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Accidents · NTSB ANC16LA048 · Final report

Stinson 108 accident near Haines, Alaska, July 18, 2016

On July 18, 2016 at about 8:30 pm local time, a 1947 Stinson 108, registered N343C, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing (landing roll) near Haines, Alaska (Haines airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot’s failure to maintain directional control of the airplane during the landing roll with a quartering tailwind, which resulted in a ground loop and overstress failure of the left main landing gear wheel axle.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 18, 2016 · about 8:30 pm local time
Place
Haines, Alaska · Haines · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 4 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Stinson 108, built 1947 · all 108s on the register
Registration
N343C · no longer on the register · serial 108-3343
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The private pilot stated that, during the landing roll in the tailwheel-equipped airplane, he started a right turn to exit the runway using a high-speed taxiway when the airplane had slowed to about 20 mph. During the exit, the airplane made an abrupt right turn that the pilot could not control with left rudder and brake. The left wheel axle fractured, followed by a collapse of the left landing gear leg, which resulted in substantial damage to the airplane. The reported wind was a left quartering tailwind of 4 knots. The pilot and passenger observed variable gusting wind immediately after the accident. Postaccident examination after recovery of the wreckage found that the tailwheel attachment bracket was fractured. An examination of the left main landing gear axle weld fracture with a scanning electron microscope (SEM) revealed features consistent with tensile overstress that would have occurred during the accident sequence. An examination of the airframe tailwheel mount fracture surface with a SEM revealed signatures consistent with overstress failure, and other fracture areas of widespread corrosion. Photographs taken before the airplane was removed from the runway showed the tailwheel assembly in its normal position, with no abnormalities visible. Also, during the recovery of the airplane, no tailwheel separation or abnormal function was observed. Based on the examinations of the fractured components, there is no evidence that the fracture of the tailwheel mount led to a displacement of the tailwheel assembly or a loss of control during the landing. Based upon the pilot and passenger's statements regarding wind at the accident site, it is possible that an unexpected gust of quartering tailwind initiated a loss of control, and the high groundspeed and heavy landing weight contributed to increased lateral loads on the left landing gear during the ground loop, which resulted in overload failures of the axle and tail bracket welds.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of control on ground during landing (landing roll) defining event
  2. Aircraft structural failure during landing (landing roll)
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during landing (landing roll)

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Directional control › Not attained/maintained
  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main landing gear › Capability exceeded
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Nose/tail gear attach section › Fatigue/wear/corrosion

Pilot

  • Certificate: private
  • Ratings: single-engine land; single-engine sea
  • Flight time: 1,001 hours in all; 900 in this make and model; 1,000 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: March 31, 2015
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,305.2 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, August 14, 2015; 96 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,230 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Lycoming O-435 (piston); 215 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: SKG Skagway AK
  • Destination: HNS Haines AK
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 26, 4,000 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 150° at 3 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.89 inHg
  • Observation at 7:54 pm from PAHN

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers3

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.