Cessna 172 accident near New Castle, Delaware, January 29, 2026
On January 29, 2026 at about 1:44 am local time, a 2006 Cessna 172, registered N969FG, was substantially damaged in an accident during landing near New Castle, Delaware (New Castle airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilots’ failure to properly identify the assigned runway during the landing approach, which resulted in the airplane landing on a closed, snow-covered runway. Contributing was the illumination of the closed runway’s edge lighting.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- January 29, 2026 · about 1:44 am local time
- Place
- New Castle, Delaware · New Castle · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Cessna 172 S, built 2006 · all 172s on the register
- Registration
- N969FG · registry record · serial 172S10373
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilots were performing a visual flight rules, cross-country flight at night. The pilots coordinated with air traffic control to perform an instrument approach to the destination airport’s runway 19 that would terminate in a circle to land maneuver to the opposite direction runway 1. The airport was equipped with three runways, two of which had been closed with an accompanying NOTAM issued due to snow and ice that was covering them. Both pilots were aware of the runway closures prior to the flight. During the subsequent right circling maneuver, the left seat (flying) pilot inadvertently aligned the airplane and began a landing approach to runway 32, whose runway edge lights were illuminated despite the runway being closed. The airplane was high on the final approach, so the pilot transitioned into a forward slip. The pilot further described being task saturated while she tried to focus on maintaining airspeed and alignment with the runway using external visual cues and did not recognize that the airplane was approaching the wrong runway. The right seat pilot described that during the left seat pilot’s turn to final approach, he had been looking inside at an electronic device for indications of nearby traffic, and when he looked out, he recalled seeing that the airplane was approaching a runway surrounded by bright lights, including an approach lighting system. Neither pilot recognized the snow-covered runway surface until after the airplane had touched down. During the landing, the airplane’s wings and propeller contacted the ground, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing and fuselage. The manager of the airport’s air traffic control tower stated that all the runway’s lights, including those surrounding the closed runway, had been illuminated at the request of airport operations personnel in order to help melt snow and ice around the lights. The airport’s operations manager stated that the airport had requested that air traffic control tower personnel leave the runway 1/19 runway edge and taxiway lights on, but did not request that the closed runways’ lights be left on. Neither the air traffic control tower manager nor the airport operations manager was able to provide documentation of any lighting requests that had been made. According to FAA order JO 7110.65BB Air Traffic Control, “Do not turn on the runway edge lights when a NOTAM closing the runway is in effect.” Additionally, the airport operations manager reported no lighted “X” markings had been placed on the closed runways, as those markings were typically only placed during temporary closures due to construction. Had the pilots verified the airplane’s heading during the final approach and recognized that it was more than 50 degrees different than that of the intended landing runway, it is likely that the accident could have been avoided. It is also likely that had the closed runway’s lights not been illuminated, consistent with FAA guidance to air traffic controllers, the pilots would not have misidentified and attempted to land on the closed runway.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Abnormal runway contact during landing
- Wrong surface or wrong airport during landing defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Pilot
- Environmental issues › Physical environment › Runway/land/takeoff/taxi surface › Snow/slush/ice covered surface › Effect on operation
- Environmental issues › Operating environment › Airport facilities/design › Runway lighting › Effect on personnel
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, military
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 677 hours in all; 119 in this make and model; 100 in the last 90 days; 21 in the last 30 days; 148 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
- Last flight review: January 21, 2026
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Pilot
- Certificate: commercial pilot, military
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
- Flight time: 2,709 hours in all; 126 in this make and model; 112 in the last 90 days; 40 in the last 30 days; 1,838 as pilot in command; 0 on instruments
- Last flight review: October 29, 2025
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 10,136.4 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, January 12, 2026; 33 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 2,550 lb
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine: Lycoming IO-360-L2A (piston); 4,307 hours total
- Operator: Infinity Flight Group
The flight
- Departed from: ABE Allentown PA at 1:05 am
- Flight plan: none
- Runway 32, 4,602 ft by 150 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 320° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 12°F (-11°C), dew point 1°F (-17°C)
- Altimeter: 30.11 inHg
- Observation at 8:51 pm from ILG
Weather report (METAR): METAR KILG 290151Z AUTO 32004KT 10SM CLR M11/M17 A3011 RMK AO2 SLP196 T11061167 $
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 |
Photographs from the investigation 5 pictures from the NTSB's docket, as the NTSB released them


Compressed right wing root. Right flap broke right rear window. Spinner shows evidence of contact with pavement during cartwheel with engine running
Damage to Rt. Horizontal Stabilizer at the hinge point Photo taken less than 2 hours after occurrence from the closest plowed taxiway ( “D”?) Note the aircraft in the background and that the runway lights are still on for R/W 32 that is unp
Note in both of these photos the lack of tire tracks in the snow. This is because the A/C cartwheeled in to its final position.The NTSB's photographs with the NTSB's captions, at screen size. Open a picture to see it full size or to report one that should not be shown.
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
14 documents, released by the NTSB on May 14, 2026. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
