Piper PA-24-250 accident near Bentonville, Arkansas, January 16, 2025

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The copilot had just purchased the airplane, and the pilot/mechanic had completed a 100-hr inspection before the planned three-leg ferry flight to an airport for an annual inspection. Before the first flight leg, the copilot topped off both wing fuel tanks for a total of 60 gallons (30 gallons in each tank). After takeoff, they climbed the airplane to 4,500 ft mean sea level (msl), circled above the airport to ensure the airplane was operating without issue, then proceeded to their first destination. While en route, the pilot noted that the cylinder head temperatures for two cylinders were higher than expected, so he did not lean the mixture. Since they did not lean the mixture and their fuel indicator showed a fuel consumption rate of about 20 gallons per hour (gph), they changed their first fuel stop to an airport closer than originally planned. After landing, they topped off the tanks by adding 20 gallons of fuel to each tank and confirmed that the fuel consumption was about 20 gph. The copilot stated that, during the second leg of the flight, he remembered switching from the left fuel tank to the right fuel tank. While in the traffic pattern at the destination airport, with the landing gear and flaps extended, the pilot adjusted the throttle, and the engine immediately lost total power. He attempted to restart the engine several times, but the starter would not engage, and the propeller stopped rotating. The copilot said he then selected the left fuel tank, but the engine would not restart. The copilot stated that the airplane did not have enough altitude to make it to the runway. The pilot executed a forced landing to a field, and the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the fuel tanks remained intact with no leaks or contaminants found. The left tank was empty, and the right tank contained 27.5 gallons of fuel. Although the fuel strainer bowl contained contaminants at the bottom of the bowl, this likely did not contribute to the loss of engine power because the rest of the fuel system was free of blockages or contaminants. The carburetor was impact separated from its mounting point, and the mixture control cable was not attached to the mixture lever. The hardware on the mixture control arm remained installed, but it was not the correct hardware. The mixture cable moved as expected when the cockpit control was manipulated. It is likely that the mixture control cable remained attached to the carburetor during the accident flight and did not come loose until the ground impact. It is unlikely that the incorrect mixture control hardware contributed to the loss of engine power. Although both pilots reported switching from the left fuel tank to the right fuel during the accident flight leg, the fuel evidence at the accident site was inconsistent with such a scenario. Based on a fuel consumption rate of 20 gph for the 1-hour-37-minute flight, the fuel remaining would have been about 27.6 gallons, which is consistent with the amount of usable fuel found in the right tank. Thus, it is likely that the pilots mismanaged the available fuel, which resulted in fuel starvation.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

Photographs from the investigation 8 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them

Photograph 1 – Accident sitePhotograph 2 – Accident sitePhotograph 3 – Accident sitePhotograph 4 – Fuel SelectorPhotograph 5 - CarburetorPhotograph 6 – Fuel strainer bowl contaminantsPhotograph 7 – Mixture control cable and carburetorPhotograph 7 – Mixture control arm and hardware

The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.