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Accidents · NTSB ERA14TA096 · Final report

Eurocopter AS350B3 accident near Houlton, Maine, January 18, 2014

On January 18, 2014 at about 1:40 am local time, a 2003 Eurocopter AS350B3 (helicopter), registered N578AE, was substantially damaged in an accident during initial climb near Houlton, Maine (Houlton Intl airport). It was a public-use flight (federal) under public-use (government) rules. No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

An engine compartment explosion during takeoff; the origin of the explosion could not be determined during postaccident examination due to extensive fire damage.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
January 18, 2014 · about 1:40 am local time
Place
Houlton, Maine · Houlton Intl · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Eurocopter AS350B3, built 2003 · all AS350B3s on the register
Registration
N578AE · no longer on the register · serial 3730
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Public-use flight (federal) · public-use (government) rules

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

After about 1 hour of flight, the helicopter crew began conducting landing refresher training with the use of night vision goggles. The copilot completed a single approach and three landings to the 5,015-ft runway, with one landing at the beginning, one near the middle, and one near the end. The copilot then lifted the helicopter off the ground once more, hovered, and began a transition to forward flight with forward cyclic and a slight amount of increased collective. Both crewmembers then heard and felt a loud explosion from the vicinity of the engine compartment. Engine sound increased rapidly, and the pilot mentioned a possible low rotor speed condition. He believed that the copilot then lowered the collective slightly in response to his statement, and, while doing so, the noise increased and helicopter oscillations began. The helicopter became almost uncontrollable, the pilot took the controls (which the copilot positively relinquished), and the copilot made two "mayday" calls. The pilot regained sufficient control to land the helicopter beyond the departure end of the runway. As the helicopter cleared the runway, the pilot observed an orange glow on the snow-covered ground, and, after landing, the copilot attempted to put out the engine compartment fire with a small onboard extinguisher, without success. The local fire department arrived about 10 minutes later and extinguished the fire, but much of the engine compartment had been consumed, and the helicopter structure below the engine compartment had been thermally compromised and substantially damaged. The were no cockpit image or flight data recorders onboard the helicopter; however, there was a vehicle and engine multifunction display (VEMD) unit. As recorded by the VEMD and confirmed by the pilots, about the time of the explosion, a red "GOV" light illuminated in the cockpit, which would have indicated a "stepper motor or resolver failure" in the fuel control. Subsequent examinations of the engine, components, and wiring did not reveal the source of the explosion, but did note charring and evidence of high heat. The engine's free turbine blades were also found shed from the turbine disk at a manufactured overspeed notch in the blade roots as designed to prevent a subsequent turbine disk rupture. Of the fuel control items that could be examined, no preexisting anomalies could be found. However, their proximity to extreme heat could have triggered the red GOV light and the loss of automatic fuel metering. The helicopter's collective twist grip mechanical stop had been upgraded with one that automatically freed the grip once the red GOV light illuminated. The helicopter did not have an automatic fuel control backup system; thus, fuel flow and, therefore, engine output had to be manually controlled by the pilot once the red GOV light illuminated. Although not the cause of the accident, the crew's inability to recognize that they were operating in a manual fuel control regime likely exacerbated the situation. Changes in collective position would have resulted in changes of engine and rotor rpm, and the inflight excursions and later engine overspeed upon landing were the likely result of collective movement without fuel control compensation. Further examination of the engine also revealed impact deposits on the axial compressor blades and gas generator turbine blades. The material was likely from the engine's sand filter and cowling, indicating that the engine compartment fire was ongoing while the engine was still rotating, with a flame established in the combustion chamber. The fact that the fire continued after engine shutdown until the fire department arrived and put it out indicates that, regardless of the crew's actions, the structural damage to the helicopter still would have occurred.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Explosion (non-impact) during initial climb defining event
  2. Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during maneuvering (low-alt flying)
  3. Miscellaneous/other during landing
  4. Fire/smoke (non-impact) during landing

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Not determined › Not determined › (general) › (general) › Unknown/Not determined

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: helicopter; instructor: instrument airplane; instructor: instrument helicopter; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 8,294 hours in all; 346 in this make and model; 44 in the last 90 days; 7 in the last 30 days; 7,137 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: January 31, 2013
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: rgt
  • Injury: no injuries

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; multi-engine sea; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 3,176 hours in all; 156 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: January 31, 2013
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,863 hours
  • Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, September 24, 2013
  • Maximum gross weight: 4,961 lb
  • Seats: 6
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Turbomeca Arriel 2B (turboshaft); 2,863 hours total

The flight

  • Departed from: HUL Houlton ME
  • Destination: HUL Houlton ME
  • Runway 23, 5,015 ft by 100 ft
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: night
  • Wind: from 200° at 5 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 34°F (1°C), dew point 32°F (0°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.82 inHg
  • Observation at 1:53 am from HUL

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew2

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

11 documents, released by the NTSB on February 23, 2017. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.