Beech V35B accident near Novato, California, August 19, 2014
On August 19, 2014 at about 4:30 am local time, a 1976 Beech V35B, registered N1160T, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Novato, California (Gnoss Field). It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 1 person was killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The instrument-rated pilot's decision to conduct a visual approach to the airport in night, instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's loss of situational awareness, the controller's failure to provide clear and concise instructions to the pilot following his declaration of an emergency, and the controller's failure to provide adequate information to the pilot regarding the airplane's proximity to terrain.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- August 19, 2014 · about 4:30 am local time
- Place
- Novato, California · Gnoss Field · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Beech V35B B, built 1976 · all V35Bs on the register
- Registration
- N1160T · no longer on the register · serial D-9928
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
While en route to the destination airport on an instrument flight rules flight plan in dark night conditions, the instrument-rated private pilot declared an emergency, advised the air traffic controller that the engine was losing power, and stated that he needed to divert. The controller first issued instructions to an airport about 20 miles behind the airplane's position, then offered an airport about 14 miles abeam the airplane's position. The pilot initiated a turn to the first airport, then to the second airport, accordingly. During these transmissions, the controller referred to the positions of these airports as "radials" from the airplane, despite the pilot's repeated request for headings. As the airplane maneuvered, it descended from its cruise altitude of 6,000 ft mean sea level (msl) to about 2,000 ft msl. The controller contacted the airplane and stated that it had descended below the minimum vectoring altitude for that area. About a minute later, the pilot stated that the engine had regained power, again asked for a heading to the diversion airport, then stated that he had "lost [the] compass." Over the next 3 minutes, the airplane climbed to about 3,100 ft msl before entering a gradual descent. The controller provided the pilot with vectors, and the pilot asked how far the airplane was from the airport. The controller first provided an incorrect distance of 7 miles, then corrected himself, stating the airplane was 9.7 miles from the airport. Shortly thereafter, the pilot asked whether the airport was under visual meteorological conditions, to which the controller replied, "affirmative." The pilot then stated that he was in the clouds and asked the controller if there were "any hills" between the airplane and the airport. The controller did not answer the pilot's question, but instead provided the current weather conditions at the airport. The last transmission from the accident airplane was the pilot stating, "one thousand feet," followed by a series of microphone clicks, indicating that the pilot may have been attempting to activate the airport's pilot-controlled lighting system. The airplane impacted terrain at an elevation about 700 ft msl about 7 miles from the airport. Examination of the airplane indicated that the landing gear was extended at the time of impact. No mechanical malfunctions or anomalies were identified with the engine, airframe, or gyroscopic flight instruments that would have precluded normal operation; therefore, the investigation was unable to identify the reason for the pilot's reported loss of engine power and "lost compass." It is likely that, following the emergency declaration, the pilot began to shed tasks and became completely dependent on the controller for providing orientation. The inaccurate and varying communications from the controller, including the use of the word "radial" rather than "heading," could have contributed to a loss of situational awareness. Further, had the controller issued a safety alert to the pilot or provided him with the elevation of terrain located between the airplane and the airport, the pilot may have been able to take action to avoid the terrain. Given the radar track of the airplane and the evidence that the landing gear was extended at the time of impact, it is likely that the pilot had configured the airplane for landing and elected to continue the airplane's descent in an attempt to locate the airport. However, despite the automated weather observation indicating the airport was experiencing visual meteorological conditions, witness accounts and additional sources of weather data indicated the presence of heavy fog in the vicinity of the accident site about the time of the accident. It is unlikely that the pilot was able to obtain visual contact with the ground or the airport environment, and descended into terrain as he attempted to do so.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Loss of engine power (partial) during enroute (cruise) defining event
- Flight instrument malf/fail during emergency descent
- Controlled flight into terrain or object (CFIT) during emergency descent
The NTSB's findings
- cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Decision making/judgment › Pilot
- cause Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability › Performance/control parameters › Altitude › Not attained/maintained
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Common phraseology › ATC personnel
- factor Personnel issues › Task performance › Communication (personnel) › Accuracy of communication › ATC personnel
- factor Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena › Light condition › Dark › Effect on personnel
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Navigation system › (general) › Not specified
- Aircraft › Aircraft power plant › Engine (reciprocating) › (general) › Not specified
Pilot
- Certificate: private
- Ratings: single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 650 hours in all; 50 in the last 90 days
- Medical certificate: Class 3
- Seat: left
- Injury: fatal
The aircraft
- Last inspection: annual inspection, May 23, 2014; 2,708 hours since
- Seats: 4
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Continental IO-550-BB (piston); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
The flight
- Departed from: BOK Brookings OR at 2:20 am
- Destination: DVO Novato CA
- Flight plan: IFR
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Temperature: 0°F (-18°C), dew point 0°F (-18°C)
- Observation at 4:15 am from KDVO, 8 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flight crew | 1 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.
