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Accidents · NTSB WPR23LA270 · Final report

Sling Aircraft (PTY) LTD SLING LSA accident near Palm Springs, California, July 11, 2023

On July 11, 2023 at about 5:55 pm local time, a 2022 Sling Aircraft (PTY) LTD SLING LSA, registered N294JY, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Palm Springs, California (Palm Springs Intl airport). It was an instructional flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Failure of the landing gear strut during takeoff due to a preexisting cracks that were caused by a manufacturing anomaly during the composite fiber layup process.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
July 11, 2023 · about 5:55 pm local time
Place
Palm Springs, California · Palm Springs Intl · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Sling Aircraft (PTY) LTD SLING LSA, built 2022 · all SLING LSAs on the register
Registration
N294JY · registry record · serial 351
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Instructional flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The accident occurred during takeoff on an instructional flight. The instructor reported that before reaching rotation speed, the airplane felt as if it were sinking to the left as if they had a flat tire. The flight instructor took over control of the airplane, reduced engine power to idle, and applied the hand brake. The airplane then became uncontrollable and veered to the right. He applied corrective control inputs, but the airplane departed the runway, struck an embankment, and sustained substantial damage. The instructor reported that the inbound landing was uneventful, and the data recorded by the airplane’s primary flight display corroborated this. Examination revealed that the left main landing gear leg, which was comprised of composite glass fiber layups, was cracked in multiple areas along its length and had delaminated. Laboratory examination revealed the cracks occurred within the center bulk of fibers parallel to the lamina. Shiny areas consistent with voids and disbonded material, indicative of a manufacturing anomaly, were spread throughout the fracture surfaces. The voids would have affected the structural integrity and allowed cracking to be initiated more easily within the strut. Entrapped contaminants were also found within the strut matrix and in several locations on the fracture surfaces, which was further evidence of cleanliness issues during manufacturing. Flattened features were also present on the fracture surfaces and were likely caused by repeated contact between the two halves of the strut as the crack progressed, indicating the crack had been present for some time. Similarly, the presence of dirt/debris on the interior surfaces was likely the result of the gap between the fracture surfaces opening during aircraft operation and allowing dirt/debris to enter. Consequently, the flattened features and embedded dirt/debris are consistent with a pre-existing delamination in the strut before the accident flight. Both the instructor and the student performed preflight procedures, which included checking the landing gear legs for cracks. Both reported that they did not see any damage or anomalies. It could not be determined why they did not see the cracks, but it is possible that the fractures were imperceptible during a preflight examination, when the airplane was not loaded to an extent that the cracks would open and be visible. A service bulletin had been issued about 10 years before the accident warning of similar cracks in the landing gear caused by an apparent manufacturing defect. However, this bulletin was not applicable to the accident airplane based on its year of manufacture.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during takeoff defining event
  2. Landing gear collapse during takeoff
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during takeoff (rejected takeoff)

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main gear strut/axle/truck › Failure
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Landing gear system › Main gear strut/axle/truck › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
  • Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › Equipment manufacture › Manufacturer

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine sea; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 761.1 hours in all; 641.7 in this make and model; 198.2 in the last 90 days; 87.5 in the last 30 days; 677.2 as pilot in command; 439.2 on instruments
  • Last flight review: October 9, 2022
  • Medical certificate: Class 3 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Dual student

  • Certificate: student
  • Flight time: 47 hours in all; 47 in this make and model
  • Medical certificate: None
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 593.4 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, July 3, 2023; 40.1 hours since
  • Seats: 2
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rotax 912 iS (piston); 634 hours total
  • Operator: Airplane Factory INC

The flight

  • Destination: TOA Torrance CA
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 31R, 4,952 ft by 75 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 050° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 102°F (39°C), dew point 37°F (3°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.89 inHg
  • Observation at 10:53 am from KPSP

Weather report (METAR): KPSP 111753Z 05004KT 10SM CLR 39/03 A2989 RMK AO2 SLP117 T03890033 10389 20278 58000 $

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

11 documents, released by the NTSB on May 14, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 9 pages View Download
2 Instructor and Student Pilot Statements PDF, 4 pages View Download
3 Airplane Damage Photos PDF, 4 pages View Download
4 NTSB Materials Laboratory Factual Report PDF, 17 pages View Download
5 Sling Service Bulletin 0001 PDF, 5 pages View Download
6 Memorandum for Record PDF, 1 page View Download
7 PFD Data for Inbound Toa to Psp Flight data file Download
8 PFD Data for Accident Flight data file Download
9 Maintenance Records Excerpts PDF, 2 pages View Download
10 POH Excerpts PDF, 2 pages View Download
11 Evidence Control Form - Landing Gear Leg PDF, 1 page View Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number WPR23LA270.