Douglas DC-6A accident near Russian Mission, Alaska, July 20, 1996
On July 20, 1996 at about 11:06 pm local time, a Douglas DC-6A, registered N313RS, was destroyed in an accident near Russian Mission, Alaska (Russian Mission airport). It was a flight of an unrecorded kind under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). 4 people were killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
fatigue failure of the master connecting rod, which originated from corrosion pitting, subsequently compromised the engine crankcase, and resulted in a fire; and failure of the flight crew to follow emergency procedures by pulling the fire handle before feathering the propeller, which diminished the effectiveness of the fire suppression system.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- July 20, 1996 · about 11:06 pm local time
- Place
- Russian Mission, Alaska · Russian Mission · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 4 people were killed.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Douglas DC-6A · all DC-6As on the register
- Registration
- N313RS · registry record · serial 44663
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Flight of an unrecorded kind · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The cargo flight was en route, when a fire erupted in or near the #3 engine. During subsequent emergency procedures, the flight crew pulled the fire handle first. Later, they feathered the #3 engine. The fire did not extinguish. During an attempt to land at a rural, intermediate airstrip, while the airplane was in the traffic pattern, witnesses saw fire coming from the area of the #3 engine. They stated the right wing buckled upward, and the airplane crashed. Examination of the wreckage revealed a failure of the master rod in the front bank of cylinders of the #3 engine. Metallurgical tests revealed a crack in the top of the master rod head, which had resulted from corrosion pits. The side of the master rod head was measured and found to be out of round. The master rod shank also fractured due to fatigue. The operator's training procedures and the Douglas Aircraft emergency checklist procedures, required that the engine's propeller be feathered first, and then the fire extinguishing system to be activated. According to information derived from the airplane's cockpit voice recorder, the flight crew reversed that order. The effectiveness of the fire suppression system is diminished if the propeller is not feathered first.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 14,200 hours in all; 7,200 in this make and model; 204 in the last 90 days; 79 in the last 30 days; 3,000 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 38,248 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, April 4, 1996; 109 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 103,800 lb
- Seats: 5
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: P&W R-2800-CB3 (piston); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: ENM Emmonak AK at 5:10 pm
- Destination: ANI Aniak AK
- Flight plan: VFR
- Runway 35, 2,700 ft by 50 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 50 statute miles
- Sky: clear
- Temperature: 68°F (20°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Altimeter: 30.00 inHg
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 3 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ANC96FA102.