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Accidents · NTSB DCA00MA079 · Final report

Douglas DC-9-32 accident near Greensboro, North Carolina, August 8, 2000

On August 8, 2000 at about 7:44 pm local time, a Douglas DC-9-32, registered N838AT, was substantially damaged in an accident near Greensboro, North Carolina (Piedmont Triad International airport). It was a flight of an unrecorded kind under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 13 people had minor injuries; 50 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

A phase-to-phase arc in the left heat exchanger cooling fan relay, which ignited the surrounding wire insulation and other combustible materials within the electrical power center panel. Contributing to the left heat exchanger fan relay malfunction was the unauthorized repair that was not to the manufacturer's standards and the circuit breakers' failure to recognize an arc-fault.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
August 8, 2000 · about 7:44 pm local time
Place
Greensboro, North Carolina · Piedmont Triad International
Type
Accident
Injuries
13 people had minor injuries; 50 others were unhurt.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Douglas DC-9-32 · all DC-9-32s on the register
Registration
N838AT · no longer on the register
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Flight of an unrecorded kind · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

Examination of the area of the fire origin revealed that relay R2-53, the left heat exchanger cooling fan relay, was severely heat damaged, as were R2-54 and the other relays in this area. However, the R2-53 relay also exhibited loose terminal studs and several holes that had burned through the relay housing that the other relays did not exhibit. The wire bundles that run immediately below the left and right heat exchanger cooling fans and the ground service tie relays exhibited heat damage to the wire insulation, with the greatest damage located just below the R2-53 relay. The unique damage observed on the R2-53 relay and the wire damage directly below it indicates that fire initiation was caused by an internal failure of the R2-53 relay. Disassembly of the relay revealed that the R2-53 relay had been repaired but not to the manufacturer's standards. According to the manufacturer, the damage to the relay housing was consistent with a phase-to-phase arc between terminals A2 and B2 of the relay. During the on-scene portion of the investigation, three of the four circuit breakers in the left heat exchanger cooling fan were found in the tripped position. To determine why only three of the four circuit breakers tripped, all four were submitted to the Materials Integrity Branch at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, for further examination. The circuit breakers were visually examined and were subjected to an insulation resistance measurement, a contact resistance test, a voltage drop test, and a calibration test (which measured minimum and maximum ultimate trip times). Testing and examination determined that the circuit breaker that did not trip exhibited no anomalies that would prevent normal operation, met all specifications required for the selected tests, and operated properly during the calibration test. Although this circuit breaker appeared to have functioned properly during testing, the lab report noted that, as a thermal device, the circuit breaker is designed to trip when a sustained current overload exists and that it is possible during the event that intermittent arcing or a resistive short occurred or that the circuit opened before the breaker reached a temperature sufficient to trip the device.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 22,000 hours in all; 15,000 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: April 24, 2000
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: left

Co-pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 8,000 hours in all; 2,000 in this make and model
  • Last flight review: April 25, 2000
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--w/ waivers/lim.)
  • Seat: rgt

The aircraft

  • Last inspection: inspection type not recorded
  • Seats: 119
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Pratt & Whitney JT8D (turbojet); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Pratt & Whitney JT8D (turbojet); 0 hours total
  • Operator: Airtran Airlines INC

The flight

  • Destination: ATL Atlanta GA
  • Flight plan: IFR
  • Runway 0

Weather at the time

  • Light: not reported
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Crew32
Passengers1048

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.