Canadian Car & Foundry HARVARD MK IV accident near Modesto, California, June 2, 2024
On June 2, 2024 at about 7:51 pm local time, a 1952 Canadian Car & Foundry HARVARD MK IV, registered N7522U, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Modesto, California (Modesto City-County-Harry Sham airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people had minor injuries. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s improper fuel tank selection, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the accident was a malfunctioning fuel selector at low fuel levels.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 2, 2024 · about 7:51 pm local time
- Place
- Modesto, California · Modesto City-County-Harry Sham · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people had minor injuries.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Canadian Car & Foundry HARVARD MK IV, built 1952 · all HARVARD MK IVs on the register
- Registration
- N7522U · registry record · serial CCF-4-214
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot reported that during the flight to his return airport, his cruise altitudes had varied from 4,000 ft to 8,000 ft mean sea level (msl) due to mountainous terrain. About an hour into the flight, he switched to the left reserve fuel tank, when the engine began to sputter. Despite switching back to the right fuel tank, the engine lost all power. The pilot initiated a forced landing to an open field and during the landing, the airplane impacted a covered dirt berm, substantially damaging the forward fuselage and left wing. The pilot reported that 2 days prior to the accident, he had topped the airplane off with fuel, which totaled 110 gallons at his home airport. He then flew 2 hours to another airport, with a cruise altitude that ranged between 4,000 to 8,000 ft msl due to mountainous terrain. On the day of the accident, the pilot conducted a preflight inspection on the airplane, which included a visual only inspection of the fuel level in the fuel tanks, which he estimated was about 65 gallons, or enough fuel for the return flight to his home airport. Post accident examination of the airplane revealed that, the airplane came to rest upright in a level attitude, and the fuel selector lever was observed in the left tank position and would not move. Damage to the fuel line near the center fuselage, was consistent with impact, and the fuel line was not breached. Recovery personnel reported that there was no fuel was recovered from the left fuel tank, and about 1/2 gallon of fuel was recovered from the right fuel tank. However, it was later reported after the airplane had been recovered, the left tank had about 5 to 10 gallons of fuel. The airplane was equipped with two 55-gallon fuel tanks, of which 51 gallons were considered usable. The selector lever had four positions, “LEFT,” “RIGHT,” “RESERVE,” and “OFF.” The left fuel tank was designed to have fuel drawn from two different locations as the fuel tank was equipped with a standpipe. The left position drew fuel from the upper portion of the fuel tank with 33.5 gallons of usable fuel, while the reserve position drew fuel from the bottom of the left fuel tank, with 17.5 gallons of useable fuel. A subsequent examination of the accident airplane reveled that the left wing fuel tank was not breached. The fuel selector valve and lever, wobble pump, and engine driven fuel pump were removed, with no visible damage to any of the components. Once removed, the fuel selector handle was free to rotate to all the positions on the fuel selector valve. A functional test of the fuel system revealed that when the fuel selector lever was in the “RESERVE” position, with the other ports capped off, interrupted fuel was observed flowing through a clear tube attached to the outlet. When the other fuel ports were uncapped, air bubbles were seen flowing in the fuel outlet line. The same functional test was performed at the other inlet positions for the fuel selector valve with less air bubbles observed. For flight planning purposes, the pilot estimated 30 gal an hour (gph). According to the Pilot’s Operating Instructions for airplane, the fuel supply is “normally sufficient for 3.9 hours cruising.” However, at “High Power,” the fuel consumption ranges from 30 gph to 56 gph depending on what RPM and manifold pressure settings were used. The total amount of fuel onboard the airplane before the accident flight could not be determined. Given the lack of fuel found in the right tank after the accident and the limited fuel in the left tank, it is likely that the pilot failed to ensure that the fuel selector lever was placed in the “RESERVE” detent, and mistakenly selected the ”LEFT” position, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due of fuel starvation.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Fuel exhaustion during enroute (cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Fuel system › Fuel selector/shutoff valve › Malfunction
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, private
- Ratings: single-engine land
- Flight time: 1,081 hours in all; 72 in this make and model; 12 in the last 90 days; 6 in the last 30 days; 936 as pilot in command
- Last flight review: June 17, 2023
- Medical certificate: BasicMed (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: frt
- Injury: minor injuries
Passenger
- Seat: rear
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 8,383.3 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, January 1, 2024; 17 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 5,300 lb
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Pratt & Whitney R-1340 AN-1 (piston); 824 hours total
- Operator: Pay It Forward Aviation LLC
The flight
- Departed from: PRB Paso Robles CA at 6:45 pm
- Destination: CA20 Ione SC
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 340° at 13 knots, gusting 17
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 81°F (27°C), dew point 50°F (10°C)
- Altimeter: 29.90 inHg
- Observation at 12:53 pm from KMOD, 2 miles away
Weather report (METAR): KMOD 021953Z 34013G17KT 10SM CLR 27/10 A2990 RMK AO2 SLP122 T02670100
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
11 documents, released by the NTSB on February 12, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Record of Phone Conversation - Pilot | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 3 | Record of Phone Conversation - FAA | PDF, 5 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Record of Phone Conversation - Recovery | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Record of Phone Conversation - Sanders Aeronautics | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
| 6 | Airplane Flight Manual | PDF, 97 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Sanders Aeronautics Exam Report | PDF, 7 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Video of Reserve Position Test | MOV file | Download |
| 9 | Video of Right Position Test | MOV file | Download |
| 10 | Video of Left Position Test | MOV file | Download |
| 11 | Photo Array | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
