Beech 35 accident near Cascade Locks, Oregon, May 17, 2020
On May 17, 2020 at about 6:45 pm local time, a 1958 Beech 35, registered N8359D, was substantially damaged in an accident during approach (VFR pattern final) near Cascade Locks, Oregon (Cascade Locks State airport). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot’s improper fuel tank selection which resulted in fuel starvation to the engine and a loss of engine power.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- May 17, 2020 · about 6:45 pm local time
- Place
- Cascade Locks, Oregon · Cascade Locks State · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person had minor injuries; 1 other was unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Beech 35 J35, built 1958 · all 35s on the register
- Registration
- N8359D · no longer on the register · serial D-5490
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The pilot departed for the personal flight with the fuel selector valve set to the LEFT MAIN position. About 20 minutes into the flight, the pilot switched the fuel selector valve to the AUX TANK position and initiated a return to the departure airport. During the return flight, he decided to familiarize himself with a local airport. While on final approach, the pilot observed a person standing on the north side of the runway more than half-way down the runway. After overflying the person, the pilot advanced the throttle to full power and retracted the flaps. About 1-2 seconds after initiating a climb, the pilot noted a lack of acceleration and the engine volume decreased. He returned the airplane to level flight and switched the fuel selector from the AUX TANK position to the RIGHT fuel tank. The pilot looked for a suitable landing area and made sure that his throttle, mixture, and propeller levers were full forward. The pilot reported a rocky shoreline and with no other options, set up for a forced landing to the water. The airplane landed in the water near the shoreline, and the pilot and passenger were able to exit the airplane without assistance and swam to shore. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed the fuel selector was selected to the RIGHT TANK position. Additionally, printed on the fuel selector plate were the words “AUX TANK, LEVEL FLIGHT ONLY.” No evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation were noted with the airframe or engine. It is likely that the reason for the loss of engine power during the climb was a result of fuel starvation to the engine. The fuel pickup line in the auxiliary fuel tank is in the forward section of the fuel tank. When the airplane is in a climb attitude, it is possible the fuel in the auxiliary tank will shift aft of the fuel pickup line, which would starve the engine of fuel. As a result, pilots are cautioned to only use the auxiliary tank while in level flight, as printed on the fuel selector plate.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (total) during approach (VFR pattern final)
- Fuel related during approach (VFR pattern final) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Use of equip/system › Pilot
- Aircraft › Fluids/misc hardware › Fluids › Fuel › Fluid management
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, military
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 3,020 hours in all; 161 in this make and model; 33 in the last 90 days; 22 in the last 30 days; 2,537 as pilot in command; 600 on instruments
- Last flight review: January 15, 2020
- Medical certificate: Class 2 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: minor injuries
Passenger
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 3,495 hours
- Last inspection: annual inspection, September 12, 2019; 57 hours since
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Continental Aerospace Tech IO-470-C (piston); 4,393 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: TTD Portland OR at 6:15 pm
- Destination: CZK Cascade Locks OR
- Flight plan: none
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 3,100 ft
- Temperature: 55°F (13°C), dew point 3°F (-16°C)
- Altimeter: 29.73 inHg
- Observation at 6:22 pm from KTTD, 23 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 | |||
| Passengers | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
5 documents, released by the NTSB on October 25, 2022. View them here, or download them; the NTSB redacts some personal details before release, and this site shows the NTSB's own titles rather than its file names.
| # | Document | What it is | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pilot/operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1 | PDF, 9 pages | View Download |
| 2 | Pilot's Statement | PDF, 4 pages | View Download |
| 3 | Engine Inspection Report | PDF, 2 pages | View Download |
| 4 | Excerpt Aircraft Logbook | PDF, 11 pages | View Download |
| 5 | Fuel Receipt | PDF, 1 page | View Download |
The same docket at the NTSB · documents without a copy here are fetched from the NTSB when you open them.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.