Boeing 737 7H4 incident near Washington, District of Columbia, June 3, 2017
On June 3, 2017 at about 12:55 pm local time, a 2000 Boeing 737 7H4, registered N765SW, suffered minor damage in an incident during enroute near Washington, District of Columbia (Washington Dulles Intl airport). It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 67 people were on board or involved. The weather was conditions the NTSB did not record.
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The failure the control alternator gearshaft, which disconnected the accessory gearbox from the rest of the engine and resulted in an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the left engine and subsequent flight diversion. The control alternator gearshaft failed because of high cycle fatigue intergranular corrosion cracking. Contributing to the failure of the control alternator gearshaft were additional manufacturing processing steps to address part non-conformances that reduced its high cycle fatigue capability and potential change in vibratory environment since the last shop visit.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- June 3, 2017 · about 12:55 pm local time
- Place
- Washington, District of Columbia · Washington Dulles Intl · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 67 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- conditions the NTSB did not record
- Aircraft
- Boeing 737 7H4 7H4, built 2000 · all 737 7H4s on the register
- Registration
- N765SW · registry record · serial 29805
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The alternator control gearshaft (L3 gearshaft) failed due to high cycle fatigue intergranular corrosion cracking. High cycle fatigue is normally vibration driven where fatigue striations are hard to resolve (count) and where the number of cycles far exceeds the flight cycles. No indications of any abnormal vibration were noted during the event flight and a review of fan and core vibration diagnostic data from the last shop visit in 2017 (the AGB was overhauled at that time) showed all the vibration levels to be within acceptable limits. A review of the manufacturing records showed that the failed L3 gearshaft was 1 of 32 initially produced from the same production batch. Due to corrosion issues during the initial manufacturing process, all the gearshafts were subjected to additional manufacturing operations; only 8 were deemed serviceable and put into service, one of which was the event gearshaft. To understand the impact of the additional manufacturing processing steps performed on the failure L3 gearshaft, a series of chemical etch and black oxide treatments were performed on a sample of the same material. This sample was compared with the failed L3 gearshaft and revealed that the intergranular attack observed on the failed L3 gearshaft could not be replicated; the sample material showed no intergranular attack even after 5 chemical etchings. CFMI concluded that the chemical etching alone could not account for the intergranular attack observed on the event L3 gearshaft; instead it is thought that the additional machining process stress combined with the chemical etching needed to remove the corrosion caused the increase in quantity and density of the microcracks along with the grain boundary consumption. However, this still did not fully account for why the gearshaft failed in high cycle fatigue, which is normally a vibration driven failure mode. Since the event L3 gearshaft was introduced into service, it had operated almost 20 years; accumulated 63,711 hours time since new and 37,433 cycles since new; and was subjected to in-service inspections at the piece part level on two occasions; once in 2007 and then again in 2017 with no anomalies reported. Had the additional manufacturing processing been the solely cause of the failure, the L3 gearshaft most likely could not have operated as long as it had, and it would most likely not have failed in a vibratory mode. Instead the additional manufacturing operations most likely affected the high cycle fatigue capability of the gearshaft, but it wasn't until a change in the vibratory stress that the part was exposed did it fail. Unfortunately, the engine is not equipped with any vibration sensors on the AGB so detecting any changing vibratory response in the AGB was not possible. The engine is however equipped with a No. 1 bearing sensor and fan frame compressor case vertical sensor. Review of the flight data recorder data showed no aircraft vibration monitoring alerts prior to, or after the engine failure event. Also, a review of fan and core vibration diagnostic data from the last shop visit in 2017, the AGB was overhauled at that time, to the event date showed all the vibration levels to be within acceptable limits. The transfer shaft locking nut was found loose but was still engaged with the 47 tooth gearshaft and the transfer gearbox. Review of the maintenance records showed locking nut was last torqued in accordance with the approved procedures during the engine's last shop visit. The locking nut threads and mating threads on the L3 gearshaft were in good condition, the lock nut retaining ring was present, properly installed, and in good condition, and the transfer shaft was found fully engaged. CFMI's experience with locking nuts becoming untorqued during operation is that the transfer shaft disengages resulting in a subsequent in-flight shutdown; in this case the transfer shaft remained fully engaged. Therefore, the loose transfer nut did not cause nor a contributing factor to the failure of the L3 gearshaft and was an artifact of the initial failure event.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Uncontained engine failure during enroute defining event
- Loss of engine power (total) during enroute
- Engine shutdown during enroute
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during enroute
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Accessory drives › Failure
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Accessory drives › Fatigue/wear/corrosion
The aircraft
- Maximum gross weight: 154,500 lb
- Landing gear: fixed
- Engine 1: Cfm Intl. CFM56-7B24 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: Cfm Intl. CFM56-7B24 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Operator: Southwest Airlines CO
The flight
- Departed from: TPA Tampa FL
- Destination: ROC Rochester NY
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cabi | 3 | |||
| Flight crew | 2 | |||
| Passengers | 62 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ENG17IA027.
