Beech 55 accident near Liberal, Kansas, November 17, 2018
On November 17, 2018 at about 10:57 pm local time, a 1978 Beech 55, registered N4817M, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute near Liberal, Kansas (Liberal Mid-America Regional airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot's improper decision to fly in an area where moderate icing conditions were forecasted in an airplane that was not certified for such conditions, and in the effort to get out of the icing conditions, his decision to fly below the minimum descent altitude for the localizer approach to the diversion airport resulting in the airplane impacting a power line and terrain. Contributing was the pilot's inadequate preflight planning.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- November 17, 2018 · about 10:57 pm local time
- Place
- Liberal, Kansas · Liberal Mid-America Regional · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Beech 55 95B55, built 1978
- Registration
- N4817M · no longer on the register · serial TC-2147
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot was conducting a personal flight that encountered moderate rime ice while en route to the planned destination airport. The pilot attempted to climb from 5,100 to 8,000 ft to allow for the accreted ice on the airplane to dissipate, but the airplane was unable to climb and entered an uncontrolled descent. The pilot recovered the airplane at an altitude of about 3,500 ft and then diverted to an alternate airport. During the approach to the diversion airport, the pilot attempted to maintain visual flight and requested a vector for the localizer approach to the airport. The air traffic controller was unable to provide those vectors due to the airplane's low altitude. The airplane impacted a power line about 3 miles south of approach end of the intended landing runway. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The airplane had ice present on the leading edges of the horizontal stabilizer and the right-side window. The airplane was not certified for flight in icing conditions. The airplane had an alcohol deice system for the left-side windshield and both propellers. However, postaccident examination of the alcohol reservoir revealed that it had not been used for a period of time, and no fluid was found in the lines leading from the reservoir; thus the windshield and propeller deice system was likely inoperable at the time of the accident. AIRMET Zulu advisories for moderate ice below 10,000 ft were issued by the National Weather Service's Aviation Weather Center and were applicable for the accident airplane's route of flight and the airspace over the pilot's destination, the airport he was diverting to, and the accident location. Leidos Flight Services indicated that it and any third-party vendor that uses the Leidos system had no contact with the accident pilot on the day of the accident. Thus, the pilot would have been unaware of the forecast icing conditions. The airplane's uncontrolled descent from 5,100 to 3,500 ft was most likely the result of reduced airplane performance from the ice accretion. The pilot most likely continued to operate at 3,500 ft, which was too low to be vectored for the localizer, because he wanted to avoid reentering icing conditions as indicated by his informing the controller that he had to use his navigation charts to intercept the localizer inbound to the airport, and his telling the controller when queried that he didn't have the airport in sight because he couldn't see through the windshield and would have to get closer. As a result of his effort to get out of the icing conditions, the pilot descended below the minimum descent altitude for the localizer approach and subsequently impacted the powerline.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Structural icing during enroute defining event
- Loss of control in flight during enroute
- Other weather encounter during approach
- Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during approach
- Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to structural icing › Decision related to condition
- cause Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Temp/humidity/pressure › Conducive to structural icing › Effect on equipment
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Ice/rain protection system › (general) › Not installed/available
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
- cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Wire › Effect on operation
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Planning/preparation › Weather planning › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 10,623 hours in all; 65 in the last 90 days; 17 in the last 30 days
- Last flight review: September 20, 2018
- Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
Passenger
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,911.3 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, August 1, 2018
- Maximum gross weight: 5,000 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: Continental IO550E6B (piston); 833 hours total
- Engine 2: Continental IO550E6B (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: MTJ Montrose CO at 8:50 pm
- Destination: LBL Liberal KS
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 35, 7,105 ft by 100 ft
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 030° at 15 knots
- Visibility: 7 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 600 ft; clear
- Temperature: 28°F (-2°C), dew point 25°F (-4°C)
- Altimeter: 30.22 inHg
- Observation at 10:56 pm from LBL, 3 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
12 documents, released by the NTSB on June 24, 2020. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ATC Summary | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Weather Study | PDF, 26 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Attachment 1 to the Weather Study | PDF, 6 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Attachment 2 to the Weather Study | PDF, 123 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Attachment 3 to the Weather Study | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Pilot Logbook | PDF, 50 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Toxicological Report | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 8 | FBO Mjt Fuel Reciept | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 9 | Wreckage Exam | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 10 | Aircraft Annual Inspections | PDF, 3 pages | View Download |
| 11 | Photo Array | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 12 | Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
