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Accidents · NTSB CEN19LA133 · Final report

Cirrus SR20 accident near Mineral Wells, Texas, May 2, 2019

On May 2, 2019 at about 10:02 pm local time, a 2003 Cirrus SR20, registered N8160C, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Mineral Wells, Texas (Mineral Wells Airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The in-flight separation of the right aileron when the inboard hinge bolt disengaged from its nut plate due to excessively twisted safety wire, which resulted in a torsional overstress fracture that caused the inboard hinge bolt to become unsecured.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 2, 2019 · about 10:02 pm local time
Place
Mineral Wells, Texas · Mineral Wells Airport · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
No one was hurt; 2 people were on board or involved.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cirrus SR20 No Series, built 2003 · all SR20s on the register
Registration
N8160C · registry record · serial 1381
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

The pilot was conducting a personal flight in the airport traffic pattern when he felt the airplane “shudder” shortly before the turn onto the base leg for the runway. The pilot and passenger then saw the right aileron “fluttering,” and the pilot immediately turned to intercept the final approach. The right aileron separated from the wing about 0.5 mile from the approach end of the runway. The pilot was able to maintain roll control of the airplane after the right aileron separated, and he completed an uneventful landing on the runway. Examination of the airplane and the recovered right aileron revealed that the aileron’s inboard hinge bolt was not threaded into its nut plate. The safety wire that normally secured the inboard hinge bolt was found fractured. The safety wire had been excessively twisted when the right aileron was installed; the excessive twisting led to the torsional overstress fracture of the safety wire during the accident flight. Additionally, the nut plate had significantly reduced thread-locking abilities that allowed the unsecured inboard hinge bolt to loosen; the right aileron separated from the wing when the inboard hinge bolt disengaged from the nut plate. Although the inboard hinge bolt assembly included a slightly longer bolt than specified and an additional small washer, these component discrepancies did not contribute to the aileron separation. The airplane had accumulated about 733 flight hours during the more than 10 years since the right aileron was last removed and reinstalled during maintenance. The most recent maintenance performed on the airplane was an annual inspection completed about 15.2 flight hours before the accident. The mechanic who performed the last annual inspection observed safety wire installed on the aileron hinge bolts.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Part(s) separation from AC during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Incorrect service/maintenance
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Flight control system › Aileron control system › Failure
  • Personnel issues › Task performance › Maintenance › Installation › Maintenance personnel

Pilot

  • Certificate: airline transport pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; multi-engine sea; single-engine land; single-engine sea; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 7,500 hours in all; 4 in this make and model; 50 in the last 90 days; 30 in the last 30 days; 4,400 as pilot in command
  • Last flight review: April 19, 2019
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: no injuries

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,108.8 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, November 1, 2018; 15.2 hours since
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,000 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Continental IO-360-ES (piston); 2,109 hours total
  • Operator: Arrive Aviation LLC

The flight

  • Departed from: FTW Fort Worth TX at 9:30 pm
  • Destination: WEA Weatherford TX
  • Flight plan: none
  • Runway 31, 5,996 ft by 100 ft

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 260° at 12 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: clear
  • Temperature: 68°F (20°C), dew point 57°F (14°C)
  • Altimeter: 29.93 inHg
  • Observation at 9:53 pm from MWL, 1 miles away

Weather report (METAR): METAR KMWL 022153Z AUTO 26012KT 10SM CLR 20/14 A2993 RMK AO2 SLP127 T02000144=

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1
Passengers1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

8 documents, released by the NTSB on February 24, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.

The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.

Other NTSB records under N8160C the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2005-03-11MIA05IA087 · incident near Jacksonville, FL · minor damage · no injuries

Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.