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Accidents · NTSB WPR22LA149 · Final report

Amateur-built S-4 COYOTE 1 accident near Chula Vista, California, April 8, 2022

On April 8, 2022 at about 10:30 pm local time, a amateur-built S-4 COYOTE 1, registered N3156D, was substantially damaged in an accident during takeoff near Chula Vista, California (John Nichols Field). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot/owner and maintenance personnel’s improper installation of the right wing’s aft lift strut to the right wing, which resulted in a loss of lift during takeoff, an uncommanded right roll, and an impact with terrain.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
April 8, 2022 · about 10:30 pm local time
Place
Chula Vista, California · John Nichols Field · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Amateur-built S-4 COYOTE 1
Registration
N3156D · registry record · serial 97251
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot of the accident airplane was attempting to depart after his airplane had recently been returned to service following a hard landing about 9 months before that had collapsed the right main landing gear and damaged the wing strut. During the takeoff attempt on the day of the accident, when the pilot started to rotate, the airplane immediately entered an uncommanded right roll. The pilot’s attempts to counteract the roll were unsuccessful and the airplane impacted the ground. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right wing’s aft lift strut was not bolted to the right wing attachment clevis. As the left wing was intact and continued to produce lift, the unsecured right wing would have reduced the lift force acting on the right wing and, therefore, inhibited the pilot’s ability to maintain level flight. This condition is what likely resulted in an uncommanded right roll and impact with the ground.   The airplane had recently been repaired by the pilot (who was also the owner) with assistance from his mechanic. During the rebuild, the mechanic placed a bolt upside down and with a finger-tight nylon locknut in the right wing’s aft lift strut to secure it to the right wing attachment clevis while they transported the airplane to a new hangar. The pilot and the mechanic never removed the bolt and the strut was never properly secured to the wing as required by the build manual before the accident flight. Both the pilot and mechanic performed the rebuild together and were both aware of the temporary measure used to secure the right wing’s aft lift strut to the right wing. The mechanic should have correctly completed the installation before he returned the airplane to service and the accident pilot should have recognized the absence of the hardware before he departed on the accident flight. Further, the pilot also missed the absence of the improper installation, having incorrectly assumed that the mechanic had performed a preflight inspection for him while they developed a preflight checklist.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power) during takeoff defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Owner/builder
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel
  • Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service › Maintenance/inspections › Return to service › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures › Wing structure › Fus (attach fitting on wing) › Incorrect service/maintenance

Pilot

  • Certificate: sport pilot
  • Ratings: single-engine land
  • Flight time: 169 hours in all; 18 in this make and model; 4 in the last 90 days; 1 in the last 30 days; 86 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: September 9, 2020
  • Medical certificate: Sport Pilot (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: sngl
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 110 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 8, 2022; 3.7 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 586 lb
  • Seats: 1
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Hirth 3203 (piston); 4 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: 0CL3 Chula Vista CA at 10:30 pm
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 27, 1,700 ft by 35 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 290° at 12 knots, gusting 17
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 91°F (33°C), dew point 23°F (-5°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.85 inHg
  • Observation at 3:53 pm from KSDM, 6 miles away

Weather report (METAR): KSDM 082253Z 29012G17KT 10SM CLR 33/M05 A2985 RMK AO2 SLP103 T03331050

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

8 documents, released by the NTSB on March 28, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.