Airbus F4-622R accident near Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 23, 2011

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The captain was the pilot flying and properly briefed the approach and completed the appropriate checklists before landing.  The reported winds at the time of landing was 320 degrees at 16 knots that would result in about a 13-knot crosswind and the flight crew properly computed the approach speed of 132 knots.  According to UPS stabilized approach criteria, airspeed should remain within +10 and -5 knots of the computed final approach speed. Below 1,000 feet above the ground, the indicated airspeed decreased to as low as 129 knots, but did not go below Vref (127 knots). The first officer properly called out the low airspeed and adjusted the target airspeed.  Throughout the final approach, the pitch attitude was stable at about 5 to 6 degrees nose up.  Although the airspeed was slightly slow during the last 1,000 feet of the approach, the airplane remained within UPS stabilized approach criteria. The airplane first touched down on the right main landing gear (MLG) at a pitch attitude of 6.7 degrees, followed shortly thereafter by touchdown on the left MLG. The pitch attitude at touchdown was slightly less than the 7-8 degrees described as typical in the UPS Pilot Training Guide (PTG). Although the radio altitude did not show a bounce, it is likely that the aircraft struts rebounded after the initial touchdown giving the flight crew a sensation of a bounce. The UPS PTG stated under "Bounce Recovery" that to recover from a light bounce (5 feet or less), continue the landing, use power as required to soften the second touchdown, maintain or regain a normal landing attitude, and be aware of increased landing distance. It stated with emphasis not to increase pitch attitude as this could cause a tailstrike. The airplane touched down in the normal touchdown zone and the pitch attitude was well below that required for a tailstrike of 11.2 degrees. UPS had a "No Fault Go-Around" policy, which stated that the decision to go around should not involve pride, pressure, hesitation, jeopardy or fault, and that crews should discuss and prepare for a go-around before each approach. The UPS PTG also stated that "at any time during an approach if the crew feels conditions are not satisfactory, the approach should not be continued." Although the captain stated that his decision to go around was prompted by a wind gust that lifted the right wing, it is more likely that the hard touchdown caused the struts to rebound and prompted the go around. Even though the airplane did not bounce into the air as they thought, the crews' actions were within the company policy. Approximately one second after the initial touchdown, the ground spoilers began to deploy, followed by an increase in pitch in the next two seconds from 4.2 degrees to 12.7 degrees. As the ground spoilers reached their maximum, the thrust levers were advanced to commence the go around and the tailstrike occurred as the pitch attitude passed 11.2 degrees while the airplane was still on the ground. Pitch attitude continued to increase to more than 14 degrees while the aircraft was still on the ground. The A300 Airplane Operating Manual (AOM) stated that the airplane has a slight pitch up tendency at touchdown as the ground spoilers extended, and that the flight crew must be prepared for this pitch-up tendency. It is likely that the crew did not anticipate the spoiler-induced pitch-up after touchdown, which resulted in the tailstrike. The AOM also stated that during a manual go-around, the application of Takeoff Go Around (TOGA) thrust can result in a rapid pitch-up to an excessive nose high attitude. From 6 to 11 seconds after initial touchdown, the engines accelerated to near full power, accompanied by a further increase in pitch from 14.1 degrees to 17.2 degrees while the airplane remained below 50 feet radar altitude. While the desired manual go-around pitch attitude was 17.5 degrees, it is implicit that the 11.2 degree ground contact pitch attitude limit must be respected while on or in close proximity to the ground. The degree to which thrust-induced pitch-up exacerbated the tailstrike cannot be determined.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.