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Accidents · NTSB ENG17IA027 · Final report

Boeing 737 7H4 incident near Washington, District of Columbia, June 3, 2017

On June 3, 2017 at about 12:55 pm local time, a 2000 Boeing 737 7H4, registered N765SW, suffered minor damage in an incident during enroute near Washington, District of Columbia (Washington Dulles Intl airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 67 people were on board or involved. The weather was conditions the NTSB did not record.

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The failure the control alternator gearshaft, which disconnected the accessory gearbox from the rest of the engine and resulted in an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the left engine and subsequent flight diversion. The control alternator gearshaft failed because of high cycle fatigue intergranular corrosion cracking. Contributing to the failure of the control alternator gearshaft were additional manufacturing processing steps to address part non-conformances that reduced its high cycle fatigue capability and potential change in vibratory environment since the last shop visit.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 12, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
June 3, 2017 · about 12:55 pm local time · cases in 2017
Place
Washington, District of Columbia · Washington Dulles Intl · cases near this airport · map
Type
Incident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 67 people were on board or involved.
Weather
conditions the NTSB did not record
Aircraft
Boeing 737 7H4 7H4, built 2000 · all 737 7H4s on the register
Registration
N765SW · registry record · serial 29805
Damage
Minor damage
Flight
Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The alternator control gearshaft (L3 gearshaft) failed due to high cycle fatigue intergranular corrosion cracking.  High cycle fatigue is normally vibration driven where fatigue striations are hard to resolve (count) and where the number of cycles far exceeds the flight cycles.  No indications of any abnormal vibration were noted during the event flight and a review of fan and core vibration diagnostic data from the last shop visit in 2017 (the AGB was overhauled at that time) showed all the vibration levels to be within acceptable limits.     A review of the manufacturing records showed that the failed L3 gearshaft was 1 of 32 initially produced from the same production batch.  Due to corrosion issues during the initial manufacturing process, all the gearshafts were subjected to additional manufacturing operations; only 8 were deemed serviceable and put into service, one of which was the event gearshaft.  To understand the impact of the additional manufacturing processing steps performed on the failure L3 gearshaft, a series of chemical etch and black oxide treatments were performed on a sample of the same material.  This sample was compared with the failed L3 gearshaft and revealed that the intergranular attack observed on the failed L3 gearshaft could not be replicated; the sample material showed no intergranular attack even after 5 chemical etchings.  CFMI concluded that the chemical etching alone could not account for the intergranular attack observed on the event L3 gearshaft; instead it is thought that the additional machining process stress combined with the chemical etching needed to remove the corrosion caused the increase in quantity and density of the microcracks along with the grain boundary consumption.  However, this still did not fully account for why the gearshaft failed in high cycle fatigue, which is normally a vibration driven failure mode.  Since the event L3 gearshaft was introduced into service, it had operated almost 20 years; accumulated 63,711 hours time since new and 37,433 cycles since new; and was subjected to in-service inspections at the piece part level on two occasions; once in 2007 and then again in 2017 with no anomalies reported.  Had the additional manufacturing processing been the solely cause of the failure, the L3 gearshaft most likely could not have operated as long as it had, and it would most likely not have failed in a vibratory mode.  Instead the additional manufacturing operations most likely affected the high cycle fatigue capability of the gearshaft, but it wasn't until a change in the vibratory stress that the part was exposed did it fail.  Unfortunately, the engine is not equipped with any vibration sensors on the AGB so detecting any changing vibratory response in the AGB was not possible.  The engine is however equipped with a No. 1 bearing sensor and fan frame compressor case vertical sensor.  Review of the flight data recorder data showed no aircraft vibration monitoring alerts prior to, or after the engine failure event.  Also, a review of fan and core vibration diagnostic data from the last shop visit in 2017, the AGB was overhauled at that time, to the event date showed all the vibration levels to be within acceptable limits.     The transfer shaft locking nut was found loose but was still engaged with the 47 tooth gearshaft and the transfer gearbox.  Review of the maintenance records showed locking nut was last torqued in accordance with the approved procedures during the engine's last shop visit.  The locking nut threads and mating threads on the L3 gearshaft were in good condition, the lock nut retaining ring was present, properly installed, and in good condition, and the transfer shaft was found fully engaged. CFMI's experience with locking nuts becoming untorqued during operation is that the transfer shaft disengages resulting in a subsequent in-flight shutdown; in this case the transfer shaft remained fully engaged.  Therefore, the loose transfer nut did not cause nor a contributing factor to the failure of the L3 gearshaft and was an artifact of the initial failure event.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Uncontained engine failure during enroute defining event
  2. Loss of engine power (total) during enroute
  3. Engine shutdown during enroute
  4. Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute

The NTSB's findings

The aircraft

  • Maximum gross weight: 154,500 lb
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine 1: Cfm Intl. CFM56-7B24 (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Cfm Intl. CFM56-7B24 (turbofan); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Southwest Airlines CO

The flight

  • Departed from: TPA Tampa FL
  • Destination: ROC Rochester NY
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • A second pilot was aboard

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Cabi3
Flight crew2
Passengers62

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

3 documents, released by the NTSB on June 20, 2018. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

#DocumentWhat it is
1 Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report PDF, 40 pages View Download
2 Flight Data Recorder - Specialist's Factual Report PDF, 4 pages View Download
3 Flight Data Recorder - Attachment 1 (FDR Tabular Data for Event Flight) zip file Download

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Connections how this case links to the rest of the register

Aircraft
Place

The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ENG17IA027.json.

The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.