Beech 95-B55 (T42A) accident near Broomfield, Colorado, May 17, 2025
On May 17, 2025 at about 4:03 pm local time, a 1972 Beech 95-B55 (T42A), registered N4321Z, was destroyed in an accident during approach (VFR pattern downwind) near Broomfield, Colorado (Rocky Mountain Metro airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The NTSB has not yet published a probable cause for this accident. Investigations usually take one to two years; this page updates when the final report is released.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 17, 2025 · about 4:03 pm local time
- Place
- Broomfield, Colorado · Rocky Mountain Metro · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech 95-B55 (T42A), built 1972 · all 95-B55 (T42A)s on the register
- Registration
- N4321Z · no longer on the register · serial TC-1463
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative preliminary · quoted from the NTSB record
On May 17, 2025, about 1003 mountain daylight time, a Beechcraft 95-B55, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Broomfield, Colorado. The pilot and pilot-rated passenger sustained fatal injuries. The flight was being operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to family members, the owner was providing a cross-country familiarity flight to the pilot-rated passenger who had recently purchased a similar airplane. Preliminary air traffic control (ATC) radar data showed the airplane depart runway 30R from the Rocky Mountain Metro Airport (BJC), Broomfield, about 1000. Shortly after rotation, the pilot made a radio call to the BJC control tower stating, “we had a door pop, we need to come back around.” ATC subsequently replied that the pilot could make “right closed traffic for 30R” along with asking the pilot are “you going to climb?” Airport surveillance camera footage and radar data showed the airplane stopped its initial climb at 6,024 ft mean sea level (msl), about 400 ft above ground level, shortly after passing the departure end of runway 30R. ATC made numerous attempts to elicit a response from the pilot stating that they were cleared to land runway 30R and further cleared the pilot to land the airplane on any runway. The airplane entered the right traffic pattern for runway 30R, as instructed, and started a continuous slow descent. During the right crosswind to downwind turn, the airplane slowed from 94 knots (kts) groundspeed at 1002:12 to 81 kts about 15 seconds later. At 1002:49, surveillance camera video from a bus stop along U.S. Route 36, located near the right downwind traffic pattern leg, captured the airplane with the landing gear extended entering a left bank that increased in roll rate until the airplane was in an inverted left wing down and nose low dive at 1002:53. The surveillance video shows what appears to be an open door, consistent with the pilot’s report to ATC (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Surveillance camera video still image. The accident site was in a flat open field about 1.5 nautical miles north of runway 30R. Impact marks and debris were consistent with the airplane impacting the terrain in an estimated 90° left bank and nose down attitude. During the impact, the airplane rotated counterclockwise 180° opposite the direction of travel and came to rest upright. The debris field was about 85 ft in length with evidence of a postaccident fire. The main cabin door was separated from the airplane, located on the left side of the debris path, and the door handle was found in the open position (see Figure 2). The rear sloped latch, lower pin, and upper claw latch were found in the locked position. Figure 2. Interior side of main cabin door The components of the cabin baggage door thumb latch were located in the fuselage debris, and the latch was found in the closed and locked position. The nose baggage door could not be identified due to impact fragmentation of the forward fuselage. Flight control continuity was established from all flight control surfaces to their respective controls.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during takeoff
- Loss of control in flight during approach (VFR pattern downwind) defining event
- Aerodynamic stall/spin during approach (VFR pattern downwind)
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during approach (VFR pattern downwind)
The aircraft
- Seats: 6
- Landing gear: retractable
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: BJC Broomfield CO at 4:00 pm
- Destination: Sidney NE
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 100° at 6 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: scat at 12,000 ft
- Temperature: 57°F (14°C), dew point 36°F (2°C)
- Altimeter: 29.98 inHg
- Observation at 9:45 am from KBJC, 2 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KBJC 171545Z 10006KT 10SM SCT120 14/02 A2998
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The NTSB has not released the docket for this case yet. The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), is usually released when the investigation is nearly complete, and the list here is refreshed when it appears. Check at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
