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Accidents · NTSB CEN18LA381 · Final report

Piper PA28 accident near Pagosa Springs, Colorado, September 19, 2018

On September 19, 2018 at about 4:00 pm local time, a 1964 Piper PA28, registered N8003W, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Pagosa Springs, Colorado (Stevens Field). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The student pilot's mismanagement of the fuel selector valve during the simulated forced landing demonstration and the flight instructor's inadequate supervision to ensure the fuel selector was properly set, which resulted in a loss of engine power and subsequent forced landing on unsuitable terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 19, 2018 · about 4:00 pm local time
Place
Pagosa Springs, Colorado · Stevens Field · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA28 180, built 1964 · all PA28s on the register
Registration
N8003W · registry record · serial 28-2063
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The airline transport pilot rated flight instructor was introducing engine failure emergency procedures to the student pilot. Emergency procedures were reviewed inflight. The flight instructor then reduced the engine power to idle to simulate a loss of engine power. The student pilot conducted the emergency procedures on the left side of the cockpit that included switching the fuel tank selector position from right to left. The engine sputtered when the flight instructor subsequently added power to go around about 600 ft above the ground. The engine sputtered. Emergency procedures were reviewed again and the fuel pressure indication was zero. The flight instructor subsequently performed a forced landing where the airplane impacted fencing and ditches and came to rest in a field. Following the accident, the flight instructor noticed the fuel selector valve was about 1.5 to 2 inches between the left detent and off positions. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe and engine that would have precluded normal operation were reported by the flight instructor and the engine was operational during a subsequent examination of the accident airplane at the accident site. It is likely the student pilot, while conducting the emergency procedure, mismanaged the positioning of the fuel selector valve. While the student pilot was conducting the emergency procedure, the flight instructor did not adequately supervise the student pilot to ensure the fuel selector valve was properly set to the correct position.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Fuel starvation during maneuvering defining event
  2. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Student/instructed pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Psychological › Attention/monitoring › Monitoring other person › Instructor/check pilot
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Fence/fence post › Contributed to outcome
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Terrain › Rough terrain › Contributed to outcome

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 10,000 hours in all; 500 in this make and model; 54 in the last 90 days; 11 in the last 30 days; 9,800 as pilot in command; 3,500 on instruments
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Dual student

  • Flight time: 3.4 hours in all; 3.4 in this make and model; 3.4 in the last 90 days; 3.4 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,125 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, May 18, 2018
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,400 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-360-A4A (piston); 5,125 hours total
  • Operator: San Juan Flyers Inc

The flight

  • Departed from: PSO Pagosa Springs CO at 3:00 pm
  • Destination: PSO Pagosa Springs CO
  • Flight plan: none
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 180° at 6 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: scat at 10,000 ft
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.21 inHg
  • Observation at 4:55 pm from KPSO, 5 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

3 documents, released by the NTSB on October 18, 2018. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.