as LC2 intended. The absence of precise standard phraseology and the failure to explicitly restate the crossing condition degraded the shared situational awareness between LC1 and LC2, likely leading LC1 to misidentify the aircraft authorized to cross behind traffic. As a result, multiple aircraft were cleared to cross and subsequently occupied runway 4L during SWR17K’s takeoff roll, resulting in a runway incursion and rejected takeoff.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de ERJ 170-200 LR final · quoted from the NTSB record

This incident occurred when Swiss International Air Lines flight 17K (SWR17K), an Airbus A330343, was involved in a runway incursion on runway 4L at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York, after four aircraft were cleared to cross the runway during its takeoff roll. The four crossing aircraft were Delta Air Lines flight 29 (DAL29), a Boeing 767-432ER, Delta Air Lines flight 420 (DAL420), an Airbus A220-100, Republic Airlines flight 5752 (RPA5752), an Embraer E175LR and America Airlines flight 2246 (AAL2246), a Boeing 737 MAX 8. SWR17K rejected the takeoff at about 50 knots, when three aircraft entered runway 4L and a fourth was nearing the edge of the runway; the nearest aircraft (DAL29) was traveling at 14 knots and was about 4,692 feet away from SWR17K at the time of the rejected takeoff. At the time of the runway incursion, the local controller 2 (LC2) was responsible for operations on runway 4L, and the local controller 1 (LC1) was responsible for operations on runway 4R and all the taxiways between runways 4L and 4R. LC2 cleared an airplane for takeoff and instructed SWR17K to line up and wait on runway 4L. LC2 subsequently directed LC1 to cross awaiting aircraft over runway 4L behind SWR17K at intersections Yankee Alpha (YA), Golf (G), Fox (F), Hotel (H), to which the LC1 replied roger, behind the departure, I’ll go one at each. Subsequently the LC1 began to issue sequential instructions for four aircraft (DAL29, AAL2246, RPA5752, DAL420) to cross runway 4L at these four intersections. At 1645:50, SWR17K was cleared for takeoff. SWR17K began its takeoff roll as the four aircraft were approaching the taxiway intersections with runway 4L. At 1646:15, SWR17K rejected the takeoff at approximately 50 knots, reporting traffic on the runway. At that time, DAL29, RPA5752, and AAL2246 had entered runway 4L, while DAL420 was approaching the runway edge. The standard operating procedures (SOP) at JFK allowed for simultaneous runway crossings at multiple intersections. Furthermore, the SOP required that explicit runway and intersection identification be used between controllers for these clearances and prohibited the use of generalized instructions for simultaneous runway crossings of multiple aircraft. The phraseology used by LC1 and LC2 controllers in this incident, including “behind the departure” and “one at each,” was inconsistent with this SOP. As a result, LC1’s understanding of the intended sequence differed from LC2’s intent. Specifically, LC1 interpreted the crossing clearance as applicable to the departure preceding SWR17K and initiated runway crossings after that airplane had departed, rather than delaying crossings until SWR17K had passed the applicable intersections as LC2 intended. The absence of precise standard phraseology and the failure to explicitly restate the crossing condition degraded the shared situational awareness between LC1 and LC2, likely leading LC1 to misidentify the aircraft authorized to cross behind traffic. As a result, multiple aircraft were cleared to cross and subsequently occupied runway 4L during SWR17K’s takeoff roll, resulting in a runway incursion and rejected takeoff.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The NTSB's narrative for the Boeing 737-8 final · quoted from the NTSB record

This incident occurred when Swiss International Air Lines flight 17K (SWR17K), an Airbus A330343, was involved in a runway incursion on runway 4L at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York, after four aircraft were cleared to cross the runway during its takeoff roll. The four crossing aircraft were Delta Air Lines flight 29 (DAL29), a Boeing 767-432ER, Delta Air Lines flight 420 (DAL420), an Airbus A220-100, Republic Airlines flight 5752 (RPA5752), an Embraer E175LR and America Airlines flight 2246 (AAL2246), a Boeing 737 MAX 8. SWR17K rejected the takeoff at about 50 knots, when three aircraft entered runway 4L and a fourth was nearing the edge of the runway; the nearest aircraft (DAL29) was traveling at 14 knots and was about 4,692 feet away from SWR17K at the time of the rejected takeoff. At the time of the runway incursion, the local controller 2 (LC2) was responsible for operations on runway 4L, and the local controller 1 (LC1) was responsible for operations on runway 4R and all the taxiways between runways 4L and 4R. LC2 cleared an airplane for takeoff and instructed SWR17K to line up and wait on runway 4L. LC2 subsequently directed LC1 to cross awaiting aircraft over runway 4L behind SWR17K at intersections Yankee Alpha (YA), Golf (G), Fox (F), Hotel (H), to which the LC1 replied roger, behind the departure, I’ll go one at each. Subsequently the LC1 began to issue sequential instructions for four aircraft (DAL29, AAL2246, RPA5752, DAL420) to cross runway 4L at these four intersections. At 1645:50, SWR17K was cleared for takeoff. SWR17K began its takeoff roll as the four aircraft were approaching the taxiway intersections with runway 4L. At 1646:15, SWR17K rejected the takeoff at approximately 50 knots, reporting traffic on the runway. At that time, DAL29, RPA5752, and AAL2246 had entered runway 4L, while DAL420 was approaching the runway edge. The standard operating procedures (SOP) at JFK allowed for simultaneous runway crossings at multiple intersections. Furthermore, the SOP required that explicit runway and intersection identification be used between controllers for these clearances and prohibited the use of generalized instructions for simultaneous runway crossings of multiple aircraft. The phraseology used by LC1 and LC2 controllers in this incident, including “behind the departure” and “one at each,” was inconsistent with this SOP. As a result, LC1’s understanding of the intended sequence differed from LC2’s intent. Specifically, LC1 interpreted the crossing clearance as applicable to the departure preceding SWR17K and initiated runway crossings after that airplane had departed, rather than delaying crossings until SWR17K had passed the applicable intersections as LC2 intended. The absence of precise standard phraseology and the failure to explicitly restate the crossing condition degraded the shared situational awareness between LC1 and LC2, likely leading LC1 to misidentify the aircraft authorized to cross behind traffic. As a result, multiple aircraft were cleared to cross and subsequently occupied runway 4L during SWR17K’s takeoff roll, resulting in a runway incursion and rejected takeoff.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record for the Airbus A330 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway incursion veh/AC/person during takeoff (rejected takeoff) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Common phraseology › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Interpretation/understanding › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › ATC personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 17,901 hours in all; 4,497 in this make and model; 157 in the last 90 days; 44 in the last 30 days; 6,364 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: August 4, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 6,671 hours in all; 1,011 in this make and model; 147 in the last 90 days; 49 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: December 21, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 64,036 hours
  • Last inspection: condition inspection, April 14, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 513,676 lb
  • Seats: 252
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Rolls Royce Trent 772B-60 (turbofan); 41,976 hours total
  • Engine 2: Rolls Royce Trent 772B-60 (turbofan); 56,789 hours total
  • Operator: Swiss International Air Lines Ltd

The flight

  • Departed from: KJFK New York NY
  • Destination: LSZH Zurich OF
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 04L/, 12,079 ft by 200 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 100° at 13 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: overcast at 9,500 ft; scat at 4,200 ft
  • Temperature: 50°F (10°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.09 inHg
  • Observation at 4:51 pm from KJFK, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KJFK 172051Z 10013KT 10SM -RA SCT042 SCT065 OVC095 10/08 A3009 RMK AO2 PRESFR SLP188 P0003 60003 T01000078 58019

The factual record for the C Series Aircraft LTD Ptnrsp BD-500-1A10 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway incursion veh/AC/person during taxi (from runway) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Common phraseology › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Interpretation/understanding › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › ATC personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,556 hours in all; 226 in this make and model; 81 in the last 90 days
  • Last flight review: October 8, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 1
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine sea
  • Flight time: 580 hours in all; 580 in this make and model; 99 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: March 29, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 1
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 13,732.4 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 14, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 135,000 lb
  • Seats: 116
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt and Whitney PW1521G (turbofan); 9,636 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt and Whitney PW1521G (turbofan); 1,101 hours total
  • Operator: Delta Air Lines INC

The flight

  • Departed from: Dallas Fort Worth TX
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • A second pilot was aboard

The factual record for the Boeing 767-432ER from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway incursion veh/AC/person during taxi (from runway) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Common phraseology › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Interpretation/understanding › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › ATC personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 21,252 hours in all; 15,765 in this make and model; 77 in the last 90 days
  • Last flight review: September 16, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land
  • Flight time: 8,519 hours in all; 7,898 in this make and model; 135 in the last 90 days
  • Last flight review: February 18, 2024
  • Medical certificate: Class 1
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 93,075.4 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, March 20, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 451,000 lb
  • Seats: 253
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Operator: Delta Air Lines INC

The flight

  • Departed from: Nice OF
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • A second pilot was aboard

The factual record for the Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de ERJ 170-200 LR from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway incursion veh/AC/person during taxi (from runway)

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Common phraseology › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Interpretation/understanding › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › ATC personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Medical certificate: Class 1
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Medical certificate: Class 1
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme
  • Maximum gross weight: 85,870 lb
  • Seats: 80
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Operator: Republic Airways INC

The flight

  • Departed from: Boston MA
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • A second pilot was aboard

The factual record for the Boeing 737-8 from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Runway incursion veh/AC/person during taxi (from runway) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Common phraseology › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Interpretation/understanding › ATC personnel
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge › Knowledge › Knowledge of procedures › ATC personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 9,613 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: December 3, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 4,789 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: June 13, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 10,047 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 15, 2024
  • Maximum gross weight: 181,200 lb
  • Seats: 175
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Operator: American Airlines

The flight

  • Departed from: Dallas Fort Worth TX
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • A second pilot was aboard

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

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The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/DCA24FA164.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.