Piper PA-32R-300 accident near Sevierville, Tennessee, October 28, 2012

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Before departure, the pilot had contacted the air traffic control (ATC) facility and received his instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance, which entailed flying direct to a navigational facility about 22 miles west of the departure airport. Shortly after departure, the pilot contacted ATC, and was given radar vectors toward that navigational facility and toward rising terrain. Because the airplane was in instrument conditions, the pilot was unable to see the surrounding terrain. When the airplane’s global position system's terrain feature alerted the pilot of a possible terrain issue, the pilot queried the air traffic controller. However, before the controller responded, the airplane impacted a pole and trees; a postimpact fire ensued and consumed the airplane. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) defines minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) as the lowest altitude at which an IFR aircraft will be vectored by a radar controller to ensure obstacle clearance. The FAA further states that air traffic controllers are to give first priority to separating aircraft, issuing safety alerts, and providing safety alerts regarding terrain or obstructions. Despite FAA requirements, a review of accident-related ATC radar and voice data revealed that ATC personnel issued a radar vector without first identifying the accident airplane on radar, provided radar vectors when the airplane was below the MVA, and did not provide safety alerts to the accident airplane or another airplane that had departed just before the accident flight. Interviews with the accident ATC personnel indicated that a facility-wide culture of providing vectors to aircraft below minimum altitudes existed, air traffic controllers supervised other controllers while performing operational duties, and the facility was non-compliant with safety alert requirements. The accident air traffic controller failed to adhere to the required procedures for vectoring and providing appropriate safety alerts, which negated the safety margins afforded by those procedures. This culture of disregard for standard operating procedures among the controller workforce at the ATC facility was indicative of a continuous failure of management at the facility.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.