Boeing 767-300F incident near Memphis, Tennessee, October 18, 2023
On October 18, 2023 at about 9:15 pm local time, a 2022 Boeing 767-300F, registered N287FE, suffered minor damage in an incident during initial climb near Memphis, Tennessee (Memphis Intl airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved. The weather was conditions the NTSB did not record.
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
A high-pressure fuel leak from a gap in the bolted flange interface between the main fuel pump’s fuel crossover supply tube and the hydromechanical unit idler adapter pad, which resulted in the crossover tube flange bolts partially pulling out and allowing fuel to escape and ignite on contact with the engine’s heatshield. Contributing to the fuel leak was Avio Aero's incorrect manufacture of the idler adapter pad bolt holes, which deviated from GE's manufacturing print requirement; Avio Aero's improper installation of threaded inserts into the idler adapter bolt holes; Avio Aero's failure to inform GE about the manufacturing deviation and request approval; and GE's failure to identify the manufacturing deviation during adapter quality and compliance design reviews.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- October 18, 2023 · about 9:15 pm local time
- Place
- Memphis, Tennessee · Memphis Intl · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 3 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- conditions the NTSB did not record
- Aircraft
- Boeing 767-300F, built 2022 · all 767-300Fs on the register
- Registration
- N287FE · registry record · serial 63138
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The incident engine, a General Electric (GE) CF6-80C2 turbofan, suffered an undercowl fire due to a high-pressure fuel leak originating from a bolted flange interface between a high-pressure fuel crossover tube and the hydromechanical unit (HMU) accessory gearbox adapter pad. The engine’s accessory heat shield surface temperatures and stagnant airflow near the fuel leak location were sufficient to cause ignition. Two threaded inserts in the adapter pad were found protruding and likely prevented the fuel tube from correctly seating on the adapter pad surface. Threaded inserts were not securely installed into the adapter pad, which allowed the crossover tube bolts to partially pull out. Multiple insert holes had stripped threads, linear scoring, counterclockwise material smearing, missing surface anodization, cross-threading, and concave hole profiles. Avio Aero, the adapter manufacturer, implemented an automated pre-tap operation that pre-machined threads into the adapter pad to ease installation of self-tapping steel inserts. In early 2023, this pre-tap operation was determined to be a deviation from the part’s drawing requirements. Neither GE Aerospace nor Avio Aero could find documentation supporting the decision to pre-tap the adapter holes or Avio Aero communicating to GE of their decision to deviate from the print requirement. Avio Aero may have decided to pre-tap the adapter holes because other parts were using this process.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during initial climb
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during initial climb defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine fuel and control › (general) › Malfunction
- Organizational issues › Development › Manufacture/production › Equipment manufacture › Manufacturer
- Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring › Documentation/record keeping › (general) › Manufacturer
The aircraft
- Seats: 2
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 2: Ge CF6-80C2B6F (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 3: Ge CF6-80C2B6F (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Federal Express CORP
Weather at the time
- Light: dusk
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
10 documents, released by the NTSB on April 30, 2025. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Powerplants Group Factual Report ENG24FA003 | PDF, 120 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Powerplants Attachment 1 - Fedex Chipcheck Analysis | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Powerplants Attachment 2 - Ge Aerospace Fohx Debris Metallurgical Analysis | PDF, 10 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Powerplants Attachment 3 - Honeywell Hmu Examination Report | PDF, 31 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Powerplants Attachment 4 - Collins Aerospace Material Project Report for Mfp Housing | PDF, 41 pages | View Download |
| 6 | Powerplants Attachment 5 - the Boeing Company Fuel Supply Hose Analysis | PDF, 20 pages | View Download |
| 7 | Powerplants Attachment 6 - Ge Aerospace Idler Adapter Metallurgical Analysis | PDF, 119 pages | View Download |
| 8 | Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report | PDF, 18 pages | View Download |
| 9 | Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 1 (FDR Csv Data for Incident Flight) | data file | Download |
| 10 | Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 2 (FDR Csv Data for Previous Flights) | data file | Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.