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Accidents · NTSB ERA14IA249 · Final report

Embraer EMB-110P1 incident near Warren, Vermont, May 21, 2014

On May 21, 2014 at about 11:33 am local time, a 1982 Embraer EMB-110P1, registered N116WA, suffered minor damage in an incident during enroute (cruise) near Warren, Vermont (Warren-Sugarbush airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's inadequate preflight inspection, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 21, 2014 · about 11:33 am local time · cases in 2014
Place
Warren, Vermont · Warren-Sugarbush · cases near this airport · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 1 person was on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Embraer EMB-110P1, built 1982 · all EMB-110P1s on the register
Registration
N116WA · registry record · serial 110399
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

According to the pilot, 1,000 lbs of fuel was to be added to each fuel tank the night before the incident flight. The next morning, he conducted a preflight inspection and reported seeing 1,000 lbs per side and then departed the home base airport on the cargo flight. The pilot reported that, while in cruise flight, the fuel low-pressure light illuminated, followed shortly thereafter by the right engine and then the left engine shutting down. The pilot subsequently diverted the flight to a nearby airport. Upon touchdown, the pilot used "aggressive braking." The left tire subsequently deflated, the airplane veered left, the left main landing gear departed the paved portion of the runway, and then the right tire deflated. Following the incident, maintenance personnel conducted a fuel quantity gauge accuracy test, and no abnormalities or malfunctions were noted that would have precluded normal operation. Postincident examination of the fuel system revealed that the fuel tanks were devoid of fuel. The fuel caps were found secure and in place, and no evidence of any preaccident mechanical malfunction or failure was found. There was no evidence of any fuel staining or leakage. A review of the airplane's fueling records revealed that it was last refueled over a week before the incident; it was not fueled the night before the incident as requested by the pilot. During that week, the airplane was flown about 1.9 flight hours; 1,100 lbs of fuel remained after that flight. Maintenance personnel subsequently conducted multiple engine performance runs and two taxi repositions, which consumed about 600 lbs of fuel, leaving about 500 lbs of fuel, which was also reported by a maintenance technician after the most recent test run before the flight. Given the lack of any preexisting mechanical anomalies and that no fuel was recovered from the airplane, it is likely that the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion because of the pilot's inadequate preflight inspection.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Preflight or dispatch event during prior to flight
  2. Fuel exhaustion during enroute (cruise) defining event
  3. Loss of engine power (total) during enroute (cruise)
  4. Off-field or emergency landing during emergency descent

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Task performance › Inspection › Preflight inspection › Pilot
  • cause Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid level other cases naming the fuel system

Pilot

  • Certificate: flight instructor, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instructor: airplane multi-engine; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: P&W Canada PT6A-60A (turboprop); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: P&W Canada PT6A-60A (turboprop); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Wiggins Airways INC

The flight

  • Departed from: MHT Manchester NH at 11:00 am
  • Destination: BVT Burlington VT
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 22, 2,575 ft by 30 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 48°F (9°C), dew point 41°F (5°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.04 inHg
  • Observation at 11:51 am from KMPV, 13 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

4 documents, released by the NTSB on December 21, 2015. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ERA14IA249.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.