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Accidents · NTSB WPR23LA352 · Final report

Amateur-built SLING 4 TSI accident near San Pedro, California, September 25, 2023

On September 25, 2023 at about 7:50 pm local time, a 2018 amateur-built SLING 4 TSI, registered N135WT, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near San Pedro, California (Zamperini Field). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A total loss of engine power due to a failure of the No. 4 cylinder exhaust valve from overheating and excessive wear.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
September 25, 2023 · about 7:50 pm local time
Place
San Pedro, California · Zamperini Field · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Amateur-built SLING 4 TSI, built 2018
Registration
N135WT · registry record · serial 131S
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot and passenger departed on a local flight and were returning to land when the accident occurred. While on final approach to land, the pilot reported to air traffic control that the engine lost power. The pilot was cleared to land. A witness video recorded the airplane as it flew north trailing white smoke. About 12 seconds later the smoke ceased and the airplane began a right descending turn. The airplane then entered a steep right turn in a nose-down attitude and rapidly descended until it disappeared from view. The airplane impacted a field about 3 nm from the destination airport. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed internal catastrophic damage and extensive damage to the No. 4 cylinder. Both spark plugs were mechanically damaged and both the intake and exhaust valves had separated at the stems. The cylinder wall and piston face were mechanically damaged, and the piston head was also breached. Data from the engine control unit recorded 350 knock (detonation) events at cylinder No. 4 in the previous 3 hours and 41 minutes of engine operation. A warning in the maintenance manual states that oil residues are permissible on up to 20% of the running surface, else the valve may be at risk of failure at the weld point due to overheating. A metallurgical examination revealed discoloration from oil residue along the running surface of cylinder 4 that was three times greater than the maximum permissible tolerance prescribed by the manufacturer. The discoloration indicated the valve stem was subjected to high heat signatures and likely overheated. The damage to the cylinder indicates that the exhaust valve failed first and damaged the cylinder. Engine data suggests the No. 2 cylinder also failed when metal fragments entered it, damaging the piston and cylinder head. Cylinder No. 2 sustained less damage than cylinder No. 4, which suggests that the No. 4 cylinder failed first. Video of the accident flight also showed white smoke trailing the airplane about one minute before the accident. The presence of the white smoke was likely due to the No 4 cylinder exhaust valve overheating. Impact damage to the No 4. cylinder exhaust valve precluded determining if the valve failed in fatigue or overstress. The No. 4 cylinder exhaust valve contained oil residue on the running surface of the stem that exceeded the tolerance by 300%. In addition, the distance between the valve stem and valve guide for cylinder Nos. 3 and 4 exceeded the 100% tolerance from the manufacturer. The lack of heat dispersion likely caused the No. 4 cylinder exhaust valve to overheat and ultimately fail, which resulted in engine failure. Although the operator failed to comply with the engine manufacturer’s oil inspection and maintenance schedule required by their fuel blend of automotive fuel and 100LL aviation grade gasoline, there was insufficient evidence to determine that their fuel blend practice was responsible for accelerating the valve wear.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute (cruise) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › Recip eng cyl section › Failure
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Scheduled/routine maintenance › Maintenance personnel
  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › (general) › Incorrect service/maintenance

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 983.3 hours in all; 10.4 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: July 3, 2023
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: serious injuries

Passenger

  • Seat: left
  • Injury: serious injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 3,031 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 6, 2023; 85 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 2,094 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rotax 915iS (piston); 693 hours total
  • Operator: Sling Flying Club, LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: TOA Torrance CA at 7:23 pm
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 280° at 12 knots
  • Visibility: 6 statute miles
  • Sky: a few clouds at 1,500 ft
  • Temperature: 73°F (23°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.05 inHg
  • Observation at 12:49 pm from KTOA, 3 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KTOA 251949Z 28012KT 6SM HZ FEW015 23/16 A3005

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

12 documents, released by the NTSB on July 22, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.