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Accidents · NTSB ERA23FA067 · Final report

Piper PA-30 accident near Winston-Salem, North Carolina, November 19, 2022

On November 19, 2022 at about 4:10 pm local time, a 1964 Piper PA-30, registered N7295Y, was substantially damaged in an accident during maneuvering near Winston-Salem, North Carolina (Smith Reynolds airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

Contamination and/or misalignment of the regulator section of the right engine’s fuel servo, which resulted in excessive idle fuel flow and a total loss of engine power. Also causal was the pilot's failure to land immediately on the nearest runway at the destination airport, his failure to feather the right propeller following the loss of engine power while approaching the airport, and his failure to maintain airspeed while maneuvering with one engine, which resulted in a loss of control at a low altitude.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
November 19, 2022 · about 4:10 pm local time
Place
Winston-Salem, North Carolina · Smith Reynolds · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
2 people were killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Piper PA-30 NO SERIES, built 1964 · all PA-30s on the register
Registration
N7295Y · no longer on the register · serial 30-335
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Near the conclusion of the cross-country flight, when the airplane was flying about 2,175 ft pressure altitude and about 4 nautical miles due west of the approach end of runway 4 at the destination airport, the pilot broadcast on the frequency that one engine was not making as much power as the other, but that, “we’re ok.” The controller cleared the pilot to land on runway 4; however, for reasons that were not reported by the pilot, the airplane continued past the extended runway centerline for that runway. The pilot subsequently asked to land on runway 33, which was approved. The airplane continued on an easterly heading past the extended runway 33 centerline, then turned left on northwesterly heading flying parallel to runway 33. While flying east of the airport one witness noted the airplane banking left to about 45° before the wings rolled level and then banked about 10° to the left. The same witness reported that, while flying in a nose-up attitude just above the trees with the landing gear extended, the airplane rolled to an inverted position and descended straight down. The airplane impacted terrain behind a house. Postaccident examination of the flight controls, propellers, right propeller governor, left engine and its systems, and right engine powertrain, lubrication, exhaust, ignition, and air induction systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Neither propeller was feathered at impact. The damage to the left propeller was consistent with the engine developing some power at impact while the lack of damage to the right propeller was consistent with windmilling/rotating and not developing power at impact. Additionally, although it was not determined if there were any missing vortex generators (VG’s) on either wing at the time of the accident, the airplane’s performance was not changed by the installation of the VG’s. Thus, if any were missing at the time of the accident, it likely did not contribute to the accident. Postaccident operational testing of the right engine’s fuel servo revealed that it passed all four test points and the regulator hysteresis check, but it failed testing of the idle circuit, which should result in decreased fuel flow with movement of the throttle control from wide open to idle. The fuel flow when reducing the throttle to idle was about 2.6 times higher than what it should have been. Disassembly of the right fuel servo revealed internal contamination in the fuel section of the regulator that was determined to be acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS), a thermoplastic, though the exact source of the contamination could not be determined. Following reassembly of the regulator with the internal contamination removed, the idle circuit test was repeated multiple times, and the fuel flow was within limits. Although it could not be determined if the excessive fuel flow during the idle circuit test was caused by the internal contamination or a combination of that and misalignment of the regulator section, the additional 0.011-inch clearance of the throttle valve at idle was likely the result of maintenance personnel attempting to remedy the excessive fuel flow when moving the throttle valve to idle. Thus, it is likely that during the descent approaching the airport with both engines operating at a reduced power setting, the excessive fuel flow to the right engine likely resulted in a total loss of engine power. Although the right engine likely sustained a total loss of engine power due to a malfunction of the fuel servo, it is likely that the pilot either did not, or delayed, feathering the right propeller until the propeller rpm slowed to where the propeller blades engaged on the start locks. In that position, an attempt to feather the propeller would not be possible until the propeller rpm increased above the speed that disengaged the start locks. The increased parasitic drag from the windmilling and unfeathered right propeller likely precluded the possibility of straight and level flight. Towards the end of flight, the airspeed likely reduced below the published Velocity Minimum Control (Vmc) speed, and the airplane rolled to an inverted position. Had the pilot either turned towards runway 4 which was the nearest runway after advising the controller of an engine malfunction, or feathered the right propeller following total loss of right engine power and maintained an airspeed above the published Vmc speed while continuing towards the airport, it is likely that he could have reached the airport and landed uneventfully.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Loss of engine power (partial) during maneuvering
  2. Loss of control in flight during maneuvering defining event
  3. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent
  4. Collision with terrain or object (not controlled flight into terrain) during uncontrolled descent

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › Fuel control/carburetor › Malfunction
  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Engine out control › Not attained/maintained
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Pilot
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot, remote
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 1,462 hours in all; 155 in this make and model; 31 in the last 90 days; 22 in the last 30 days
  • Last flight review: March 19, 2021
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

Passenger

  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 5,453.3 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, May 3, 2022
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,600 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Lycoming IO-320-B1A (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Lycoming IO-320-B1A (piston); 0 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: LOZ London KY at 3:04 pm
  • Destination: INT Winston-Salem NC
  • Flight plan: VFR
  • Runway 33, 6,655 ft by 150 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 46°F (8°C), dew point 27°F (-3°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.29 inHg
  • Observation at 10:54 am from KINT, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KINT 191554Z 00000KT 10SM CLR 08/M03 A3029 RMK AO2 SLP259 T00781033=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

27 documents, released by the NTSB on March 6, 2024. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 PDF, 11 pages · our copy View Download
2 Witness Statements PDF, 4 pages · our copy View Download
3 FAA Record of Conversations PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
4 NTSB Record of Conversations PDF, 6 pages · our copy View Download
5 Fuel Information PDF, 9 pages · our copy View Download
6 Excerpts from Twin Commanche Owner's Handbook PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
7 Excerpts from Propeller Owner's Manual PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
8 Excerpts from Maintenance Records Regarding Right Fuel Injection Servo PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
9 Maintenance Record Excerpts PDF, 14 pages · our copy View Download
10 NTSB Prepared Partial Transcription of Communications PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
11 Google Earth Plot with ADS-B Targets, Select Times, Locations, and Transmissions PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
12 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Automatic Dependent Surveillance A�� Broadcast (ADS-B) Tabular Data data file · our copy Download
13 Investigative Photographs PDF, 15 pages · our copy View Download
14 Memorandum for Record - Cockpit Observations PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
15 Memorandum for Record - Fuel Supply System Factual Observations PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
16 Memorandum for Record - On-site Airframe Factual Observations PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
17 Memorandum for Record - On-site Engine Examination Factual Observations PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
18 Memorandum for Record - Right Fuel Injection Servo Factual Observations PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
19 Memorandum for Record - Wing Vortex Generator Inspection Factual Observations PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
20 Memorandum for Record - Propellers and Propeller Governors Examination Factual Observations PDF, 3 pages · our copy View Download
21 Memorandum for Record - Rudder Trim Factual Observations PDF, 2 pages · our copy View Download
22 Toxicological Report - Pilot PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
23 Autopsy Memorandum for Record - Pilot PDF, 1 page · our copy View Download
24 NTSB Materials Laboratory E-mail Report Concerning Analysis of Contamination Inside Regulator Section of Right Servo Fuel Injector PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
25 Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation PDF, 11 pages · our copy View Download
26 Release of Aircraft Wreckage, NTSB Form 6120.15, and NTSB Evidence Control Forms PDF, 5 pages · our copy View Download
27 NTSB Database Search Results 2008 Thru 2023 for Twin Engine Accidents Citing Delay or Failure to Feather Following A Loss of Engine Power spreadsheet · our copy Download

The same docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.