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Accidents · NTSB CEN24LA206 · Final report

Piper PA-24-250 accident near Colorado Springs, Colorado, May 31, 2024

On May 31, 2024 at about 6:45 pm local time, a 1961 Piper PA-24-250, registered N7500P, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern downwind) near Colorado Springs, Colorado (City Of Colorado Springs Muni airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to use the carburetor heat during a descent that resulted in the loss of engine power due to carburetor icing.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 31, 2024 · about 6:45 pm local time
Place
Colorado Springs, Colorado · City Of Colorado Springs Muni · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-24-250, built 1961 · all PA-24-250s on the register
Registration
N7500P · registry record · serial 24-2699
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot reported that after a cross-country flight at 10,500 ft mean sea level (msl), he had descended and was approaching to land. When the airplane was abeam the runway numbers on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, about 7,500 ft msl, he noticed that the engine sounded as if it was no longer producing power. He attempted to restore power but was not successful and executed a forced landing to a field which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. Postaccident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. First responders stated that the airplane’s wing contained fuel, the fuel selector was positioned for the left main fuel tank, and that the left fuel gauge read just over ½ tank of fuel remaining. The recovery company confirmed the presence of fuel in the airplane but could not provide a detailed report of how much fuel each fuel tank contained. The pilot reported in a telephone interview that he did not use carburetor heat at any time during the accident flight or during troubleshooting procedures. When he was about 20 minutes from his destination, he descended to about 9,000 ft. msl, and switched to the fullest fuel tank. He also adjusted settings as appropriate for the approach. When in the traffic pattern, once he realized that the engine had lost power, he said attempted to restore engine power using the emergency procedures from the pilot’s operating handbook (POH), including switching fuel tanks, and activating the airplane’s electric fuel boost pump. When engine power was not restored, he switched back to the previous tank as it should have contained the most fuel. Review of the POH revealed that the normal approach and landing procedures state: “Carburetor heat should not be applied unless there is an indication of carburetor icing, since the use of carburetor heat causes a loss in engine power which may be critical in the event of a go-around, and can induce detonation in this situation.” The POH stated in the “Emergency Procedures” section that in the event of an engine failure the first step would be to switch fuel tanks, and if this did not restore engine power the pilot should: Check fuel pressure and turn on electric fuel pump, if off. Push Mixture control to full rich. Apply carburetor heat. Check ignition switch. The temperature and dewpoint at the accident airport were conducive to serious icing at glide power settings. Given the lack of mechanical anomalies found and the recorded temperature and dewpoint being within a range conducive for carburetor icing, the likely reason for the loss of engine power was due to carburetor icing.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel related during approach (VFR pattern downwind) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to carburetor icing › Effect on equipment

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 365 hours in all; 68 in this make and model; 13 in the last 90 days; 6 in the last 30 days; 308 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: September 5, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine: Lycoming O-540 Series (piston); 1,389 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: DTO Denton TX at 3:47 pm
  • Runway 13/3, 8,270 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 160° at 8 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 7,000 ft
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 46°F (8°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.14 inHg
  • Observation at 12:54 pm from KCOS, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KCOS 311854Z 16008KT 130V200 10SM R17L/5000VP6000FT SCT070 SCT230 21/08 A3014 RMK AO2 SLP142 T02060078

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1
Passengers1

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN24LA206.