Bombardier CRJ700 incident near Hodeida, Ye, September 13, 2014
On September 13, 2014, a 2008 Bombardier CRJ700, registered N7OFAB, suffered minor damage in an incident during takeoff near Hodeida. It was flown under non-U.S. commercial rules. The NTSB record does not give the injuries. The weather was conditions the NTSB did not record.
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The probable cause of the undercowl engine fire was the burn-through of the combustion chamber inner liner from the accumulation of dust that became molten during operating and infiltrated the combustion chamber thermal barrier coating causing it to spall off and accelerate normal thermal distress. The burn-though of the combustion chamber caused downstream hardware to experience higher than designed temperatures that resulted in mechanical and thermal distress to the point that the low pressure turbine case began to melt. Contributing to the combustion chamber failure was the operators' failure to do recommended borescope inspections that would have detected the combustion chamber distress and hence the removal of the engine before it was allowed to progress to the point that the combustion and turbine sections of the engine failed.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made November 2, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- September 13, 2014 · cases in 2014
- Place
- Hodeida, Yemen · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- The NTSB record does not give the injuries.
- Weather
- conditions the NTSB did not record
- Aircraft
- Bombardier CRJ700 702ER NG, built 2008
- Registration
- N7OFAB · not in the FAA's current or past register files · serial 10268
- Damage
- Minor damage
- Flight
- Flight · non-U.S. commercial rules
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
On September 13, 2014, at about 06:02 UTC, Airways Bombardier (formerly Canadair) CRJ702ER Next Generation (NG), registration number 7O-FAB, powered by two General Electric (GE) CF34-8C5B1 turbofan engines, experienced a No. 1 (left) engine failure just after takeoff from the Hodeida International Airport (HOD), Yemen. The flight crew received a No. 1 engine fire warning indication along with high N2 vibrations and performed an inflight shutdown (IFSD) of the engine and made an uneventful air turn back (ATB) and landing at HOD. External examination of the No. 1 engine revealed a 26½ inches circumferential breach in the low pressure turbine case. Disassembly of the engine revealed a 10 inch burn-through hole in the combustion chamber inner liner. No anomalies were noted to any of the hardware upstream of the combustion chamber. Downstream of the combustion chamber, thermal distress and impact damage was noted throughout the high pressure and low pressure turbines. Debris that looked and felt like a brown soft talc was collected from the HPT aft shaft and HPT stage 2 blade retainers and sent to GE for analysis. Although the samples were similar, the HPT stage 2 blade debris was enriched with calcium sulfate (CaSO4). According to GE, the dust forms a calcium-magnesium-aluminum-silica (CMAS) that melts and infiltrates the structure on the thermal barrier coating (TBC) of the combustion liner surfaces causing the TBC to spall and accelerate thermal deterioration of the liner. Engine trend data for the event engine showed that starting in early May 2014 that there was an anomaly with the engine's interstage turbine temperature. GE recommended that the engine should be borescope inspected and to troubleshoot the temperatue indication system. Review of the engine logbook for the event engine found no mention of a borescope inspection or troubleshooting of the temperature indication system after May 2014. A review of other CF34-8C5/8E engines operating in a similar harsh enviroment found the event engine found had remained on wing and operated almost 2.5 longer than the average engine.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Fire/smoke (non-impact) during takeoff defining event
- Engine shutdown during takeoff
- Loss of engine power (partial) during takeoff
- Powerplant sys/comp malf/fail during takeoff
The NTSB's findings
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Combustion section › Failure other cases naming the engine
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Combustion section › Not serviced/maintained other cases naming the engine
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (turbine/turboprop) › Combustion section › Inadequate inspection other cases naming the engine
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Lack of action › Maintenance personnel
The aircraft
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: General Electric CF34-8C5B1 (turbofan); 0 hours total
- Engine 2: General Electric CF34-8C5B1 (turbofan); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: HOD Hodeida
- Destination: SAH Sana'A
- Flight plan: not recorded
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: not reported
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
10 documents, released by the NTSB on January 20, 2016. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Connections how this case links to the rest of the register
- Engine: General Electric CF34-8C5B1 135 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
- Engine: General Electric CF34-8C5B1 135 aircraft carry this series today · as the NTSB recorded it
The whole map of how records connect · these connections as data: /graph/accident/ENG14IA029.json.
The bigger picture in Aviation Analytics: accidents over time since 1982, by model, by phase of flight and conditions, by place and on the map.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text does not name anyone involved, its policy at this time. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.