Learjet 35A accident near Dorchester, New Hampshire, December 24, 1996
On December 24, 1996 at about 3:05 pm local time, a Learjet 35A, registered N388LS, was destroyed in an accident near Dorchester, New Hampshire (Lebanon Municipal Airport). It was a positioning flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 2 people were killed. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The captain's failure to maintain situational awareness, which resulted in the airplane being outside the confines of the instrument approach; and the crew's misinterpretation of a step-down fix passage, which resulted in an early descent into rising terrain. Factors included the captain's misreading of the instrument approach procedure, the crew's rushed and incomplete instrument approach briefing, their failure to use additional, available navigational aids, and their failure to account for the winds at altitude.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 5, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 24, 1996 · about 3:05 pm local time
- Place
- Dorchester, New Hampshire · Lebanon Municipal Airport
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 2 people were killed.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Learjet 35A · all 35As on the register
- Registration
- N388LS · no longer on the register · serial 388
- Damage
- Destroyed
- Flight
- Positioning flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The first officer was in the left seat, flying the airplane, and the captain was in the right seat, for the positioning flight. Approaching the destination, the crew briefed, then attempted an ILS RWY 18 approach. The captain reported not receiving the localizer, when, in fact, the airplane was actually about 5 nautical miles to the left of it. Winds at the airport, about that time, were from 190 degrees true, at 5 knots; however, area winds at 6,000 feet were from 220 degrees, in excess of 40 knots. The crew executed a missed approach, but did not follow the missed approach procedures. The captain later requested, and received clearance for, the VOR RWY 25 approach. The captain partially briefed the approach to the first officer as the airplane neared the VOR, then subsequently "talked through" remaining phases of the approach as they occurred. The outbound course for the VOR RWY 25 approach was 066 degrees, and the minimum altitude outbound was 4,300 feet. After passing the VOR, the captain directed the first officer to maintain 4,700 feet. The airplane's last radar contact occurred as the airplane was proceeding outbound, 7 nautical miles northeast of the VOR, at 4,800 feet. As the airplane approached the course reversal portion of the procedure turn, the captain initially directed the first officer to turn the airplane in the wrong direction. When the proper heading was finally given, the airplane had been outbound for about 2 minutes. During the outbound portion of the course reversal, the captain told the first officer to descend the airplane to 2,900 feet, although the procedure called for the airplane to maintain a minimum of 4,300 feet until joining the inbound course to the VOR. During the inbound portion of the course reversal, the captain amended the altitude to 3,000 feet. As the airplane neared the inbound course to the VOR, the captain called out the outer marker. The first officer agreed, and the captain stated that they could descend to 2,300 feet. The first officer then noted that the VOR indications were fluctuating. The captain pointed out the VOR's continued reception, and the first officer noted, "but it's all over the place." Shortly thereafter, the first officer stated that he was descending the airplane to 2,300 feet. Three seconds later, the airplane impacted trees, then terrain. The wreckage was located at the 2,300-foot level, on rising mountainous terrain, 061 degrees magnetic, 12.5 nautical miles from the VOR. It was also 10.3 nautical miles prior to where a descent to 2,300 feet was authorized. There was no evidence that the crew used available DME information. There was also no evidence of pre-impact mechanical malfunction.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 4,250 hours in all; 1,000 in this make and model; 55 in the last 30 days; 3,058 as pilot in command
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 6,897 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, November 26, 1996; 143 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 18,300 lb
- Seats: 0
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: Garrett TFE 731 (turbojet); 0 hours total
- Fire on the ground
- Operator: Aircraft Charter Group, INC.
The flight
- Departed from: BDR Bridgeport CT at 2:19 pm
- Destination: LEB Lebanon NH
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 25, 5,496 ft by 100 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 190° at 5 knots
- Visibility: 5 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 1,200 ft; not recorded
- Temperature: 106°F (41°C), dew point 99°F (37°C)
- Altimeter: 29.00 inHg
- Observation at 1:45 pm from LEB, 17 miles away
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 2 |
Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report
The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.
Everything on this page comes from the NTSB's public records. The narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words; the coded tables behind the report are written out in plain English, with pilots' ages, home towns and medical details left out. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, shown as the NTSB released them. This site's own text never names anyone involved. A preliminary report can change; the final report usually follows one to two years later, and the page is refreshed when it does.